

**10
YEARS
AFTER
THE
FALL
OF
THE WALL**

**Public Opinion in Central
and East European
Countries in Transition**

1989 — 1999

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THE FALL OF THE WALL

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Prepared by:

Dina Smeltz, Chief, Europe
Janice Bell
Nancy Mendrala
Anna Sweeney
Mark Teare

with special thanks to:

Stephen Shaffer
Jim Marshall

Ann Terry Pincus, Director
Stephen M. Shaffer, Deputy Director

Office of Research
Department of State
SA-44, Room 352
301 Fourth Street, S.W.
Washington, DC 20547

Phone: (202) 619-4490

Fax: (202) 619-6977

email: reu@exchange.usia.gov

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Ten years after the fall of communism in central and eastern Europe, publics across the region are struggling to adapt to the new rules of the game. While publics are disappointed by the shortcomings of the reforms undertaken by their countries so far, they remain optimistic for the future and committed to the democratic path they have chosen. Office of Research surveys conducted across six countries – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia – throughout the 1990s offer valuable insights into public expectations and impressions of the political and economic transition.

Deflated Expectations

In the early years of political and economic transition, publics across the region expressed high expectations. Many expected democracy to raise living standards, new freedoms to allow constructive national expression and a truly democratic political system, and a new sense of security through quick admission to NATO and the European Union. However, reversing the effects of communism has proven to be a slow process, with the scale of costs and the length of the recovery not fully anticipated by the average central and east European celebrating the beginning of a new era in 1989.

Although publics across the region support the democratic system, they are critical of how it is working in their countries and its responsiveness to people's needs. Central and east Europeans are cynical about their politicians' interests and perceive widespread corruption, not just among government officials but also in the health care system, the judicial system, and in the business sector. Although publics now enjoy political freedoms without public surveillance and repression, the democratic process itself has been tarnished by corruption scandals, increasing crime rates and ethnically-motivated violence. Some are nostalgic for the employment and living standard guarantees of the former political system. Still, most continue to believe that democracy is the best system of government for their country.

A European Economic Model

Publics expected major and immediate economic benefits from democratization. Although economic liberalization brought a fairly quick end to shortages, the transition led to an economic recession that in some countries is only now easing. Most in these countries say the economic changes have had an adverse impact on living standards in their household and in their country at large, and say they are concerned about unemployment and low wages. For these reasons, many central and east Europeans are ambivalent about a free market economy, privatization and foreign investment. They favor a west European-style social market economy (in contrast to a more American model), with a strong role for the state in the provision of social services and ownership of most large firms.

Legacies of Past Experience

As there was no one road to socialism, so too, these countries have taken different transition paths. Historical experiences with democracy, civic activism and economic experimentation helped place the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in leading positions, allowing them to achieve a greater degree of economic recovery and political stability. The publics in these countries tend to have more confidence in their governments, are less negative toward the economy, and have greater confidence

in international institutions. By contrast, Bulgarians, Slovaks and Romanians who were worse off economically and had less of a democratic tradition, have had a rockier time, and attitudes in these countries tend to reflect the disappointment and frustration with the current situation and the events of the past ten years.

New Divisions

Within these transition societies, there are new material and attitudinal divisions between the “winners” and “losers.” Those who are generally better able to adapt to and compete in the new system – especially the young, educated and urban – are more supportive of the new ways. Those who have had a more difficult time – especially those who are older, less educated and live in rural areas – are more likely to express nostalgia for the security of the previous system.

International Membership with Costs

Few in central and eastern Europe see security concerns as a top priority, yet in some ways the integration of post-communist countries into western institutions has progressed further in this area than in either the political or economic spheres. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have been NATO members for almost a year, and Bulgaria, Slovakia and Romania are members of the Partnership for Peace. Most publics in the east want to join both NATO and the European Union, but integration into western institutions requires money and making difficult political decisions. Joining NATO means having to improve equipment and undertake unpopular responsibilities, while negotiating with the EU requires making tough economic reforms. Obligations of membership may require government policies at odds with popular opinion, as highlighted during the recent military action in Kosovo.

Ethnic Tolerance One Such Membership Requirement

International organizations have demanded that aspiring members resolve ethnic border disputes and assure equal protection for ethnic minorities. Yet hostile ethnic relations reflect historical tensions as much as current dynamics. During the communist era, ethnic or national aspirations and imagery were often either suppressed (usually in the case of minorities) or (for the ethnic majority) exploited to legitimize the goals of the communist hierarchy. After the fall of the one-party state, the tensions between majority and minority groups could be freely expressed. Although ethnic problems remain and are likely to persist, there are signs that traditional suspicions and disputes are easing and opinion of some ethnic minorities is improving. Majorities in each of these countries support the idea of multiethnic societies in principle, and only minorities express strongly nationalist views; even fewer actually vote for nationalist parties.

1. DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION


After a century marked by military coups, communist takeovers, political repression, devastating wars, and economic disasters, central and eastern Europe enters the twenty-first century with a real opportunity to build a free and prosperous future. The transition to democracy has been made difficult by impediments – including economic recession and restructuring, political rivalries between post-communists and former dissidents, and inter-ethnic tensions – and the path ahead will not be easy.

1.1 Democracy Remains a Work In Progress

The current state of democracy in the region is in part a reflection of various political experiences prior to World War II, ranging from parliamentary rule, to dictatorship – including military coups – and constitutional monarchies. Only Czechoslovakia had a functioning democracy through the interwar years.

After the devastation of WWII, most of central and eastern Europe attempted to return to democracy, but between 1946 and 1949, communist regimes succeeded in imposing Soviet-type systems on these countries. The political systems in the Soviet bloc were highly repressive, as reflected in the Freedom House ratings of political freedom shown in Figure 1 for each year since 1973. The Freedom House indicators categorize the world's countries as “free,” “partly free,” or “not free,” with 1 being the

Figure 1: Freedom House Annual Survey of Freedom Scores



Source: Freedom House

most free societies and 8 the least free. The score is based on two indices, which gauge political rights and civil liberties. Figure 1 shows how Poland and Hungary made some minor gains in freedom in the late 1980s, while the more repressive regimes in Bulgaria, Romania, East Germany and Czechoslovakia collapsed almost instantaneously in 1990.

The progress of democracy also reflects the varying development of civil society and levels of dissent in the 1970s and 1980s. The dissident movement in Poland united workers and intellectuals under KOR in the 1970s and Solidarity in the 1980s; the imposition of martial law in December 1981 proved only a temporary setback in the inexorable rise in public support for political change. The Hungarian uprising of 1956 laid the groundwork for the 1989 protests. Hungary was the first country in the Soviet bloc to allow real party competition (in February 1989), and it generated an active trade union movement opposed to the communist regime. Furthermore, Hungary's decision to open its border with Austria in May 1989 fomented the fall of the Berlin Wall and made the process of change irreversible. The Czechoslovak dissident movement, set back by the crackdown on the 1968 Prague Spring, reemerged in the Charter 77 movement and in the 1989 formation of Civic Forum in the Czech lands and Public against Violence in Slovakia. Romanians, of course, lived under Ceaucescu's repressive regime; the sudden collapse was driven from above, with the open letter issued by six key Party officials in March 1989 being a critical turning point. The opposition in Bulgaria did not effectively mobilize until the Ecoglasnost movement and the Podkrepa independent trade union seized the initiative in the late 1980s. An environmental conference in October 1989 turned into a focus for protest against the regime.

The process of change also varied across the region. In Poland and Hungary, the Party had made a few concessions before 1989, while in other countries (like Romania and Czechoslovakia) the socialist regime attempted to maintain social control to the moment of collapse. The pace at which these countries liberalized also varied. East Germans underwent a complete political reversal between 1990-91; most other countries in the region also made decisive breaks with the past. In this regard, these transitions echo earlier ones made in Greece, Spain and Portugal (Figure 1). Only in Romania was the revolution accompanied by violence; it subsequently democratized more slowly, although a change in government in 1997 brought about a sudden improvement. Now, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are considered as free as most European Union countries, with Bulgaria, Slovakia and Romania close behind.


Many See Country as Still on the Way Toward Democracy

Despite the dramatic changes in government and the political system, publics across the region believe their country is becoming a democracy (Figure 2, next page). Only about one in ten believes that their country already is a democracy. Two in ten or fewer doubt that their country will ever become a democracy.

"I would say that we are going through a stage in which we try to reach real democracy. I would say that what we are living right now is not a democratic stage."

– Romanian focus group participant, January 1999

Figure 2: Progress Toward Democracy




Many Are Disappointed With Transition

Although there is a general sense that building a democracy takes time, many central and east Europeans express disappointment with the course of political transition to date. About three-quarters or more in all six countries agree with the statement: "I thought that democracy would be better than it has turned out to be." Since the early transition period, this disappointment has grown noticeably in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and modestly in Poland; the Hungarian and Bulgarian publics have been largely skeptical from the beginning (Table A-1). Reasons for disappointment appear to relate to the length of time it has taken to carry out basic reforms, the fact that benefits of democracy (especially economic ones) have not met expectations, and also because of the rise of crime and concerns for personal safety. Moreover, 1998 surveys found that majorities in Bulgaria (68%), the Czech Republic (73%), Hungary (57%), Poland (55%) and Slovakia (67%) believe that "regardless of which party is in power, the country is governed poorly." Romanians were closely divided when asked the same question in 1997 (Table A-2).

Economic Difficulties Complicate Political Environment; Many Say Life Has Gotten Worse

These critical views likely reflect not only disappointment with government performance, but also with the economic difficulties of transition. Majorities of six in ten or more in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia say that "life in general" tends to be *worse* today than it was under communism; only about one-quarter to one-third say that things tend to be *better* now than before (Figure 3). Opinions are evenly divided in the Czech Republic and Poland. Only in Poland has the public become significantly more positive toward post-communist life since the early 1990s. In Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia, more now than in 1992 say that life in general is *worse* now than it was under communism. Hungarians' views have changed little since 1992.

Figure 3: Life In General Compared To Communist Era



Majorities Critical of Transition's Effects

Consistent with central and east Europeans' tendency to compare life in general today unfavorably to that under communism, these publics tend to see the post-communist transition as having had a negative effect on a number of aspects of life in their country. Majorities (often large ones) in these six central and east European countries say that "the changes that have taken place since 1989" have had a "bad effect" on law and order, interpersonal relationships, people's happiness and the standard of living (Table 1). These views have changed little since the early 1990s. With the collapse of socialism, public surveillance and repression were abolished, but the level of personal and political freedom also manifested itself in negative consequences, including increased street crime, prostitution and pornography, and ethnically-motivated violence.

Table 1: Impact of Transition

(1991-1993) Have the changes that have taken place since 1989 had a good or a bad effect on our country's:
(1999) Have the changes that have taken place over the past ten years had a good or a bad effect on:

	Bulgaria		Czech Rep.		Hungary		Poland		Romania		Slovakia	
	1991	1999	1991	1999	1993	1999	1993	1999	n/a	1999	1991	1999
Law and order												
Good effect	12%	19%	13%	20%	33%	25%	30%	28%	—	31%	13%	25%
Bad effect	69	73	83	77	55	68	59	63	—	60	78	68
Don't know	19	8	5	4	13	7	11	9	—	9	9	7
How well people get along with each other												
Good effect	24	17	18	21	15	15	18	20	—	26	16	11
Bad effect	58	72	69	73	76	79	70	71	—	65	77	86
Don't know	19	11	13	6	10	6	12	9	—	9	7	4
People's happiness												
Good effect	17	13	25	26	8	13	13	28	—	20	11	13
Bad effect	47	71	53	58	83	77	74	57	—	71	72	78
Don't know	37	15	23	16	9	10	14	15	—	9	17	9
Standard of living												
Good effect	12	17	14	41	6	16	14	38	—	20	7	13
Bad effect	71	74	79	53	91	80	79	51	—	75	89	84
Don't know	17	9	7	6	4	4	7	11	—	5	4	4

Office of Research Surveys: 1991-1999

The most notable increases in the percentages seeing "good effects" in any of these areas are in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – the three central and east European countries currently members of the OECD and NATO. Sizable pluralities in the Czech Republic (41%) and Poland (38%) now say that the standard of living has improved, up from 14 percent in each country earlier in the decade. In Hungary, more now (16%) than in 1993 (6%) say that the changes have had a "good effect" on the standard of living, although most (80%) continue to hold a negative opinion. In addition, Hungarians and Poles have become somewhat more positive in their assessment of the transitions' effects on people's happiness.

As time passes, publics are better able to assess the impact of transition. Across central and eastern Europe, fewer now say they “don’t know” than in 1992-1993, indicating a crystallization of the public’s conception of reform as being either costly or advantageous for themselves personally.

Despite Problems, Most Do Not Want To Return To Old System

Despite dissatisfaction with some aspects of the transition, half or more reject returning to the previous system. In the Czech Republic (69%), Romania (59%), Poland (56%), Hungary (56%), Slovakia (53%) and Bulgaria (51%), one in two prefer “to go on with more changes” rather than to reverse the course of reform (Table A-3). Only about a third in each country would prefer “to return to the security of the old system.” Czechs and Slovaks are somewhat more inclined now than they were in 1993 to want to turn back the clock, while Hungarians have been increasingly favorable toward further change. Poles’ and Bulgarians’ opinions have fluctuated modestly over recent years. Majorities in Romania (71%), Hungary (66%), the Czech Republic (62%), Poland (58%), Slovakia (58%) and Bulgaria (54%) also agree that “whatever the problems that democracy brings, it’s the best system of government for us” (Table A-4).

Discontent with politics is more likely to be expressed through a struggle over the redistribution of resources rather than a rejection of democracy. The smooth functioning of elections and power transfers in each country over the past decade, the solidification of support for centrist rather than radical parties, and the apparent link between attitudes toward the quality of life now versus before 1989 and short-term fluctuations in indicators such as GDP growth all provide additional support for this conclusion.


1.2 Public Expresses Differing Definitions of the Democratic Ideal

Central and East Europeans Judge Democracy on Economic Grounds

Central and east European publics embraced democracy with high hopes, including the hope that democracy would bring economic prosperity. Office of Research surveys suggest that central and east Europeans generally tend to define the benefits of democracy differently than do west Europeans. While a concept of democracy based on *political* liberties is more dominant in western European countries, one centered on *economic* benefits is more dominant in central and eastern countries.

Asked to choose which of six characteristics “is the most important in a democracy,” majorities in all six central and east European countries surveyed picked one of the economic elements: economic prosperity, guarantees of basic needs or economic equality (Figure 4 and Table A-5).

This association of political legitimacy with economic performance can be attributed to the relatively lower income levels in the region compared to European Union countries. It can also be linked to a holdover in attitudes from the socialist



system; in the 1970s and 1980s, these governments' legitimacy became increasingly tied to their ability (or inability) to provide the scarce consumer goods needed to meet their promises of better material living standards. The bottom line, however, is that levels of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the political system continue to be closely linked to the government's ability to deliver improved economic welfare.

Justice for All Seen as Key to a Functioning Democracy

While central and east Europeans tend to place greater emphasis overall on the economic aspects of democracy, majorities do think that individual political elements are important or even essential elements of a democracy (Table 2). Overwhelming majorities (78-84%) in Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic – and two-thirds in Poland and Romania – feel that a system of

Table 2: Meanings of Democracy

People associate democracy with diverse meanings such as those on this card [SHOW CARD]. For each of these, please tell me whether you think it is essential, important but not essential, not very important, or not important at all for a society to be called a democracy.

	Bulgaria	Czech Rep.	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
At least two strong political parties competing in elections						
Essential	47%	40%	39%	32%	34%	33%
Important but not essential	34	34	30	43	40	40
Not very important	8	15	16	12	11	17
Not important at all	4	6	11	3	5	6
Don't know	9	5	4	10	10	4
A government that guarantees economic equality among its citizens						
Essential	44	44	54	42	43	57
Important but not essential	35	31	34	37	38	29
Not very important	12	14	8	11	8	9
Not important at all	4	8	2	5	3	3
Don't know	4	3	3	5	8	2
A system of justice that treats everyone equally						
Essential	84	79	78	69	66	78
Important but not essential	13	16	18	22	26	17
Not very important	1	3	2	4	3	3
Not important at all	–	1	–	1	1	1
Don't know	2	2	2	5	5	2
Freedom to criticize the government						
Essential	49	31	41	44	37	32
Important but not essential	33	34	36	38	39	39
Not very important	10	24	16	11	14	20
Not important at all	2	9	5	2	3	6
Don't know	6	2	3	6	8	3
A government that guarantees basic economic needs for all citizens						
Essential	66	59	75	61	53	71
Important but not essential	28	29	22	29	36	22
Not very important	3	8	2	5	4	3
Not important at all	1	2	–	1	1	1
Don't know	3	2	2	5	6	3
Economic prosperity in the country						
Essential	76	70	77	71	64	77
Important but not essential	20	23	20	22	30	19
Not very important	1	4	2	2	1	2
Not important at all	–	1	–	1	–	1
Don't know	3	1	1	4	5	2

Office of Research Surveys: 1999

justice that treats everyone equally is an “essential” component of democracy. In addition, all six publics view multiparty elections and the freedom to criticize the government as at least “important” if not “essential.” For the most part, central and east Europeans’ views of these components of democracy have shifted little over the last 10 years (Tables A-6 and A-7). There is a very modest decrease in the numbers who see strong, competing parties as “essential,” and a slight increase in emphasis on economic issues.

When asked to choose whether political or economic development should receive higher priority, majorities of about six in ten in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia select “economic prosperity” over the “freedom to speak and act freely,” as do narrow pluralities in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (Table A-8). Similarly, half or more across the region say “economic equality” is more important for democracy than “political liberties like freedom of speech;” in the early 1990s, most publics were more closely divided between these two options (Tables A-9 and A-10). The exception is the Czech Republic, which has shifted from a slightly greater emphasis on political issues to a more equal evaluation of political and economic elements of democracy.

Publics in Key West European Countries Tend to View Democracy in Political Terms

West European publics are more likely than those in central and eastern Europe to describe democracy in political rather than economic terms (Figure 5 and Table A-11). Yet, sizeable minorities in Britain and Germany, and half in Italy and France describe democracy in economic terms.

Large majorities of these west European publics feel that a fair system of justice is *essential* to a democracy, and that freedom to criticize the government and multiparty elections are more *important*, but not *essential* – similar to publics in the east (Table 3, next page). Only in Britain do a clear majority think that multiparty elections and freedom to criticize the government are *essential* to a democracy. Compared to 1992, the British public’s views are essentially the same. Perhaps a reflection of recent economic difficulties, however, the French and Italians have become less likely to say each of these elements is “essential,” and Germans now emphasize political aspects of democracy less and economic prosperity more.

Figure 5: The Most Important Element of a Democracy




Table 3: Meanings of Democracy

People associate democracy with diverse meanings such as those on this card [SHOW CARD]. For each of these, please tell me whether you think it is essential, important but not essential, not very important, or not important at all for a society to be called a democracy.

	Britain		France		Germany		Italy	
	1992	1999	1992	1999	1992	1999	1992	1999
At least two strong political parties competing in elections								
Essential	61%	59%	62%	52%	76%	50%	43%	25%
Important but not essential	26	27	24	32	18	31	33	42
Not very important	9	7	6	10	5	8	12	19
Not important at all	1	4	5	5	1	3	6	9
Don't know	3	3	3	2	1	7	6	5
A government that guarantees economic equality among its citizens								
Essential	45	47	63	58	43	47	52	32
Important but not essential	39	38	29	33	39	35	31	47
Not very important	9	9	4	6	13	9	9	12
Not important at all	4	3	1	2	4	3	5	6
Don't know	4	4	3	2	2	5	3	4
A system of justice that treats everyone equally								
Essential	78	83	87	79	86	75	85	63
Important but not essential	18	13	10	18	12	17	11	32
Not very important	2	1	2	2	1	3	2	3
Not important at all	1	1	—	1	—	1	1	1
Don't know	1	2	1	1	1	4	2	2
Freedom to criticize the government								
Essential	74	74	66	53	73	54	51	27
Important but not essential	21	21	25	33	22	34	36	48
Not very important	3	2	7	10	3	8	9	16
Not important at all	—	1	1	3	1	1	2	5
Don't know	2	2	1	1	1	4	3	4
A government that guarantees basic economic needs for all citizens								
Essential	63	65	75	65	68	61	66	47
Important but not essential	29	30	22	29	28	29	27	45
Not very important	4	3	1	4	2	4	4	5
Not important at all	—	1	—	1	1	1	1	—
Don't know	3	2	2	1	1	4	3	3
Economic prosperity in the country								
Essential	59	57	67	55	39	53	60	31
Important but not essential	33	34	27	37	49	36	34	54
Not very important	5	4	3	6	9	6	3	10
Not important at all	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Don't know	3	4	2	1	1	4	2	4

Office of Research Surveys: 1992-1999


Guaranteeing Basic Needs More Important Than Providing Opportunities

While publics east and west tend to emphasize different aspects of democracy, people in both regions believe the state has an obligation to provide a basic level of existence for its citizens. Reflecting a strong preference for a welfare state, majorities in Britain, France and Germany, and half in Italy say that a government that provides for basic economic needs is *essential* to a democracy (Table 3). And at least half in each country, including those in western Europe, say that it is more important for the

government to ensure people's basic needs are met than to provide opportunities to get ahead (Figure 6). In fact, publics in Italy and Britain, along with those in Hungary and Romania, feel quite strongly that the government has an obligation to provide for basic needs. In Poland and France, views are more evenly divided on which should be the government's priority.


Publics Diverge Over How Well the Current Political System Compares to Communism
After the early euphoria of casting off the former regime, central and east Europeans soon realized that economic and political transition would be longer and more difficult than many initially expected. The depth of the economic recession as well as political scandals and in-fighting caused some to lose confidence in the emerging democratic institutions and system.

Figure 6: Which is more important for government to do: provide opportunities to get ahead or meet basic needs?



Over the past seven years, there has been an overall decline in these publics' evaluation of the current political system compared to that under communism (Figure 7). In 1992, two-thirds in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Romania said that the political system was better than under communism, as did about half in Bulgaria, Slovakia and Hungary. Between 1992 and 1995, there was a general decline in the percentages positive toward the present system. Since then, Hungarians have become more positive, Slovaks, Bulgarians, Czechs and Poles show little change, and Romanians have

Figure 7: Political System Better Than Under Communism
Percentage saying "Better"



become more negative. At present, majorities in the Czech Republic (55% better vs. 35% worse) and Poland (59% vs. 28%), and pluralities in Bulgaria (47% vs. 36%) and Romania (50% vs. 39%) say the present system is *better*, while pluralities in Hungary (42% vs. 47%) and Slovakia (41% vs. 53%) see the current system as *worse*. While there has been some fluctuation over the years, Czechs, Poles and Romanians have tended to compare their current political systems more favorably to the communist era than have Hungarians, Slovaks and Bulgarians (Table A-12).

Many Value Strong Leadership Over Freedom

Rejection of a return to communism may not preclude some from favoring a more authoritarian form of government, perhaps as a response to the feeling that some people take unfair advantage of these new freedoms, or that their own needs are being overlooked. Although these views have become less strongly held over time, substantial numbers say they would support a system which delivers greater security, even if it meant individuals' freedom could be curtailed – perhaps reflecting concern about the poor state of the economy or one's own finances. Majorities in Romania (64% agree vs. 30% disagree) and Hungary (56% vs. 38%), and pluralities in Poland (50% vs. 41%) and Bulgaria (50% vs. 37%) agree that “if we could find a strong leader who we thought could solve our country's problems, I wouldn't care if that leader took away many of the political freedoms we've gained since the fall of communism.” In Slovakia, the public divides more evenly: 49 percent disagreeing, 43 percent agreeing. Only in the Czech Republic do a majority (56%) oppose the trade-off; 40 percent, however, would accept it (Tables A-13 to A-15). Majorities in all six countries would prefer that governments focus on maintaining order rather than on protecting political rights and freedoms (Table A-16).

Across the region, those who would back a strong leader tend to be – as expected – poorer, older, and more negative about the impact of transition on the political system, the economy, and life in general (but only slightly more likely than the average to criticize transition's impact on law and order). Those in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia who favor a strong leader also would prefer to return to socialism's security. In Bulgaria and Slovakia, those who favor a strong leader are more apt to doubt whether democracy is the best system for their country and also tend to favor the former communist parties.

1.3 Democratic Political Institutions Fail to Inspire Public Confidence

For the most part, confidence in public institutions – particularly government bodies – is relatively low across central and eastern Europe, and has been declining since the post-communism “honeymoon” period of the early 1990s. In part, this may reflect the fact that most of these institutions have been either newly created as part of democratization (e.g. the Senate in the Czech Republic and Poland) or have been modified from their communist era or earlier counterparts (e.g. implementing civilian control of the armed forces, restructuring economic ministries, former communist parties as in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic). These institutional structures have much shorter track records and shallower roots than most of their counterparts in western Europe. But in terms of the confidence they currently command, political institutions in the post-communist countries do not differ substantially from those in the western democracies. Public opinion surveys and other social indicators in the United States, Canada and throughout western

Europe have marked a similar decline in popular esteem of political institutions in recent decades.¹ Across Europe, a pattern of relatively deep – and perhaps healthy – skepticism about governmental institutions and the political process appears to dominate public attitudes.

Confidence in National Governments Remains Limited

Looking across central and eastern Europe, only in Hungary do a majority of people express confidence in their own national government, and even this is a recent development (Table A-17). Currently, a bare majority of Hungarians (55%) say that they have at least a fair amount of confidence in the national government, while substantial majorities in Romania (78%), the Czech Republic (77%), Poland (70%) and Slovakia (64%) register little or no confidence. In Bulgaria, somewhat more lack (53%) than have (44%) confidence. In a related question, over the last few years an increasing percentage of Bulgarians (currently 57%) say that “one can rely on the government to do the right thing,” while the percentage holding this view has been declining in the Czech Republic (now 27%), Poland (33%) and Slovakia (37%). Hungarian opinion has been somewhat more volatile since 1996 (38% now) (Table A-18). By comparison, about half in Britain, France and Germany agree with this statement. In Italy, one a third agree (Table A-19).

“...[T]he government’s incompetence – during the parliamentary meeting they were walking around, reading the newspapers, they were sleeping, they were laughing, as if they were watching a play.”

– Romanian focus group participant, January 1999

“I would like to mention here the lack of cooperation between various political groups. There is rather talk of the past, but no one is concerned about the future and lots of time is wasted on past issues, particularly in such a partisan Sejm.”

– Polish focus group participant, January 1999

Another dynamic at work in some countries is a short-lived upturn in confidence in the national government immediately after elections, most visibly in Hungary in 1994 and in 1997, and in Bulgaria after the 1997 election of President Stoyanov. Polls taken in Romania at the end of the first year of the Democratic Convention coalition government showed higher than average support for the national government, although this increase was not sustained. But new governments do not always prompt an increase in confidence. In Poland, the 1997 parliamentary vote did not result in a rise as the 1993 election did. Likewise, the Slovak electorate’s confidence was relatively unaffected by the 1998 election which put Meciar out of office.

Publics Say They Have Limited Influence on Politics, But Few Are Actively Engaged

Many central and east Europeans appear to recognize that the average citizen has an important role to play in democratic politics. In recent years, majorities in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia have agreed that “citizens’ involvement in political life is an integral part of democratic solutions of political problems” (Table A-20); other publics were more closely divided. Across the region, majorities of eight in ten or more in each country report having participated in national and local elections (Table 4, next page).

¹ See World Values Survey results presented in R. Putnam, S. Pharr, and R. Dalton, 2000, *What Is Troubling the Trilateral Democracies?*, Princeton: Princeton University Press. See also summary article “Is there a crisis?”, *The Economist*, July 17, 1999, pp. 49-50.

However, participation extends little beyond voting, and other forms of civic participation are much less common. Except in Hungary, relatively small minorities claim to have signed a petition, taken part in a demonstration, run for public office at any level or joined an organization or club. In addition, more than half the public in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania have repeatedly expressed little or no interest in politics; about half in Bulgaria and Slovakia indicated at least a fair amount of interest in politics (Table A-21).

Table 4: Participation in Civic Activities						
	Bulgaria	Czech Rep.	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
Voted in national election	90%	82%	84%	82%	89%	93%
Voted in local election	89	75	80	78	84	86
Signed petition to register party or candidate	5	7	59	15	3	21
Taken part in a public demonstration	17	11	4	6	10	7
Run for public office at any level	2	3	2	3	18	2
Joined an organization or club	6	12	8	9	7	9

Office of Research Surveys: 1999

This limited involvement in politics apart from voting may be associated with the widespread public perception that citizens have little impact upon governmental decision-making. In all six countries surveyed between 1996 and 1998, majorities (in many cases, overwhelming ones) said that people like themselves can *rarely* or *never* “have some effect on the way political decisions are made” by either the national or local governments (Tables A-22 and A-23). Central and east European publics have consistently faulted both levels of government for their lack of responsiveness to the public throughout the post-transition era. Publics also appear cynical toward politicians: only about one in ten in the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia says that politicians care about the problems of the average citizen. Majorities across the region *disagree* that “since 1989, our leading politicians have always had good intentions.” Despite this, majorities in Hungary and Romania tend to believe that “it’s best to leave politics to elected officials;” Bulgarians are closely divided and Poles, Czechs and Slovaks are opposed (Table A-20).

“Since you are talking about democracy, you have to start with the fact that people are the base, that’s what the word democracy is derived from...So, why is half of Poland on strike and nobody listens to them?”


– Polish focus group participant, January 1999

Esteem for Many Other Public Institutions Remains Low

With some notable exceptions, public skepticism toward national governments resonates with similar doubts about other major political and social institutions (Figure 8, next page). Large majorities in all of these countries except Hungary also lack confidence in their national parliament (Table A-24); views are more variable toward local government (Table A-25).

Trust in the rule of law is weak, as evidenced by the fact that solid majorities in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Slovakia lack confidence in the courts and judicial system. Hungary again is the exception: a majority (58%) voice confidence in the courts (Table A-26). Moreover, half or more in each country doubt that the judicial system would find them innocent if they “were

Figure 8: Average Level of Confidence in Institutions by Country



wrongly accused of a crime” (Table A-27); attitudes are similar in western Europe, but this is not necessarily a good sign. Publics in these transition countries diverge, however, in their views of the police. Majorities of Czechs, Hungarians and Slovaks lack confidence in their police forces, while public opinion is closely divided in Bulgaria, Romania and Poland (Table A-28).

Uniform Confidence in National Armed Forces

Relative to other major governmental institutions, armies are viewed favorably in most of these countries. This may be partly based in the fact that armies have generally remained politically neutral and involved in relatively few scandals during the past decade. Majorities in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia have confidence in their national army, while about half in the Czech Republic do not. Participation in the 1999 NATO action in the Balkans appears to have had some impact on public opinion of the army in the three new NATO member-states. Between 1998 and 1999, Czechs and Poles became more favorable toward their armies while Hungarian views held steady (Table A-29).

Opinions are mixed toward the dominant church in each country. Half or more in Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Bulgaria express confidence in “the church,” but majorities in the Czech Republic and Hungary do not (Table A-30). In addition, frequency of church attendance varies widely. In 1999, only one in ten Czechs (11%), Bulgarians (11%) or Hungarians (13%) reports attending services at least once a month; four in ten Slovaks (42%) and Romanians (44%) say they observe this frequently. By contrast, three in four Poles (75%) say they attend church at least once a month. Compared to the first months of 1990, church attendance is little changed in Poland (83% in Spring 1990), Slovakia (46%) or the Czech Republic (14%).

Publics Split Over Views of Media

The media in central and eastern Europe has burst forth in the post-communist era, although under varying legal and financial constraints. Half or more in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania express confidence in the domestic media, while Slovaks are evenly divided between those

with and without confidence (Table 5). Opinions are somewhat closely divided with reference to the foreign media: pluralities in the Czech Republic and Poland have confidence in media sources originating in other countries while about half in Romania and Slovakia do not. Asked their opinions of the “mass media,” Bulgarians are evenly split between those who have confidence and those who lack confidence.

		Table 5: Confidence in the Media					
		Bulgaria	Czech Rep.	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
Domestic	Confident	–	60%	62%	60%	52%	49%
	Not confident	–	40	36	32	42	49
Foreign	Confident	–	48%	–	53%	26%	40%
	Not confident	–	37	–	43	48	51
Mass media	Confident	47%	–	–	–	–	–
	Not confident	44	–	–	–	–	–
Freedom House indicators		Partly free	Free	Free	Free	Partly free	Free
(100 = not free)		39	20	28	25	44	30

Office of Research Surveys: 1999; Freedom House: 1999

This rather mixed public opinion of the media may reflect similar perceptions of the media’s accuracy. Publics in countries with the freest media according to the Freedom House indicators – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – also have more confidence. Publics in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia are less confident, which may reflect tighter restrictions now (Bulgaria and Romania) or in the recent past (Slovakia).

Asked in 1998 how frequently the media in their country “report the truth about political and national issues,” publics in the Czech Republic, Poland and Romania were divided about evenly between those saying “always” or “often” and those who said the media “only sometimes” or “never” report the truth. In Hungary, a majority expressed confidence in the media’s accuracy while a majority in Bulgaria doubted it.

Corruption Is Seen As Pervasive

Confidence in national institutions is limited not only because of politicians’ perceived lack of responsiveness to the public’s needs and wants, but also because of perceptions of widespread corruption. Averaging responses from all six publics (Figure 9, next page), a majority think that corruption is widespread in the *government/state administration* and half think it is widespread in *parliament*. Relatively fewer view *municipal government* as tainted. Higher levels of confidence in the army correspond with low levels of perceived corruption: the *army* is on average considered the least corrupt national institution.

“...The worse thing that was done during the communist regime was that it has taught us to steal and lie and not to work.”


– Romanian focus group participant, January 1999

“I think that corruption also existed before ‘89, but now it is more spoken about, it is more open.”

“Now journalists reach places that they couldn’t before, so that’s how we know [about corruption], before it was impossible.”

– Polish focus group participants, January 1999

Figure 9: Average Perception of Corruption



Publics also perceive extensive corruption in law-making and law-enforcing institutions. On average, two-thirds think *lawyers* are mostly corrupt and about six in ten think corruption among *police* and in the *judiciary* is widespread. As mentioned earlier, half or more in each country do not believe that were they wrongly accused of a crime, their judicial system would find them innocent.

The business community is considered corrupt as well. About two-thirds think that corruption in *business* and *privatization agencies* is widespread. However, there is more faith in *banks* especially in Poland and to a lesser degree in Slovakia and Hungary (a third in Bulgaria say they don't know). Outside of government and business, in an area where many have had direct experience, *hospitals* are considered one of the most corrupt institutions in these societies. Solid majorities in each country believe that most or all hospitals and doctors are engaged in corrupt activities. *Universities*, however, are seen as relatively corruption-free, as are non-governmental organizations, or *NGOs* (although this score is low, in part, because sizable minorities are unable to estimate the extent of corruption among NGOs).

But Corruption Is Not Seen As Inevitable

Despite perceptions that many organizations in their societies are corrupt to a certain extent, publics do not appear resigned to this situation. Relatively few across central and eastern Europe, about two in ten, believe that the spread of corruption in their countries *cannot be confined* (Table 6, next page). Large majorities think it can be either *limited to a certain extent* or *substantially reduced*. However, very few think it can be *completely eradicated*, suggesting publics have realistic expectations.

Table 6: Potential for Cleanup of Corruption						
	Bulgaria	Czech Rep.	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
The spread of corruption cannot be confined	8%	15%	23%	15%	19%	20%
Corruption will exist, yet it can be limited to a degree	46	57	54	50	43	53
Corruption can be substantially reduced	31	23	17	25	18	23
Corruption in [Survey Country] can be eliminated	6	3	3	8	12	3

Office of Research Surveys: 1999

Asked which organization would be most effective in curbing corruption in their country, government is most commonly named, with many also naming the judiciary, parliament and police. Sizable numbers say that citizens themselves would be most effective at curbing corruption. Very few mention NGOs or the media, despite the fact that the media can and has in many countries been active in exposing corruption.

Many Also Lack Trust in People

In addition to perceiving that many institutions are corrupt, central and east Europeans appear to be concerned that people are untrustworthy. Recent surveys show large majorities in these transition countries expressed the view that “you can’t be too careful in dealing with people,” while typically only one-quarter agree that “most people can be trusted.” However, these publics tended to assess the honesty of their fellow citizens somewhat less negatively when they were asked in the early- to mid-1990s to *agree* or *disagree* that “most people can be trusted” (Tables A-31 and A-32).

“I think that something has changed, that some customs are more savage...people are less ashamed of taking bribes.”

– Polish focus group participant, January 1999

Little Tolerance of Illicit Behaviors

Interestingly, Office of Research surveys show that central and east Europeans are fairly similar to west Europeans in their tolerance of certain illicit behaviors (Table 7, next page). Large majorities in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania say that accepting a bribe, buying stolen goods, claiming benefits which one is not entitled to, and not paying all one’s taxes are *never* justified; Czechs and Slovaks are closely divided over whether each of these behaviors is sometimes or never justified. Majorities in Bulgaria, Poland and Romania also say that it is *never* justified for employees to use company equipment or supplies for work outside the company, but the Czech, Slovak and Hungarian publics are all inclined to tolerate this behavior. Views in key west European countries are similar, with most disapproving of taking bribes and buying stolen goods. The French, and to a lesser extent Germans, are somewhat more likely to say falsely claiming benefits and tax evasion can be justified. Half of the French also say using an employer’s equipment for outside is work can sometimes be justified.

Table 7: Personal Approval of Illicit Behaviors


	Bulgaria	Czech Rep.	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia	Britain	France	Germany	Italy
Accepting a bribe in the course of a person's duties										
Sometimes justified	10%	18%	15%	13%	10%	24%	10%	25%	17%	12%
Never justified	86	81	84	86	85	75	89	72	79	86
Buying something a person knows was stolen										
Sometimes justified	20%	31%	26%	19%	12%	40%	17%	30%	22%	23%
Never justified	76	67	72	80	81	58	82	68	74	74
Claiming benefits which one is not entitled to										
Sometimes justified	21%	49%	21%	29%	22%	51%	17%	38%	37%	27%
Never justified	72	48	78	69	73	45	81	59	58	68
Not paying one's taxes										
Sometimes justified	26%	44%	32%	29%	24%	47%	26%	49%	43%	33%
Never justified	70	55	66	68	73	52	73	50	53	65
Using the company's equipment or supplies for work outside the company										
Sometimes justified	20%	58%	52%	38%	19%	59%	44%	53%	40%	33%
Never justified	75	38	47	59	77	38	56	44	54	63

Office of Research Surveys: 1999

Czechs and Slovaks Diverge on Democracy

In December 1992, on the eve of the split of Czechoslovakia, publics in both the Czech and Slovak Republics were more unhappy (57% Czechs, 53% Slovaks) than happy (33% Czechs, 38% Slovaks) about the division. Furthermore, both publics felt that the split was due to politicians' actions rather than the public's wishes. Seven in ten Czechs blamed Slovak politicians for the split, while four in ten Slovaks blamed Czech politicians, three in ten Slovak politicians, and one-quarter blamed politicians in both republics. Also, Slovaks thought the split would leave them worse off (55%, 30% better off), while six in ten Czechs thought they would be better off (four in ten worse off).

From this rather shaky start for each republic's democracy, publics in both countries have grown increasingly critical of the state of their political system. In the Czech Republic more continue to say that the political system now is better than it was under communist rule (55% better vs. 35% worse), but the public is less convinced than in the early 1990s. In Slovakia, opinion has shifted from relatively positive in 1992 (50% vs. 34%) to negative (41% vs. 53%) in 1999.



Publics in both countries are as likely now (62% Czechs, 85% Slovaks) as in 1992 (57% Czechs, 85% Slovaks) to say the economy is worse than under communism, although only in the Czech Republic was there an intervening period of optimism (in 1994-95, more than half said the economy was better). Similarly, Czechs and Slovaks are both now as likely as in 1992 to say the economy is in bad condition (83% Czechs, 93% Slovaks), and in both views worsened between 1998 and 1999. However, while Slovaks have been consistently negative, between 1994 and 1996 Czechs were relatively positive about their economy.

That said, the general feeling in both countries is that they would *not* prefer a return to the security of the old system, but favored continuing with the changes. However, there has been some backsliding in each country, particularly in the past year (Table A-3). In 1993, 82 percent of Czechs rejected a return to the old system (14% agreed), whereas in 1999 support for a return to security grew (26%, 69% disagree).

Six years after the "Velvet Divorce," Czechs and Slovaks express consistently positive opinions of each other. In 1999, large majorities of Czechs (85%) and Slovaks (92%) held favorable views of the other republic, with a gradual improvement over the decade. In fact, in 1998 one in four Slovaks (25%) named the Czech Republic as the country they could most count on in a crisis (but only 3% of Czechs named Slovakia, many more named NATO (21%) or the U.S. (21%)).

Most Seek Limits on Political Role of Communist Collaborators

Few central and east Europeans think that individuals who were informants for the secret police during the communist era should hold a public role in their country's democracy. Pluralities in most of these countries believe that public figures who collaborated with communist secret services should be banned from holding public office. Many others believe that they should only be allowed to hold office after they have fully disclosed their activities under the old regime. Only about one in ten would allow former collaborators to hold office today without requiring any disclosure of their prior activities, and most of these people sympathize with their country's post-communist political party. The exception to this pattern is Slovakia, where a majority would allow collaborators to hold office once they have disclosed their activities; one in five would not impose even this requirement.

Table 8: Best Way to Deal with Communist Collaborators

There have been a number of proposals of how to deal with the fact that some public figures such as politicians or judges collaborated with the secret services under communism. Which of the following proposals do you think is the best way for our country to deal with people who collaborated with the secret services?

	They should be banned from holding public office.	They should be able to hold public office once they fully disclose their activities.	They should be able to hold public office without having to fully disclose their activities.	Don't know
Bulgaria	36%	25	14	25
Czech Rep.	52%	34	6	8
Hungary	44%	37	10	10
Poland	46%	38	10	7
Romania	49%	36	10	5
Slovakia	17%	54	19	10

Office of Research Surveys: 1999

What Happened to the Politicians of 1989?


Bulgaria: The Survivor and the Reformer

In December 1989, former Communist Party member and former dissident Zhelyu Zhelev assumed the chair of the newly-formed Union of Democratic Forces. Eight months later, he was elected president by Bulgaria's national assembly. As in the nearly fifty years of Zhelev's political career, the past decade has been one of wide changes in fortune. Zhelev

received wide public support in the first three years of Bulgaria's democratic transition. However, this support collapsed after the fall of the Dimitrov government in autumn 1994. Since he left office, replaced as president by Emil Constantinescu, he has served as honorary

chairman of the "moderately nationalist" Liberal Democratic Alternative. In this position, a plurality of Bulgarians again have come to express favorable opinions of the former president. However, Zhelev's support is considerably less than that of current President and UDF member Petar Stoyanov. From being a relative unknown, during his term in office Stoyanov has become viewed more favorably than has Zhelev at any point in the past decade.

Figure 11: Bulgarians' Opinion of Zhelyu Zhelev and Petar Stoyanov (% favorable)




Czech Republic: Slow Decline in Public's View of Havel

Along with Hungarian president Goncz, Vaclav Havel is the only other central European president to remain in office for nearly the entire decade. But Havel's two tenures as Czech president have not been easy. Apart from health problems and intense media coverage of his personal life, conflicts between Havel and the leaders of the two largest political parties have undermined the Czech public's attitudes toward its political leadership. Support for Havel has declined

gradually since the buoyant public mood of 1990. Comparing Office of Research data on favorable ratings from 1990-95 with IVVM confidence indicators for 1998-1999, half still are positive toward the president, but this is a far cry from eight in ten in the early to mid-1990s.


Figure 12: Czechs' Opinion of Vaclav Havel and Vaclav Klaus (% favorable)



Hungary: Democratic Veteran Goncz Perennially Popular

In 1995 Arpad Goncz was re-elected to serve a second term as president of Hungary. Like Zhelev, Goncz's political career spans the post-World War II era, but Goncz opposed the communist takeover, being active in the Smallholders' Party during the 1940s. In 1991, the first time Office of Research polls asked about views of politicians in Hungary, one in two Hungarians were favorable toward Goncz, then a member of the Alliance of Free Democrats. Since then, Goncz's popularity has only solidified in the public eye. In Hungary, the presidency is a largely ceremonial post, elected by the national parliament, which could contribute to Goncz's ability to retain public esteem. The most recent data shows that Goncz remains more popular than other political leaders, including prime minister Viktor Orban (58%), or former prime minister Gyula Horn (50% in 1998).


Figure 13: Hungarians' Opinion of Arpad Goncz and Viktor Orban (% favorable)



Poland: The Legacy of the Round Table

In 1989, the former electrician and then-leader of the Solidarity trade union Lech Walesa came to the Round Table talks as the symbol of Poland's rejection of the communist system. Aleksander Kwasniewski sat on the opposite side of the table, as a member of the Polish United Workers' Party and government minister for sports. In November 1990, Walesa was elected president. His confrontational style contributed to his loss of popularity during his term in office. In 1995, Walesa narrowly lost his bid for reelection to Kwasniewski, the candidate of the communist successor party, the Democratic Left Alliance. Ten years after Poland's negotiated transition, Walesa stands on the periphery of the Polish political scene, with just a third favorable toward him. By contrast, Kwasniewski, who has worked to project a calm and conciliatory image, received positive ratings from seven in ten, and appears well-placed to win a second term.

Figure 14: Poles' Opinion of Lech Walesa and Aleksander Kwasniewski (% favorable)



Romania: Iliescu and Roman Stay on Political Scene


In Fall 1990, four in ten (42%) Romanians named Radu Campeanu of the reformed National Liberal Party as the most important opposition leader. While Campeanu no longer takes a prominent role, former premier Petre Roman and former president Ion Iliescu have maintained a presence on the Romanian political scene throughout the decade.

When appointed premier in late 1990, three in four Romanians expressed positive opinions of Petre Roman. But his government was brought down by failed attempts to start economic reform and the 1991 Jiu Valley miners' strike. About the time of the National Salvation Front's split in 1992, Roman's ratings had turned negative.

Elected President of Romania in 1992 but voted out in 1996, Iliescu's ratings have remained positive through the decade, with half or more regularly expressing favorable opinions. Currently, Roman serves as foreign minister and Iliescu as leader of the NSF offshoot, the Social Democracy Party of Romania (PDSR); each is

seen favorably by about half the Romanian public. However, the most powerful political offices are held by relatively newer faces: former National Bank of Romania governor Mugur Isarescu (51% favorable in Spring 1999) is premier, appointed after Radu Vasile (57% favorable) was dismissed by President Constantinescu (49% favorable, 48% not).

Figure 15: Romanians' Opinion of Ion Iliescu and Petre Roman (% favorable)




Slovakia: Goodbye Meciar

In 1998, the Slovak opposition was voted into office on a wave of rejection of six years of rule by Vladimir Meciar. Two politicians whose battles scarred post-communist Slovakia's the first decade found themselves holding neither political office nor public favor in 1999.

In the early 1990s, both HDS leader Vladimir Meciar and Michal Kovac – once colleagues in the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia – were seen favorably by eight in ten. Once Slovakia gained its independence, these two held the new country's two top posts: Meciar as premier and Kovac as president. However, their bitter feuding delayed much-needed

institutional reform, led to abuses of power, and caused public confidence in political institutions to plunge. At present, only a small core of Meciar supporters view him favorably, and Kovac has also lost public favor. Today, Slovaks give more favorable opinions of politicians such as Robert Fico (69%), President Rudolf Schuster (64%), Peter Weiss (57%) and Edward Kukan (52%), who have distanced themselves from this rivalry.

Figure 16: Slovaks' Opinion of Vladimir Meciar and Michael Kovac (% favorable)



2. ECONOMIC TRANSITION FROM THE PUBLIC'S PERSPECTIVE

The transition from a planned to a market economy is often defined as including three fundamental changes: stabilization (achieving a stable currency and stable government finances), liberalization (freeing prices, opening trade and legalizing private economic activity), and privatization (both in the "narrow" sense of improving state firms and finding private owners for them, and the "wide" sense of fostering private sector growth). Central and east Europeans express clear attitudes toward reform policies: solidly positive toward reducing inflation and opening opportunities to start new businesses, but more cautious or even negative toward the inflow of foreign capital, the privatization of large state companies and the concomitant rise in unemployment. There is widespread support for a European model of the economy, in which the state takes a leading role in providing social services including pensions, health care, and income support for the most vulnerable.


While most economic reform policies are formulated and implemented at the national level, these changes have had profound effects on everyday lives. Not only have people had to adapt to a new range of market signals such as free prices and a competitive labor market, but they have also become subject to a new array of opportunities and risks. Moreover, the burdens of transition have fallen unevenly across societies and across the region. This section presents central and east Europeans' reflections on the impact transition has had on their lives, where they would like the process to go, and what the post-transition economy should look like.

2.1 Comparisons of the Planned and Market Economy

Many Say Economy Is in Worse Shape Now Than Under Communism

In the ten years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, central and east Europeans have grown further apart in their evaluation of their countries' economic situation now compared to that under communism (Figure 17). Early in the transition process (1992), between half and three-quarters of Bulgarians, Czechs, Hungarians, Poles, Romanians and Slovaks were negative about the economy relative to before transition. Seven years later, opinions range from the one in two Poles who says the system is *better* now to the 85 percent of Slovaks who say it is *worse* (Tables 9, next page, and A-33). Although attitudes toward the economy have diverged across countries, there was a sharp downturn in all six surveyed publics in 1999.

**Figure 17: Current Economic System Relative to Communist System
(% saying "Better" minus % saying "Worse")**



Of publics in the three more advanced transition countries (the three OECD members: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), Poles rate the benefits of the present system most highly (Table 9). Poles grew more positive about the present system between 1992 and 1997; while still more positive than negative since then, slightly fewer are now positive and slightly more are negative. Czechs' support for the present system peaked even earlier. When serious structural difficulties emerged in 1995, Czechs began to evaluate the current system as worse in relation to the previous system. Hungarians are still the most negative of the three publics; although more are positive now than before 1997, net opinion has remained negative throughout the transition period.

Table 9: Current Economic System Relative to Communist System							
	1992	1993	1994	1995	1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria							
Better	21%	21%	13%	14%	19%	20%	15%
Worse	63	69	79	77	74	72	79
Czech Rep.							
Better	32	—	57	56	43	44	31
Worse	57	—	35	33	50	51	62
Hungary							
Better	21	20	20	16	24	40	31
Worse	70	73	68	78	70	50	59
Poland							
Better	19	31	38	41	62	56	52
Worse	67	59	53	47	25	30	40
Romania							
Better	22	21	28	—	35	33	27
Worse	61	68	63	—	61	64	67
Slovakia							
Better	17	—	14	17	30	27	12
Worse	74	—	81	74	63	65	85

Office of Research Surveys: 1992-1999

Publics in the three other transition countries (Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia) have consistently said the current economic situation in their country is worse than that under communism, with relatively little variation. At present, solid majorities in Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania say the economy is worse than before transition.

Publics Consistently Negative Regarding Current Economic Situation

Central and east Europeans' negative views of state of the economy have not improved as the decade has passed. Even in the countries frequently deemed success stories, publics perceive their economy's performance to be poor (Table A-34).

Hungarians are more positive now than at any time since 1991 – but despite having the highest per capita GDP in the region, those who say the economy is “bad” still outnumber those who say it is “good” by nearly three to one (71% vs. 26%). Czechs' evaluation of their country's economy improved steadily following the January 1991 launch of market reforms, with more positive than negative in 1993-96. However, the 1997 Czech devaluation and effects of the emerging markets

crisis contributed to a worsening view of the economy. Most recently, 85 percent of Czechs say the economy is in poor shape and only 14 percent say it is in good health.

Not until 1997 did a majority of Poles describe the economy as good (54%) rather than bad (35%). Recently, negative opinion has increased (43% positive vs. 53% negative), although this downturn was probably not as sharp as in other countries because the Polish economy was relatively less affected by the international financial crisis. Whereas Czech GDP contracted in 1998, Poland's growth rate slowed but remained positive. In comparison to these three leading central and east European countries, German (49%), French (44%) and especially British (67%) publics are more inclined than Czechs and Hungarians – though not the Poles – to rate their country's economic situation positively; six in ten Italians (60%) say their economy is bad (37% good).

Romanians, Bulgarians and Slovaks More Pessimistic About the Economy

On the whole, Romanians, Bulgarians and Slovaks are more negative than Poles, Hungarians and Czechs about their economies, and with good reason. Reforms in these countries have tended to be slower or the setbacks greater. In recent years, nearly the entire Bulgarian public (95% in 1996, 97% in 1997) said the economy was "bad," a low nearly matched in Slovakia (93% in 1999). Romanians, too, have become more critical of the state of the economy over the past few years (89% "bad" in 1999).

In five of the six countries (Table 10), the proportion saying their national economy is "bad" or "very bad" rose substantially between Spring 1998 and Spring 1999; the exception

"And now, after all these years...I don't see the big change we were all expecting. I don't see the big hand the West lent to us."

– Romanian focus group participant, January 1999

Table 10: Current Economic Situation in the Country

		1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria											
	Good	–	34%	22%	68%	9%	15%	14%	2%	12%	12%
	Bad	–	63	67	32	88	81	85	97	88	86
Czech Rep.											
	Good	–	15	33	53	55	50	54	27	27	14
	Bad	–	84	64	46	41	47	44	72	73	85
Hungary											
	Good	–	9	19	8	9	8	11	16	26	26
	Bad	–	89	79	90	90	90	88	81	70	71
Poland											
	Good	14	20	14	26	27	30	36	54	49	43
	Bad	81	79	81	72	69	64	58	35	44	53
Romania											
	Good	9	11	18	15	26	–	23	20	20	11
	Bad	89	86	70	78	70	–	74	79	78	89
Slovakia											
	Good	–	–	20	9	10	12	27	27	22	6
	Bad	–	–	78	90	88	85	70	71	76	93


Office of Research Surveys: 1992-1999

being Bulgaria where nine in ten already saw the economy in poor condition. Compared to the early 1990s, Bulgarians, Czechs, Romanians and Slovaks are more likely now to say the economy is bad. Only among Poles and Hungarians are net opinions more positive.

2.2 Many Criticize Transition's Impact on Living Standards

Publics' views on the economy and comparisons to the previous system typically mirror their attitudes toward the impact of transition on living standards. As shown in Section 1, large majorities are negative when asked whether "life in general" is now better or worse than it was under communism (Section 1, Figure 3, page 5). In addition, at least half in each country say that the changes of the past ten years have had a *bad* rather than a *good* effect on standards of living (Figure 18). This view is more prevalent in Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria than in Poland and the Czech Republic. While most of those who say transition has had an adverse effect on "life in general" also say "the standard of living" is worse, about one in ten in each country is willing to say that life is better now *despite* lower living standards.

Figure 18: Impact of Transition on the Standard of Living



Publics Tend to View Their Own Financial Situation as Poor

Central and east Europeans also see their own household financial situations as poor, especially Romanians, Bulgarians and Slovaks (Table 11). Bulgarians' views have worsened over the latter half of the decade and Slovaks' over 1998-1999; in other countries views have been generally consistent. Czechs and Poles are the most positive toward household welfare (Tables A-35 and A-36).

These negative views do not vary considerably by social groupings in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. Poles and Czechs tend to split by groups: those who are better educated, white collar workers, and those living in capital cities tend to say living standards have improved. Poles and Czechs in small towns and villages tend to be more negative. This pattern of "winners" in favor of reform and "losers" more opposed is likely to emerge more strongly across the region as faster growth translates into greater economic unevenness within publics.

Table 11: Current Household Financial Situation

		1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria	Good	41%	42%	30%	32%	30%
	Bad	58	57	71	68	70
Czech Rep.	Good	56	59	54	53	49
	Bad	44	40	45	45	50
Hungary	Good	36	35	31	39	43
	Bad	64	64	68	60	56
Poland	Good	50	48	51	49	47
	Bad	50	49	46	47	52
Romania	Good	–	28	26	32	23
	Bad	–	72	74	69	75
Slovakia	Good	31	42	41	46	31
	Bad	68	57	57	52	68

Office of Research Surveys: 1995-1999

Publics in transition countries are much more critical of their household financial situation than their western neighbors. Six in ten or more among the British (76%), French (61%), German (67%), and Italian (71%) publics say their own household financial status is *good*, and – as with many central and east Europeans (Table A-37 and A-38) – most (55% Britain, 59% France, 65% Germany, 66% Italy) say it will be pretty much the same next year.

Unemployment and Poor Living Standards Top Concerns

Central and east Europeans express strong concern about unemployment, regardless of how severe the problem is in their own country (Table 12). At the time of the most recent polling in the region (Spring 1999), official unemployment rates ranged from 8 percent in the Czech Republic to 16.7 percent in Slovakia; 17 percent in both countries say unemployment is the most urgent issue for their country. Living standards and general economic issues also emerge as pressing problems. Although few Romanians name unemployment as their country's most pressing issue, half name either living standards (34%) or economic issues (21%) as the most urgent problem.

Table 12: Percentage Saying Unemployment is the Most Urgent Issue Facing the Country

	1990	1999
Bulgaria	4%	22%
Czech Rep.	10	17
Hungary	24*	21
Poland	28	29
Romania	1	6
Slovakia	14	17

*Office of Research Surveys: 1990-1999; *1991*

Many Remain Personally Worried About Unemployment


Many also fear that their own household will be affected by unemployment, with majorities concerned that someone in their family will lose their job in the near future (Table A-39). In 1994, Czechs were relatively unconcerned (55%, 36% worried) about unemployment, whereas in 1999 seven in ten (68%) are worried (31% are not). The share of Poles, Romanians and Slovaks personally worried about unemployment has risen from half in 1994 to two-thirds or more now. Hungarians are slightly less concerned, although six in ten say they are at least somewhat worried. Since the start of transition, Bulgarians have been most worried about unemployment affecting their own family; at present eight in ten (79%) are either somewhat or very worried (20% not worried).

Not Out of the Woods Yet: Expectations for the Economy Worsen as Crises Persist and Recur

During a period of reform, changes in expectations about the economy's future performance may signal important changes in individuals' behavior. People who expect improvement will be more likely to invest, to take chances, and to trust the institutions of the market. Those who expect further decline are more likely to engage in defensive behavior: to buy hard currency rather than hold domestic money, to save rather than spend, and to sell off a firm's assets instead of maintaining them. In this way, expectations can contribute to a self-fulfilling outcome.

In the countries which have had the most dramatic *perceived* declines in economic performance as measured by Table 9 (page 26) – the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia – four in ten are pessimistic about the future state of the economy (Figure 19, next page). Less than a third think the economy will be better in a year's time. Although in all three countries expectations have worsened since 1990, the decline has been particularly steep in Romania. After initial optimism in Fall 1990 (73% said the economy would be better in one year), four in ten or more remained fairly optimistic

about the likelihood of economic improvement through 1998 (Tables A-40 and A-41). But expectations deteriorated further last year: now most think the economy will be the same (31%) or will become worse (42%) in twelve months. In Slovakia, attitudes slumped from an expectation that the situation would remain the same to an expectation that it would worsen. By contrast, Hungarians and Poles are mildly optimistic, with a third thinking the economy will improve and a third thinking it will be the same.



2.3 Attitudes toward Market Reform

Publics Divided over Free Market Economy; Support Declines in Leading Reform Countries


Despite these generally negative evaluations of the post-communist economy in practice, publics remain divided – but perhaps more positive than might be expected – toward the market economy (Tables 13 and A-42). More Bulgarians (48%), Poles (46%) and Hungarians (45%) favor than oppose “the free market economy, that is one largely free from state control” for their country (Figure 20, next page). In Poland and Hungary, the replacement of a government led by the communist successor party with one dominated by conservative former oppositionists (1997 in Poland, 1998 in Hungary) was followed by a moderate increase but then a drop in support for the free market.

Table 13: Free Market Economy – Right or Wrong?

		1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria									
	Right	51%	50%	43%	48%	48%	54%	51%	48%
	Wrong	23	28	35	32	37	27	30	32
Czech Rep.									
	Right	58	54	53	44	42	35	42	40
	Wrong	22	34	33	39	37	46	46	46
Hungary									
	Right	62	54	50	52	52	43	59	45
	Wrong	19	26	25	28	25	40	27	38
Poland									
	Right	48	51	51	50	53	54	50	46
	Wrong	34	36	36	30	26	27	29	39
Romania									
	Right	36	44	46	–	54	45	41	42
	Wrong	39	45	40	–	39	45	51	48
Slovakia									
	Right	46	41	40	35	38	36	35	34
	Wrong	28	42	40	42	37	42	52	52

Office of Research Surveys: 1992-1999

Figure 20: Free Market Economy -- Right or Wrong
(% saying "right" minus % saying "wrong")



More significant perhaps than the short-term fluctuation in Hungarian and Polish views is the longer term fall in Czech support for the free market economy. In Spring 1992, 58 percent of Czechs said the free market was right for their country; one in five (22%) said it was wrong. By June 1999, the proportion who say the market economy is *wrong* doubled (46%, 40% right), a view likely associated with factors including privatization scandals, political instability and worsening opinions about the prospects of the economy.


Slovaks, Bulgarians and Romanians have varied considerably in their attitudes toward the market economy. Slovaks were positive in Spring 1992, but attitudes generally declined and now they are the most negative of the six publics examined here (34% positive, 52% negative). Bulgarians (at 48%) are as positive as Poles and Hungarians; a boost in support for the market following the 1997 introduction of the currency board. Romanians were most positive toward the free market economy in 1996, but continuing difficulties have likely fed negative views (currently 42% positive, 48% negative). However, these views are rather similar to those held by west European publics, where support for a free market economy at best rests at half (54% in France, 48% in Germany, 47% in Italy and 51% in Britain) (Table 19, page 39).

Most Believe Country Is Still in Economic Transition

Central and east Europeans are aware of the shifting balance of the state and private forces in the economy, but the relationship between perceptions and reality is not always straightforward. Currently, about half in each country see their economy as more driven by market forces than by state control; about four in ten still see government influence as the more dominant factor. Since 1995, views have become more alike across the region, with Hungarians, Bulgarians and Slovaks now *less* likely to describe their economies as state-driven (Figure 21, next page, and Table A-43).

Opinion among Czechs and Poles, two of the most advanced reformers, seems to move contrary to expectations. Slightly fewer Czechs (62% in 1995, 49% in 1999) and Poles (59% in 1995, 43% in 1999) describe their economy as *market-based*, while more Poles (from 34% to 43%) say it is *state-driven* (a stable percentage of Czechs say the economy is *state-driven*, at 36% in 1995 and 39% in 1999). More are also uncertain how to classify their country's economy (from 1% to 13% in the Czech Republic, 8% to 13% in Poland). This shift may be partly explained by these countries' early success in reforming. In 1995, both countries were being widely praised as economic "miracles," particularly the Czech Republic. But in subsequent years, structural problems emerged and difficult

Figure 21: The Current Economy -- Market- or State-driven




institutional reforms were tackled, problems which required state involvement. Perhaps these issues, along with greater understanding of how a market-oriented economy works, brought about more realistic appraisals of the roles of state and market in the economy during transition.

Preference for Pace of Reform May Be Linked to Reform Experience

Spring 1999 surveys found that publics in countries which have made more progress in reform – Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic – tend to say that, looking back over the past ten years, if they could choose their country's reform path over again, they would prefer more gradual or slower reform (Figure 22). In Romania and Bulgaria, where reform has been more erratic in implementation and faltering in performance, people say they would opt for more radical reform. Relatively few (5-8%) say "no reform" would have been the best option, the exception being Romanians (16%) (Table A-44).

Between 1990 and 1992, these publics were asked whether they would prefer radical economic reform, "which reduces our living standards a great deal but at the same time will bring remarkable growth," gradual reform which would "not reduce the living standard that much but would result in

Figure 22: Preferred Speed of Reform



"[Transition brought] greater chances for self-realization, and also choice of one's own future. There are many opportunities to choose what to do with one's own life in the economic sense – some educational development and understanding of one's own activity or a job change. Things you actually do can be adjusted according to what you want to do."

– Polish focus group participant, January 1999


slower economic growth,” or no reform whatsoever (Tables A-45 and A-46). Very few (1-6%) in each of the publics preferred no reform, the exception being Slovakia (12% in 1991). But three in four Hungarians (74% in 1991) – and a rising share of Poles (50% in 1990, 75% in 1991) – backed *gradual* reform. Publics in the other transition countries were more closely divided.

Life Changes Appear Related To Support for Market System

The move from the socialist system to a market-oriented economy requires the public to adapt to a new set of “rules of the game.” People’s overall ability to adjust to these changes not only helps increase the economy’s efficiency, but it also signals the public’s willingness to accept and support market reforms.

According to these data, the private sector in central and eastern Europe accounts for about four in every ten jobs, ranging from three in ten in Bulgaria to five in ten in Poland (Figure 23 and Table A-47). However, this is on average still less than in western Europe, where half or more say they are employed in the private sector. It is likely that the state sector will account for fewer jobs and the private sector for more as central and east European economies continue to restructure.

Figure 23: Reported Employment By Sector



Yet in the countries for which there is data, there appears to be a greater preference for state sector jobs now than at the start of the decade (Tables 14, A-48 and A-49). In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, many who were previously uncertain or undecided now seem to opt for state sector employment. In Romania, about half continue to prefer state sector jobs, and fewer who would like to become self-employed. Across the

region, state sector employment is usually seen as less demanding than private sector work, as well as more secure and stable, an important factor considering publics’ fear of unemployment.

Furthermore, survey data indicate that people who have made lifestyle changes – such as changed jobs or moved to another city – are more likely to say the present system is *better* than that under communism. For instance, Romanians and Hungarians who have moved to a different town or region

Table 14: In which sector would you prefer to work?

		State sector	Private sector	Self-employed	No difference	DK/NA
Czech Rep.*	1992	22%	32	3	13	10
	1999	50%	31	5	11	3
Romania	1991	43%	12	30	n/a	15
	1999	51%	29	3	11	6
Slovakia*	1992	32%	22	3	16	11
	1999	68%	20	4	5	3

Office of Research Surveys: 1992-1999; *Also: “Firm with foreign capital” 1992 – 21% Czech Republic, 17% Slovakia.

tend to say life today is better (these Romanians also more often approve of the market economy); those who have not moved tend to take the opposite view. Bulgarians and Hungarians who undertook retraining or education are relatively more positive about life now compared to under socialism.

These links are particularly apparent among Poles; those who have changed jobs, moved, undertaken reschooling or been self-employed tend to be significantly more favorable toward the current state of the economy and living standards than those who have not. Poles who have been unemployed are noticeably more negative toward the present system than are others. In general, not only are the “winners” of reform those who are better educated and more highly skilled, but also those more able and willing to take the risks associated with change.

2.4 Most Favor Continued State Role in the Social Economy

Considerable Numbers Favor Continuing Role for State in the Economy

Publics’ hesitation to accept a “free market economy” and a rapid pace of reforms should not be interpreted as a widescale rejection of a market-oriented economy. Rather, there is considerable support for a “social market economy” along the lines of the European model. Publics support a considerable state role in the economy, particularly in the provision of social goods and in typical market failure areas, but do not support legal limits on firms’ profits or employees’ incomes. Views on the state’s role in the economy can be grouped into four policy areas: **socialist-type controls** on enterprise and pricing behavior such as those used during the latter stages of “real socialism,” interim **transition policies** used during the stabilization phase of reforms, **restructuring policies** which concern privatizing and reorienting the country’s firms, and the policies on redistribution and social services which are often thought of as elements of a welfare or “**caretaker**” state.

“There is no need for standing in queues, you can get everything – it is far better.”

“The goods are in stores and people have no money for it.”

“But this is what the free market is about, those who have money go and buy, those who don’t – sorry, it’s their problem.”

–Polish focus group participants, January 1999

Socialist-type policies

Under socialism, not only were loss-making state-owned enterprises subsidized, but state firms which managed to make exceptional “profits” often had them taxed away. Most people in transition countries are neither completely pro-intervention nor pro-free market, but think that the state has a role to play in alleviating some of the market’s more painful consequences. Publics solidly oppose setting legal limits on profits – at least six in ten in all countries except Romania agree that firms should *not* be limited in the level of profits they can earn (Table 15, next page). However, half or more say failing firms should receive subsidies to prevent their closure (Table 17, page 37).

Under socialism, state-administered price controls on many consumer goods (and the plan’s inability to supply enough of these goods) were the main factors in creating the chronic shortages which fed public dissatisfaction with the system. Indeed, full shelves and a wide choice of consumer goods are

Table 15: Opinion on "Socialist-type" Economic Policies				
	Price controls		Controls on profits	
	Set by gov't: limited supply but affordable	Float, with supply plentiful	Limit by law to a certain level	Level of profits should be unlimited
Bulgaria	62%	33	25%	62
Czech Rep.	46%	47	21%	70
Hungary	66%	29	30%	62
Poland	52%	41	26%	63
Romania	53%	39	43%	47
Slovakia	69%	25	27%	64
<i>Office of Research Surveys: 1999</i>				

widely acknowledged as one of the chief benefits of the transition to the market. However, majorities across central and east Europe express a somewhat paradoxical acceptance of a statutory limit on prices of some essential goods and services, even if at the cost of limiting supply (Table 15).

As Table 15 shows, majorities in all countries but the Czech Republic prefer a policy whereby the government sets prices, "limiting availability but keeping things affordable." Only in the Czech Republic is the public closely divided between this backward-looking option and a market-based option where most prices are allowed prices to float "so that products are plentiful" (Tables A-50 and A-51).

Transition policies

Governments in post-communist countries have important economic functions to perform, particularly during the initial stages of systemic reform. For instance, states have provided "nominal anchors" (such as a fixed exchange rate) to establish a stable atmosphere for market transactions and to help individuals alter their expectations (for instance, a tight monetary policy can help to break inflationary inertia). But then the question remains how far and how fast governments should pull back their economic role.

In the first one to three years of transition, a common tool used to fight inflation was a temporary income policy, which limited wage increases by, for example, levying a draconian tax on "excess" (more than the rate of inflation) pay increases. In each country, this since has been replaced by some form of tripartite (state-employer-union) organization which aims to set ceilings on wage increases, but often to little effect. Yet the fear of a return to high inflation and the common belief that these economies have "eastern wages and western prices" may influence the publics' response to state control of wages "to limit inflation" (Table 16, next page).

Majorities Support Price Controls for Basic Goods

Governments across the region have liberalized most prices, but have been slower to free the prices of some basic goods and services such as housing, food, public transport, and utilities. Although price controls and supports also exist in most western economies, their continuation in transition countries (for instance the slow deregulation of energy prices in Poland or rents in the Czech Republic) have been controversial. Not surprisingly, central and eastern Europeans who say transition has been costly for living standards also support the continuation of price controls for some

basic goods. Seven in ten or more across the region agree with state control of “the prices of some essential or basic items” (Table 16). About one in five says that “all prices for goods and services should be set by the market, according to what people will pay.”

Table 16: Opinion on Transition Policies						
	Income policies		Price controls		Farm subsidies	
	Wages controlled by state to limit inflation	Free to rise as high as market allows	Market sets most, controls on basic goods	All prices set by market	State subsidies to raise farm incomes	Rely on market, grow profitable crops
Bulgaria	46%	45	78%	19	69%	23
Czech Rep.	44%	50	71%	26	62%	30
Hungary	51%	43	78%	19	41%	50
Poland	44%	47	80%	17	57%	38
Romania	64%	30	79%	21	81%	16
Slovakia	53%	41	83%	14	74%	22

Office of Research Surveys: 1999

Despite this consistent concern to keep prices low, majorities in most of these countries also favor state subsidization of farmers’ incomes, apparently not making the connection that – as in the European Union under the Common Agricultural Policy – this will make food relatively more expensive. In Hungary, which arguably has the most successful agricultural sector in the region, half say that farmers should *not* be subsidized, but instead should rely on the market and grow the most profitable crops.

Restructuring policies

While the stabilization phase of the transition can be implemented relatively quickly, a longer, more difficult, and potentially more disruptive element of the transition is the “restructuring” of the economy. Restructuring is usually understood to have three main elements: a shift from predominately state to private ownership, the adjustment of enterprises from being inefficient and over-manned to more efficient and competitive organizations, and from predominately large enterprises to more entrepreneurial, smaller-scale operations.

Small Firm Privatization Widely Supported

The latter of these three points is the least contentious across the region. Across countries and over time, central and east Europeans agree that the majority of small enterprises should be under private rather than state ownership (Tables A-52 and A-53), ranging from six in ten (61%) in Romania to eight in ten (81%) in the Czech Republic. Majorities also express generally favorable attitudes towards private business people (Table A-54).

Opinions Split Over Selling Large Companies

The private ownership of large enterprises is more controversial (Table 17). Publics across the region tend to prefer the continued *state* ownership of large firms, with percentages ranging from half in Romania to nearly nine in ten in Slovakia. Opposition to the private ownership of large companies also appears to span regional variations in how countries have handled the privatization of large state firms so far.

Table 17: Restructuring Policies						
	Unprofitable firms		Large scale privatization		Foreign investment	
	Subsidize to protect jobs	Close, even if lose jobs	Majority state-owned	Majority private	Dangerous, loss of control	Necessary, positive
Bulgaria	48%	39	61%	27	24%	43
Czech Rep.	42%	46	68%	28	32%	59
Hungary	42%	52	75%	20	41%	53
Poland	52%	41	73%	23	54%	40
Romania	47%	46	50%	39	35%	55
Slovakia	56%	36	87%	9	35%	57

Office of Research Surveys: 1999

For instance, there are similar levels of opposition to the private ownership of most large companies in Hungary (75% oppose), the Czech Republic (68% oppose) and Poland (73% oppose), despite the different privatization methods used in each country (foreign investors in Hungary, mass privatization in the Czech Republic, and a slower and more diversified approach in Poland). In Slovakia (87%), Bulgaria (61%) and Romania (50%), where privatization has been largely delayed, a majority also oppose private ownership of most large firms. Attitudes toward privatization have remained fairly consistent over the past two to three years (Table A-55). West European views tend to be more positive, though at best about sixty percent (in France and Italy) support privatization (Table 19, page 39).

Publics are more resistant to the privatization of some sectors than others, particularly in respect to what are often termed "strategic sectors." For instance, there is general opposition to the private ownership of public utilities, such as telecommunications or electric power generation and distribution (Figure 24). The example of Hungary suggests that public acceptance may not increase even after utility privatization is mostly completed.

The privatization method has, however, apparently influenced publics' involvement or stake in the privatization process. One in ten or fewer in Romania and Hungary report having purchased shares, as compared to three in ten or more in Slovakia and the Czech Republic (Figure 25).

Figure 24: Ownership of Public Utilities





Figure 25: Percentage Who Have Bought Shares in a Company



Opinions Also Divided Over Foreign Investment

Successive governments in central and eastern Europe have emphasized the importance of attracting foreign investment – both greenfield development as well as portfolio and direct investment. But these countries have had varying success in attracting investment inflows: Poland is presently the highest *net* recipient of foreign direct investment in the region, Hungary has the highest *per capita* level of investment, while Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia have attracted relatively few inflows. However, the level of investment appears to have little effect on public attitudes toward it.

Generally speaking, publics in transition countries are relatively open to foreign investment, agreeing that it is “necessary and will have a positive influence on the development of our economy” (Table A-56). Poles are somewhat out of step with the rest of the region, in that half currently agree that foreign investment is “dangerous because it allows outsiders too much control over our affairs.” Central and east European views closely resemble views in western Europe (Table 19, next page).

“...[T]he society is poor, and for example, in order to privatize a factory, to sell its shares to ordinary people like all of us here, is practically impossible because we do not have the financial resources. So to solve the problem, we bring in foreign capital, meaning we get the money from abroad. This way the whole [privatization] process is speeded up and its results are visible, but the final effect is not very good for the future; we are becoming dependent on the finances of foreign capital.”

– Polish focus group participant, January 1999

Most Say Unprofitable Companies Should Be Closed

There are moderate differences across these countries in respect to whether loss-making enterprises should be subsidized to preserve jobs, or shut down. Half of Hungarians (52%) say that “unprofitable businesses should be closed even if it means employees would lose jobs.” Publics in Bulgaria (48%), Poland (52%), and Slovakia (56%) tend to take the opposite view that in order to protect jobs, “the government should subsidize or rescue factories that are losing money.” Romanians (47% to 46%) and Czechs (42% to 46%) are split almost evenly (Table 17, page 37).

Many Accept Unemployment As Cost of Restructuring

Half or more across the region say that some unemployment in their country is acceptable “if that’s what it takes to improve and modernize the economy” (Table 18). Bulgarians are divided between this perspective and thinking there should be “no unemployment, even if it means that the economy will not improve and modernize in the near future.” These opinions have been fairly stable over the past few years (Table A-57).

Table 18: Acceptance of Unemployment


	Unemployment unacceptable	Some acceptable
Bulgaria	49%	46
Czech Rep.	22%	77
Hungary	44%	55
Poland	34%	64
Romania	33%	57
Slovakia	33%	65

Office of Research Surveys: 1999

Private Sector Better At Creating New Jobs, But Many Allow Role for Government Also

The preference for a mixed economy also comes through in publics’ ideas about job creation. Substantial numbers – ranging from 13% in Poland to 39% in Hungary – volunteer that both the state and the private sector are equally able to create new jobs (Figure 26, next page, and Table A-58). Czechs (49%), Poles (43%), Bulgarians (39%) and Slovaks (38%) tend to say the private sector is

better able than the state sector to create jobs, Hungarians are divided, and Romanians tend to think the state is better suited for this task. This overall preference for a state role in job creation tends to set central and east Europeans (except for Czechs) apart from west Europeans. Spring 1999 surveys in Britain, France, Germany and Italy show that about half consider private enterprise to be better at creating new jobs. While pluralities in Hungary, Bulgaria and Slovakia select business over government, in these countries plus Poland and Romania, greater numbers say the government is better at job creation than do publics in any of the west European countries.



East More Skeptical Than West About Large-Scale Privatization

Section 1 shows that publics in both eastern and western Europe desire a government that guarantees basic needs. There is also a shared preference for a welfare state, and for a government role in regulating the economy. Reflecting this orientation, no more than half in either region support a “free market economy” (Table 19), although support is somewhat higher in western Europe than in central and east European countries. Support for foreign investment is actually greater in some eastern countries (Czech Republic and Slovakia) than in some western countries (Italy and Britain). Only in Bulgaria and Poland do more oppose than favor foreign investment inflows.

The largest differences in attitudes on the basic elements of the market economy lie in attitudes toward the privatization of large enterprises. Half or more in the four west European countries agree that the majority of large business should be privately owned. In the six transition countries, majorities agree that the government – and not private owners – should run the majority of large businesses in the country.

Table 19: Attitudes toward Elements of an Open Market Economy

	Free markets	Foreign investment	Large privatization
France	54%	53%	59%
Germany	48%	61%	54%
Italy	47%	49%	59%
Britain	51%	51%	47%
Romania	42%	55%	39%
Czech Rep.	40%	59%	28%
Bulgaria	48%	43%	27%
Hungary	45%	53%	20%
Poland	46%	40%	23%
Slovakia	34%	57%	9%

Office of Research Surveys: 1999

Social Policies

Across central and eastern Europe, majorities favor the state provision of social services, including national health care, child care, and old age pensions (Table 20, next page). However, the presence of significant minorities who prefer private provision of these goods signals the existence of core support for private sector development.

Table 20: Social Policies							
	State Health Care			Child care		Pensions	
	For all citizens	For the poorest	All private	Paid for by the state	Provided by parents	Rely on government	Rely on savings, family
Bulgaria	68%	29	3	72%	23	86%	11
Czech Rep.	92%	6	1	80%	17	73%	23
Hungary	69%	27	4	61%	34	89%	10
Poland	66%	24	9	56%	38	88%	9
Romania	63%	34	4	78%	17	74%	21
Slovakia	95%	4	–	84%	14	74%	23

Office of Research Surveys: 1999

Reminded that social programs are financed through general taxation, two-thirds in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania support a “free” health care service for all citizens, while between one-quarter and one-third say that state-funded health care should only be provided for the poorest in society. Nearly all Czechs and Slovaks prefer socialized medicine. Few (highest in Poland, at 9%) say health care should be entirely provided via the private sector. Large percentages also support a state system of child care for pre-schoolers, with publics in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania most strongly in favor. In contrast, more than a third in Hungary and Poland, and one-quarter in Bulgaria favor a system where parents themselves pay for child care.

“People who were lucky were registered in public companies or possibly in big companies, because small firms don’t want to pay for insurance. Now the employee is happy because he earns more this way, but what will happen when it’s time to retire? It’ll be too late, he’ll have nothing or almost nothing.”

– Polish focus group participant, January 1999

Likewise, three-quarters or more across the region prefer that the elderly should be able to rely on the state to maintain their standard of living. One-quarter or less say that individuals should rely more on their personal savings and family assistance during their retirement years, with publics in the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia more accepting than those in Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland.

Generations and Attitudes Toward Economic Reform

Across the region, older people tend to be more skeptical of reform, while the young are more open to its opportunities. In addition, support for the **market system** is more widespread among the young, particularly those who are better-educated, urban dwellers and those who support the current pro-reform governments. Older citizens tend to be more uncertain.

There is even greater variation in views toward whether **life today is better or worse than under communism** and on transition's impact on the **standard of living**. In Bulgaria, Romania and the Czech Republic, those under age 30 are generally favorable in their evaluation of life and living standards now, while others tend to say life is worse now. In Hungary, large majorities across all age groups agree that the past ten years have had a bad effect on living standards, but younger Hungarians (50% better, 35% worse) are much less likely than Hungarians in their fifties or older (79% worse) to say life is now worse than it was under communism.

This optimism of younger citizens toward transition is reflected in their more active involvement in and greater ability to adjust to a changing labor market. Young people are more likely to report having changed jobs, gone back to school or undertaken retraining, and to have moved to a different city (including for educational purposes). Those under 30 are also more likely to have moved to another town than are older people. Starting one's own business, however, appears to be an activity for those with relatively more work experience. Across the region, individuals in their thirties and forties are more likely to be self-employed than people in other age groups.

Women During Economic Transition

Across the region, women and men have highly similar views across broad economic topics, such as the current state of the economy, its prospects for improvement, and preferences for the pace of reform. These attitudes, outlined in Section 2, tend to vary more across countries than between the sexes. But two factors emerge which distinguish the views of men and women. First, women across the region show a moderately greater acceptance of an active role for the state in providing social protection and regulating the market. Second, in a pattern visible across the globe, women are more likely to be unsure how to answer questions on specific policy issues.

Women and men in central and eastern Europe agree that the state should take a role in activities including controlling the prices of some basic goods, subsidizing farmers, and providing universal health care, pensions for the elderly and child care for pre-school age children. A majority of both men and women think the state should not place limits on the profits firms can earn.

Across some micro-level dimensions, however, women show a greater propensity for a state role in the economy and greater hesitation about leaving things to market forces, especially where jobs are concerned. Women are more likely than men to say that unemployment is unacceptable, even if preventing job loss slows economic growth. Taking a regional average, women tend to say that the government should subsidize or rescue factories that are losing money to protect jobs (53%, 35% close them), while men are divided between rescuing firms (48%) or closing unprofitable businesses even if it means lost jobs (46%).

There is greater variation across countries in attitudes toward privatization of large businesses and foreign investment. Hungarian, Polish and Slovak men and women share a preference for state ownership of most large enterprises, while Bulgarian and Romanian women tend to be more pro-state ownership than men. In Hungary and Poland, women are less accepting of foreign investment than are men, while – perhaps in slight contradiction to views on large privatization – men and women in Bulgaria and Romania tend to say foreign investment is necessary and beneficial for the economy.

Czechs are unique in the similarity of views among women and men. Czechs of both sexes take a more liberal stance on small firm ownership and the acceptability of unemployment in a modernizing economy. Czech women and men equally prefer most large enterprises to remain state-owned, and about six in ten Czechs overall are in favor of foreign investment.

In regard to their own household's current financial situation, Polish and Czech women and men share similar perspectives, while Bulgarian women (74% bad) are more negative than Bulgarian men (64%). Overall, women across the region tend to have greater concern about their future well-being, and are slightly more likely than men to say they are concerned that someone in their household will become unemployed.

Women's work experience has also differed from men's. Not only are men more likely to have changes their job at least once during the past decade, but in all countries except Hungary and Slovakia, men are more likely to have changed jobs three or more times. Reported incidence of unemployment varies little across the sexes, but perceived options may be more constrained for women than for men. In Hungary, more men (15%) than women (7%) report having been unemployed for a year or more, but this may be explained by the greater withdrawal of women from the active labor market in Hungary than in other transition countries. Across the region, women are less likely than men to have been self-employed at some point in the past decade, and about twice as many men than women are seriously considering starting their own business.

Women appear more hesitant to make judgments on policy issues, and more frequently than men say they "don't know" whether the creation of a free market economy is right or wrong for their country's future. They are also more hesitant in appraising whether their country should join the European Union. On policy issues, similar shares of men and women appear to hold negative attitudes, while men are more positive and women more likely not to know. This suggests that in the inevitable trade-offs that accompany reform, women may tend to perceive both gains and losses in the transition process while men tend to net out these effects as being positive overall.

3. ETHNIC RELATIONS IN A NEW ERA

The countries of central and eastern Europe have a history of shifting borders. These changes, sometimes caused by external forces, sometimes internal, have resulted in a pattern of somewhat arbitrary political boundaries which often separate people who identify themselves as a distinct ethnic group or nation. During the communist period, the friction between majority and minority groups and between neighboring states regarding ethnic minority rights was largely superseded by the “internationalist” ideals of communist leaders. Through censorship, harassment, imprisonment, exile and other means, nationalist expression was limited or controlled.

The fall of the Berlin Wall changed the political and economic landscape in the region, with a profound impact on ethnic relations – both positive and negative. With the explosion of freedom of expression of all types, ethnic minorities have become able to seek rights openly, and in some cases call for autonomy or independence. At the same time, state support for nominal cultural representation and quotas has generally ceased. In addition, nationalist views among some majority groups have reemerged. Office of Research surveys indicate that publics have complex views and fears regarding ethnic relations. Overall, publics in the east have become more favorable toward minorities in the past ten years and appear no more intolerant than those in western Europe. Yet these countries in transition lack some of the mechanisms to protect minority rights and to channel patriotic sentiment in more positive directions.

3.1 Public Views of Ethnic Relations

Ethnic relations is a pivotal element in the post-communist transformations in central and eastern Europe. These new democracies must find a way to resolve their local and regional conflicts to be able to fully develop their democracies to western norms, to succeed economically and to meet the criteria for membership in the European Union and NATO. One of the most important ethnic issues is relations between minority and majority ethnic groups living together in a single political state.² The Czech Republic and Hungary have diverse minority ethnic populations. Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia each has a sizable minority of one ethnic group in addition to a number of smaller ones. In Poland, the population is more homogeneous, with Poles making up almost 98 percent of the population.

In all of these countries, friction can occur when members of minority ethnic groups wish to have their linguistic, cultural and political rights protected in the country where they live, while members of the majority ethnic group may be trying to establish or consolidate a state viewed as their own. One central and east European country – Czechoslovakia – solved its main ethnic problem through a peaceful separation into the Czech and Slovak Republics, in contrast to the violent break-up of Yugoslavia. Slovakia and Romania, along with Serbia, are home to large ethnic Hungarian

²The U.N. Sub-Committee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities has defined a minority as: “A group of citizens of a State, constituting a numerical minority and in a non-dominant position in that State, endowed with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the majority of the population, having a sense of solidarity with one another, motivated, if only implicitly, by a collective will to survive and whose aim it is to achieve equality with the majority in fact and in law.”

Table 21: Ethnic Populations in Central and Eastern Europe

In Bulgaria	Bulgarian 85%	Turks 9%	Roma 3%	Macedonian 3%	Armenian .3%
In Czech R.	Czech 94%	Slovaks 3%	Polish 1%	German .5%	Roma .3%
In Hungary	Hungarian 90%	Roma 4%	German 3%	Serb 2%	Slovak 1%
In Poland	Pole 98%	German 1%	Ukrainian 1%	Belarusian .5%	
In Romania	Romanian 89%	Hungarian 9%	German .4%		
In Slovakia	Slovaks 86%	Hungarian 11%	Roma 2%	Czech 1%	

CIA World Factbook: 1999

minorities – part of the roughly 3 million ethnic Hungarians living in central and eastern Europe outside the borders of Hungary. Bulgaria is home to a sizable Turkish population, Poland includes small German, Ukrainian and Belarusian populations, the Czech Republic is still home to a number of Slovaks and Germans, and Roma live throughout the region (Table 21).

Publics Support Multiethnic Principles

Central and east European publics tend to believe their countries can develop peacefully with people of many nationalities. Despite the differing ethnic compositions of these six countries, majorities of roughly eight in ten in each agree that “we can live together in harmony with different nationality groups” (Tables 22 and A-59). About a fifth in each

“Warsaw is such a diversified center, that people from various parts are now living here, so if you talk to people who live in Warsaw at the moment, they are more liberal, tolerant.”

– Polish focus group participant, January 1999

country disagree, believing instead that “it would be better” if their country were “composed of only one nationality group.” In Slovakia and Hungary, twice as many now as in 1996 or 1997 think that one nationality would be better. Opinion in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria has been fairly stable since the mid-1990s, and opinion in Romania has fluctuated over time.

Table 22: Support for Multiethnic Societies

	Bulgaria	Czech Rep.	Hungary	Poland*	Romania	Slovakia
Can live together	73%	83%	76%	76%	79%	80%
One nationality better	23	14	21	17	19	18
Don't know	5	3	3	6	2	2

*Office of Research Surveys: 1998; *1999 (slightly different question wording)*

Publics Assess Ethnic Relations in Their Own Country

Publics in the region have differing views on the current state of ethnic relations in their country (Tables 23, next page, and A-60). In Bulgaria and Romania, where there is one sizable minority in each country, publics are most positive about the overall state of ethnic relations, followed by Poles, who have a nearly homogeneous population. Hungarians and Slovaks are fairly evenly split and Czechs are decidedly negative, perhaps due to recent attention directed at Czech-Roma relations. There has been a significant decline in perception of good relations in the Czech Republic and

Table 23: Evaluation of Ethnic Relations						
	Bulgaria	Czech R.	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
Good relations	79%	25%	49%	63%	72%	49%
Poor relations	17	72	43	22	22	49
Don't know	5	4	8	13	6	3
<i>Office of Research Surveys: 1999</i>						

Slovakia compared with views while Czechoslovakia was united. This shift seems to reflect the change in the dominant ethnic conflict in the two republics from Czech-Slovak to Czech-Roma and Slovak-Hungarian.

Some Among Dominant Ethnic Groups Favor States for Themselves

While publics widely believe that they can live together in a single country with people of other ethnic backgrounds, sizable percentages, except in Hungary, think their cultural traditions are superior to others (Table 24). In many cases, expression of the culture of the dominant ethnic group is part of political efforts to legitimize a new state, political system or particular program. This type of expression or pride (even a mild degree of chauvinism) does not necessarily infringe on the rights of individuals who do not belong to the dominant ethnic group in the country.

Table 24: "My people are not perfect, but our cultural traditions are superior to others"*						
	Bulgaria	Czech R.	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
Agree	78%	61%	33%	71%	76%	44%
Disagree	7	33	60	18	18	47
"Every nation should have own state"**						
Agree	38%	43%	49%	91%	60%	62%
Disagree	65	53	44	6	35	32
<i>Office of Research Surveys: *Romania 1998, Bulgaria, Slovakia 1997; Czech Rep., Hungary, Poland 1996; **1996</i>						

A potentially more serious problem for multiethnic states is the belief among many that their nationality – or nationalities/ethnic groups in general – ought to have a political entity of its own. A 1996 survey found that majorities of Poles, Romanians and Slovaks, and half of Hungarians agree that "every nation should have its own state" (Table 24). Czechs and Bulgarians tend to disagree. Differing views may reflect the varied histories of these central and east European countries. Poland, for example, has a long history of struggling for the independence of its territory, and Slovakia has only had independence for six years (aside from a brief period during the Second World War). By contrast, Hungary lost territory in the 20th century leaving millions of ethnic Hungarians in other countries.

Sizable Percentages Express Moderately Nationalist Views

Overall, sizable minorities in these publics express nationalist leanings, but only a small percentage hold these views firmly. When asked whether they agree that "the Czech Republic is only for Czechs," "Poland is only for Poles," and so on, majorities in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia *disagree*, as do half in Bulgaria and Romania. Half or more across these five publics *disagree* that

there are “too many” people of minority nationalities living in these countries, and most *disagree* that the situation would be improved if “all foreigners” were expelled (Tables 25, A-61 and A-62).

The exception is Hungary, where nearly three-quarters agree that their country belongs solely to the dominant ethnic group and that there are too many “non-Hungarians” living in the country. Nearly half think that expulsion of foreigners would improve conditions.

– “It means these [Russians and Romanians] are going to immigrate to our territory.”

– “Because to say it frankly, for these people from the East, we are the West for them.”

– Polish focus group participants, January 1999

Table 25: Nationalist Sentiment

		Bulgaria	Czech R.	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
[Survey country] is only for [Survey county nationals]	Agree	42%	31%	72%	40%	46%	33%
	Disagree	51	68	26	56	49	65
There are too many non- [Survey county nationals] in [Survey country]	Agree	35%	46%	72%	40%	29%	41%
	Disagree	47	52	26	56	60	57
Life in [Survey country] would be better if all foreigners were expelled*	Agree	21%	38%	45%	28%	20%	15%
	Disagree	70	58	49	62	68	77

Office of Research Surveys: 1999; *Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia 1996, Bulgaria 1995, Romania 1994

While publics tend to disagree with these three assertions, a sizable segment do agree. On the average, between 30 and 40 percent at least somewhat agree with these statements, except in Hungary where many more agree. On average, Romanians, Slovaks and Bulgarians are least likely to express intolerant, nationalist views. Slightly more in the Czech Republic and, and even more in Hungary openly voice these opinions.

Only relatively small minorities hold these views strongly. For example, only a quarter or fewer in Romania (23%), Poland (18%), Bulgaria (18%), Slovakia (12%) and the Czech Republic (9%) believe strongly that their country “is only for” people of their nationality. However, four in ten (39%) in Hungary hold this view *strongly*.

Education Contributes to Tolerance

Demographic characteristics vary among those most inclined to agree with these statements, but across all six countries, those with a higher education are less likely than those with a primary education or less to agree. In Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, those living in rural areas are more likely than those in urban areas to agree while in Bulgaria, the reverse is true. In general, gender, age and religiosity do not appear related to nationalist views.

Significant Segment in Western Europe Express Intolerant Views

The minorities in central and eastern Europe who express nationalist views are not out of line with findings from west European surveys. A 1994 survey found that a third in Britain, France and Germany agreed that their country was only for members of their (the dominant) ethnic group, though

Table 26: Nationalist Sentiment

		Britain	France	Germany	Italy
[Survey country] is only for [Survey country nationals]*	Agree	36%	38%	35%	36%
	Disagree	59	59	65	62
There are too many non-[survey country nationals] in this country**	Agree	51%	53%	61%	52%
	Disagree	43	42	31	42
Life in [Survey country] would be better if all foreigners were expelled***	Agree	20%	44%	21%	29%
	Disagree	74	49	62	64

Office of Research Surveys: *1994; **1999; ***1997

nearly two-thirds disagreed (Table 26). In addition, half in Britain, France and Italy and six in ten in Germany say there are too many people of other nationalities (non-British, non-French, non-German) in their respective countries. Sizable percentages in several west European countries also say that “there are too many immigrants living in [their] country” (51% in Britain, 39% in France, 49% in Germany and 65% in Italy), but half in France and majorities elsewhere disagree that life would be better if they were expelled.

3.2 Varying Opinion of Specific Groups

Hungarians’ Image Improves in Romania

The largest single ethnic group living outside its borders in Europe are the Hungarians. Primarily living in Transylvania, they represent nearly 10 percent of the total population of Romania. Romanian opinion of Hungarians living in Romania has improved since the end of communism (Table A-63). In 1992, only one-quarter of the population expressed a favorable opinion of Hungarians compared to nearly six in ten in 1999. Among *ethnic Romanians only*, a small majority now have a positive opinion of the Hungarian minority, an improvement over the last year (Table 27).

Table 27: Ethnic Romanian Opinion of Hungarians Living in Romania

	1998	1999
Positive	45%	55%
Negative	50	40

Office of Research Surveys: 1998-1999

Similar Trend Seen in Slovakia

Opinion of Hungarians in Slovakia has also improved somewhat among Slovaks. Just four in ten expressed a favorable opinion of Hungarians in Slovakia in late 1992, and 45 percent in 1998, but now a majority are favorable (55%) (Table A-64). The current coalition government, the reform-oriented Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK), includes a united group of Hungarian parties known as the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) which is representing the Hungarian minority in government for the first time. While relations between the SMK and other parties in the coalition have not always been smooth, perhaps the inclusion of the SMK in government has affected public views of Hungarians overall.

Hungarians Become More Negative Toward Romanians and Slovaks


In Hungary, opinion of Romanians and Slovaks living in Hungary has not improved in recent years. In fact, while opinion has fluctuated slightly over the past seven years, Hungarians are more negative now toward Romanians (60% unfavorable, 31% favorable) and Slovaks (37%, 49% favorable) than they were in 1992 (39% and 19% unfavorable, respectively) (Table A-65). This decline appears only loosely related to perception of the treatment of Hungarians in neighboring countries.

Bulgarian Views of Turks Improving Steadily

Bulgarians have become increasingly favorable toward the Turkish minority in their country. In the waning days of communism in Bulgaria, Turks faced considerable discrimination. One of the most blatant episodes was the “Bulgarianization” campaign of the 1980s during which the government forced ethnic Turks in Bulgaria to take Slavic names in place of their own. Following the collapse of the communist regime, the predominantly Turkish party “Movement for Rights and Freedom” was created, and has since played an important role in political life in Bulgaria.

Favorable opinion of Turks has steadily increased since 1991, and today, Bulgarians tend to say ethnic relations in Bulgaria are good (Figure 27 and Table A-66). Bulgarians also express favorable views of other groups living in Bulgaria, including Russians (86%), Germans (81%), Jews (80%), Macedonians (79% in 1996) and Pomaks (63% in 1993).

Figure 27: Bulgarian Opinion of Ethnic Turks Living in Bulgaria
% favorable



Favorable Opinion of Germans Across Region

Germany has long been an important power in central Europe. While the percentage of Germans living in the region declined sharply during this century, people of German ethnicity have played an important role in the history of these central and east European states. And since the fall of the Berlin Wall, German investment has played an important part in the development of central and east European economies. German support has also been critical for these countries' bids to join NATO and the EU.

Currently, majorities in Romania (90%), Hungary (85%), Slovakia (84%), Bulgaria (81%), the Czech Republic (74%) and Poland (70%) have a favorable opinion of Germans living in their country. Opinions have generally become more favorable over the ten years since the fall of the Berlin Wall (Tables A-63 to A-68). In the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, favorable views have increased by about 10 percentage points since the early to mid-1990s. Views of Germany also tend to be favorable: eight in ten or more have a favorable opinion, though slightly fewer in the Czech Republic are favorable (67%, 31% unfavorable).

Opinion of Jews Improved Substantially in Most Countries

Majorities in central and eastern Europe (except in Poland) express a favorable opinion of Jews in their own countries. Three-quarters or more in the Czech Republic (84%), Bulgaria (80%), Slovakia (76%) and Romania (72%), and two-thirds in Hungary (66%, down from 76% in 1998) say they have a favorable opinion of Jews. Yet anti-Semitism remains a problem to some degree across Europe despite the fact that the declared Jewish population has dwindled to between about 3,000 to 15,000 in each country, except in Hungary where the population is larger (80,000). Negative opinion ranges between 6 and 19 percent. Opinion has generally become more positive toward Jews in the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia. Views have been stable in Bulgaria and more volatile in Hungary, where favorable views rose steadily in the early 1990s and declined after 1995 (Tables A-63 to A-68).

Moderator: "Are there any internal threats, within Poland, threats which could endanger our security?"

– "national minority."

Moderator: "Which one?"

– "All, but mainly the one which is in power now . . . they have dominated all media and they actually rule the country."

– Polish focus group participant, January 1999

In Poland, which has a more ethnically homogenous population than elsewhere, anti-Semitism remains an important social issue. A number of high-profile incidents, including last year's controversy over the crosses at Auschwitz, underscored the tension that still exists in Poland. From 1993 to 1995, favorable opinion of Jews in Poland increased from about one-third (35%) to over one-half (57%) and has since remained rather stable (Table A-67). Currently, half (49%) are favorable, a third (32%) are unfavorable and about a fifth express no opinion. Polish opinion of Jews is somewhat

more favorable than opinion of Roma (33%) or Russians (41%), but significantly less favorable than views of Germans (70%) or Slovaks (69%).

West European opinion of Jews resembles opinion in the east, though generally higher than in Poland, and has remained positive and stable over the past few years. Britons (80%), the French (70%) and Germans (63%) tend to express favorable views of Jews (12% to 22% are unfavorable). Western and eastern Germans express similar opinions of Jews (64% favorable west, 62% east) (Table A-69).

Negative Opinion of Roma Spans the Region

Roma have been a target of racially-motivated violence and official discrimination in many countries in central and eastern Europe. During the communist period, conditions for Roma varied from country to country. Many governments denied the existence of a Roma minority (conceding only citizens "of Gypsy descent"), while Roma in some countries were subject to the monitoring of their movement, forced settlement, and in some cases forced sterilization. With the transition, many of

– "I am really annoyed by all kinds of symptoms of nationalism in Germany and those attacks not only on the Turks but also Poles . . ."

– "We had the same here with Gypsies."

– Polish focus group participants, January 1999

these practices ended, but Roma were often hit hard economically. Lack of education, widespread discrimination and other factors have contributed to an unemployment rate which tops 80 percent in some regions. Although Roma are now able to declare their nationality and are counted in national censuses, it is likely that official statistics

vastly under-represent the total Roma population in many countries. Romani groups estimate that the actual number of Roma in the Czech Republic and Slovakia is more than twice the official number, and more than four times as high in Hungary and Romania (as high as 1.4 to 2.5 million in Romania, by some estimates).

In central and eastern Europe, opinion of Roma is most negative in Romania and Hungary (Table 28), followed by Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland. Slightly more Bulgarians are favorable than unfavorable toward Roma. As a percentage of the overall population, Roma represent a relatively larger share in Hungary (4%), Bulgaria (3%) and Slovakia (2%) than elsewhere.

Table 28: Opinion of Roma									
	Bulgaria	Czech R.	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia	Britain	France	Germany
Favorable	55%	30%	18%	35%	18%	27%	52%	41%	29%
Unfavorable	42	69	78	55	80	72	41	50	62
Don't know	3	2	4	10	2	1	7	9	10

Office of Research Surveys: 1999

Although Roma make up just .03 percent of the Czech population, relations between Czechs and Roma have been a high-profile issue in the last several years. The 1999 construction and subsequent dismantling of a wall to segregate Roma from the Czech community in Usti nad Labem in the Czech Republic underscored the antagonistic nature of the relationship between Czechs and Roma. Surveys have found that public opinion of Roma is negative in the Czech Republic, but generally no more so than in other central and east European countries (Table A-68).

Publics in Britain and France are not as negative as central and east Europeans in their expressed views of Roma (Table 28). Despite large inflows to Dover a year ago, the British are slightly more favorable than unfavorable toward Roma. The French are slightly more unfavorable than favorable, and a sizable majority in Germany (62%) express a negative view (29% are favorable). Britons and Germans have become more positive in their views since 1994 (Table A-69).

Support for the Principle of Equal Rights for Roma

Majorities in all six countries ranging from 73 percent in the Czech Republic to 55 percent in Slovakia say that "Roma should have the same rights" in their countries as the members of the majority ethnic group (Table 29). Four in ten (41%) in Slovakia and about a third elsewhere disagree.

Table 29: Roma Should Have the Same Rights						
	Bulgaria	Czech R.	Hungary	Poland	Romania*	Slovakia
Strongly agree	32%	35%	26%	24%	63%	22%
Somewhat agree	33	38	33	34		33
Somewhat disagree	14	15	20	22	33	24
Strongly disagree	13	8	17	11		17
Don't know	8	4	5	9	4	5

*Office of Research Surveys: 1999; *wording in Romania: "Do you think Roma should or should not have the same rights in Romania as Romanians?"*

However, this support does not necessarily represent support for an *increase* in the rights of Roma in the region. Majorities in most publics believe the rights of Roma are already “adequately protected in our country” (Table 30). In the Czech Republic, two thirds (67%) also agree that “racial violence is adequately prosecuted” (30% disagree). Those central and east Europeans who are unfavorable toward Roma are slightly more likely than those who are favorable to agree that protection of Roma’s rights are adequate.

Table 30: The Rights of Roma Are Adequately Protected in Our Country

	Bulgaria	Czech R.	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
Strongly agree	23%	38%	42%	9%	28%	48%
Somewhat agree	36	43	38	40	41	40
Somewhat disagree	16	13	11	17	14	6
Strongly disagree	7	4	4	4	7	4
Don't know	18	3	4	30	9	3

Office of Research Surveys: 1999

Opinion of Majority Groups Among Members of Minorities

While opinion of minority groups varies from country to country and, within countries, by ethnic group, a general pattern observed across the region is that members of minority ethnic groups tend to hold more favorable views of the majority than vice versa. For example, ethnic Turks (85%) in Bulgaria tend to be even more positive than ethnic Bulgarians (78%) about the state of relations and almost all ethnic Turks view ethnic Bulgarians favorably. Similarly, ethnic Hungarians in Romania (83%) and Slovakia (56%) are slightly more likely than ethnic Romanians (76%) or Slovaks (47%) to say relations are good, and nearly all express a favorable opinion of the majority nationality in their countries.

Minority Ethnic Groups Seek Rights

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of socialist governments led ethnic minorities in central and eastern Europe to press for improvement of their position in their states. In some countries, the end of the communist system meant improved conditions for members of ethnic minority groups. In others, the cultural and legal support formerly offered by communist governments came to an end. In some instances, nationalist sentiments were unleashed, for example the street demonstrations in Bulgaria in the early 1990s against the return of expelled Turks and the authorization of Turkish language education, and the violence in the Balkans.

Over the past decade, many civic associations and political parties have formed, pressing for greater rights – particularly language rights. Members of the ethnic majority groups appear more open (or less threatened) by cultural rights (except in higher education) than political rights, which apart from parliamentary representation, have little support.

Across the region, majority populations tend to support the right of ethnic minorities “to establish organizations and associations to preserve and develop their traditions and culture.” In recent surveys, seven in ten in Romania, and six in ten in Slovakia and Bulgaria support this right for the largest minority (Hungarians and Turks, respectively) (Tables A-70 to A-75). This support has

remained fairly consistent over the past ten years in Romania and Bulgaria, but has declined somewhat in Slovakia.

Support for parliamentary representation is also strong across the region. Ethnic Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia, and ethnic Turks in Bulgaria all have strong political parties representing their interests (though the Bulgarian constitution forbids the creation of ethnic parties) and each party currently has representatives in parliament. In Poland, the German Minority of Lower Silesia represents the German minority in western and northern Poland with two representatives in the *Sejm*. Seven in ten Romanians, Slovaks and Bulgarians support the right of ethnic minorities "to have their own representatives in parliament." Only about a quarter are opposed. Over the past ten years, support has been consistently high in Romania, declined slightly in Slovakia and increased substantially in Bulgaria (46% in 1991, 69% in 1999).

Widespread Opposition to Minority Language Education

Opposition is more widespread on the question of education in minority languages, which was a difficult issue under communism and remains a difficult issue in transition. The Romanian public is evenly divided over ethnic Hungarians' right to primary and secondary education in their mother tongue (51% support vs. 48% oppose). Similarly in Slovakia, where the constitution guarantees minorities the right to education in their native language, the public is evenly split on question of Hungarians' right "to conduct school classes in their own language" (48% vs. 49%). Ethnic Romanians (46% vs. 53%) and ethnic Slovaks are slightly more opposed (42% vs. 54%) than the overall public. And in Bulgaria, in contrast to their generally favorable views of Turks and the fact that the state funds some optional Turkish language instruction, a large majority (69%) oppose this right (25% support it).

Across the board, support for university education in minority languages is opposed by the majority ethnic group. Opposition likely stems from concern that minority language universities could become politicized and breed support for special status, autonomy or separation from the state. In Romania, where the status of the Babes-Bolyai University at Cluj has been a source of conflict long before transition, four in ten (38%) currently support the right of Hungarians to university education in the Hungarian language. Eight in ten Bulgarians oppose the right of Turks to university education in Turkish. When last asked in 1993, seven in ten Slovaks opposed higher education in minority languages.

"[Hungarians] are asking for those so-called collective rights, meaning human rights which are actually for every individual, no matter one's nationality, religion and so on, and I agree with these. However, when you ask for certain supplementary collective rights, it means that some inequities are about to be created . . . they started asking for a university in their own language . . . and territorial autonomy."

– Romanian focus group participant, January 1999

Poles and Hungarians Voice Support for Minority Rights

Asked between 1992 and 1994, majorities in Poland and Hungary, which have no sizable cohesive ethnic minority group, supported the right of minorities in their countries to establish cultural organization organizations, conduct school classes in their own languages, have radio and television programs in their own language and have representatives in parliament to represent their interests (Table A-73 to A-75). Poles and Hungarians are likely more supportive of rights for minorities than

are other publics because Poland's ethnic minority population is so small and Hungary's is so diverse that few feel threatened by minority organizations. In addition, Hungarians may be aware of the rights that ethnic Hungarians in other countries have worked for, particularly Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia.

Mixed Views on Rights in Western Europe

Publics in western Europe were mixed in their views of rights for ethnic minorities in 1992. A majority in Germany (both west and east), half in France and four in ten in Britain supported the right of minority groups to establish organizations and form associations to develop their traditions and culture (Table A-76). Just over half in Britain and nearly half in France were opposed. A majority in Germany and just four in ten in France and Britain supported the right of minorities to conduct school classes in their own language, and majorities across the three publics opposed "the right to have their own political organizations." Support was highest in eastern Germany (35%) and lowest in France (18%).

3.3 Few Support Extreme Nationalist Political Parties

Strength of Nationalist Parties

Just as only a small percentage strongly agree with intolerant assertions, only a very small group within each state actually vote for nationalist or far right political parties. In the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, well-organized nationalist parties have captured only between 4 and 9 percent of the vote in the last parliamentary elections. By comparison, in western Europe, extreme right parties have had a fair amount of popular success in national elections in recent years, particularly the much publicized gains made by Haider's Freedom Party (FPO) (27% of the vote) in Austria (Nationalrat 1999) and the entry of the party into government. Other far-right parties in western Europe that garnered sizable percentages over the past few years include the National Front (15%) in France (National Assembly 1997), the National Alliance (14%) and Northern League (11%) in Italy (Chamber of Deputies 1996). Very few voted for the right-wing parties in Germany, the Republikaner (2%) and Volksunion (1%) (Bundestag 1999).

Surveys in central and eastern Europe have found that in percentage terms, fewer say they support extreme right parties than vote for them in elections. The percentages who admit to supporting an extreme nationalist party are in some cases very small, therefore the following analysis should be viewed as broadly suggestive of the views of these supporters.

■ **In Slovakia**, the Slovak National Party (SNS) is the major party representing the extreme right. The SNS was founded in 1989 and maintains an extremely nationalist anti-Hungarian rhetoric. The SNS was in government until their defeat with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) in 1998. While the HZDS is not an avowedly nationalist party, supporters share many of the views of the SNS. Long led by Jan Slota, the SNS recently installed a new and slightly more popular leader, Anna Malikova. In recent years, the party opposed NATO membership for Slovakia and supported a "voluntary exchange of minorities" with Hungary. SNS supporters resemble the overall Slovak public in terms of their demographics, but they are more likely than others to say that "Slovakia is only for Slovaks" and that there are too many people of other nationalities in their country. They tend to *lack* confidence in the national government, say the U.S. has too much influence over their country's affairs and are less likely than ruling SDK supporters to support joining the EU. SNS

supporters are more pessimistic than others about Slovakia's chance of ever becoming a democracy, though they are no more likely than others to want to reverse the political transition.

■ **The Czech Republic** has one party representing the extreme right: the Assembly for the Republic - Czechoslovak Republican Party (SPR-RSC). The party was founded in 1989 by Miroslav Sladek who remains party chairman. The party held seats in parliament in the mid 1990s, but in 1998 it only gained 3.9 percent of the vote, thus failing to reach the 5 percent threshold for entry. SPR-RSC is a xenophobic party with an anti-Semitic, anti-Roma and anti-Sudeten German program. Because the Republican's following is so small, Office of Research data is not available.

■ **In Hungary**, the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP) represents the extreme right and voices extreme nationalist views. The party was formed by István Csuka in 1993, after he was expelled from the mainstream Hungarian Democratic Party (MDF). The party supports the return of former Hungarian territory which was lost in 1919 and 1947, opposes EU membership and is conspicuously anti-Semitic. In the 1998 parliamentary elections, the party won 5.5 percent of the vote and have 14 (out of 386) seats in parliament. A spring 1999 poll found that supporters do not appear to differ demographically from the general Hungarian public. They do not appear to hold anti-western views generally, but majorities say that "western consumerism and commercialism are a threat" to Hungarian culture and that foreign investment "is dangerous because it gives outsiders too much control" over Hungarian affairs. Consistent with the party's stated support for the current government, supporters have views similar to the overall public on the new democratic system and the economy and tend not to want to "return to the security of the old system." MIEP supporters are slightly more likely than supporters of most other parties to agree that "Hungary is only for Hungarians" and that there are too many foreigners in Hungary. Most say that ethnic relation in Hungary are bad and have a negative opinion of Jews and Roma.

■ **Romania** has two strong extreme right parties: the Party of Greater Romania (PRM) and the Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR). The PRM was founded in 1991 by Corneliu Vadim Tudor. The party is anti-Hungarian and supports unification with Moldova. It won 4.5 percent of the vote in the 1996 parliamentary elections. The PUNR was founded in 1990 by Gheorghe Funar (now the mayor of Cluj) and is currently led by Valeriu Tabara. It also has an anti-Hungarian bias, but it supports integration into western institutions. The party won 4.3 percent in 1996 and participates in government. Supporters of these two parties do not differ greatly from the overall public in terms of age, gender or highest level of education, but they are more likely than others to say their household economic situation is bad. They are slightly more likely than the public as a whole to say that there are parts of neighboring countries that really belong to Romania, that "western consumerism and commercialism are a threat" to Romania and that there are too many non-Romanians in Romania. However, majorities of several mainstream parties share these views. PRM and PUNR supporters tend to lack confidence in the national government.

■ **Bulgaria** does not have a strong xenophobic party. Winning only 0.17 percent of the vote and no seats in the 1997 election, the National Radical Party supports a "Greater Bulgaria." The Fatherland Party of Labor promotes an anti-Turkish program and had ties to skinheads in the 1994 elections. Because support is so limited, Office of Research polling does not capture enough supporters of this party to make any clear distinctions in their views.

■ **Poland** has an unusually high number of small, marginal political parties. Some of these support xenophobic programs, though they have little or no influence on national political debate. Two of the more well-known are the Union of Real Politics (UPR) and the Polish National Party-Polish National Commonwealth (PSN-PWN), neither of which has representation in parliament. Of those parties present in parliament, representatives of the Christian-National Union (ZChN), the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN) and the Republican League are seen to be more nationalist than others. Because these parties' followings are so small, Office of Research data is not available. Among larger parties, supporters of the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland (ROP) are somewhat more likely than others to express nationalist views.

Nationalist Party Supporters Share Some Common Views

Supporters of far-right parties in central and eastern Europe share similar views on some key domestic issues and issues of tolerance, however there is no single view on foreign policy matters. As might be expected, the SPR-RSC in the Czech Republic, MIEP in Hungary, PRM in Romania and SNS (and HZDS) in Slovakia³ are more nationalist and intolerant than others (supporters of PUNR in the 1999 sample expressed views similar to those of the overall Romanian public). They tend to agree with the idea that their country belongs to their own ethnic groups and that there are too many people of other nationalities living there. They also tend to be more skeptical than the general public of economic reform and opposed to the free market system. In addition, supporters of each of these far-right parties, except the MIEP, tend to be somewhat open to authoritarian rule and willing to trade some political liberty for a strong leader if they thought he "could solve the country's problems."

On foreign policy-related issues, however, opinions diverge. Only in Slovakia, do far right supporters oppose joining both NATO and the EU. In the Czech Republic, SPR-RSC supporters oppose joining NATO, but support joining the EU, as do most Czechs. Right-wing supporters in the other countries resemble the general publics on NATO and EU membership. Similarly, while SNS, HZDS, PRM and SPR-RSC supporters tend to be more critical of the U.S. than the public overall, supporters of MIEP and PUNR share the generally favorable views of the overall public.

³Because of the small samples sizes (n=15 to n=86), this analysis should be seen as merely suggestive.

Key Attitudes Among Political Party Supporters

	Country is for the majority		Too many foreigners		Too much U.S. influence		Join NATO		Join EU		Free market		Strong leader desirable	
	Agr	Dis	Agr	Dis	Agr	Dis	Sup	Opp	Sup	Opp	Rt	Wrg	Agr	Dis
Bulgaria														
Total	42	51	35	47	61	21	52	34	76	8	48	32	49	37
Dem. Left (n=151)	54	42	45	36	75	9	18	74	67	18	27	60	69	20
UDF (n=331)	46	51	35	55	53	38	85	10	93	2	69	20	36	60
The Czech Republic (combination preference and inclined)														
Total	31	68	46	52	57	38	61	35	72	21	40	46	40	56
SPR-RSC (n=15)	53	47	53	47	80	13	40	60	60	27	27	67	60	27
KDU-CSL (n=84)	34	66	52	44	54	41	68	28	79	16	35	44	30	63
ODS (n=262)	25	73	39	60	47	49	87	11	90	8	57	35	29	68
US (n=109)	13	85	31	68	34	63	90	9	88	7	60	28	23	54
CSSD (n=194)	29	69	42	56	66	30	50	45	75	24	36	51	44	50
KSCM (n=94)	38	59	55	46	72	26	18	81	31	58	18	67	65	32
Hungary														
Total	72	26	72	26	52	37	68	27	78	14	45	39	56	39
MIEP (n=23)	96	4	88	13	38	63	65	35	84	17	38	54	42	59
FKGP (n=62)	81	18	73	26	49	42	66	31	76	21	48	39	56	43
FIDESZ (n=308)	73	26	66	32	49	43	81	15	83	12	49	34	51	40
MSZP (n=246)	71	28	78	20	59	31	65	31	82	12	44	44	64	33
Munkaspart (n=22)	68	15	91	9	78	22	55	36	70	31	35	52	91	9
Poland														
Total	40	56	25	68	48	39	77	18	64	25	46	39	50	41
ROP (n=47)	47	49	41	53	53	41	68	30	57	34	34	49	53	40
AWS (n=149)	40	58	27	67	44	47	86	10	75	14	59	30	46	48
SLD (n=220)	40	58	24	71	58	35	77	21	65	29	50	41	59	36
UP (n=59)	46	54	29	65	57	36	82	18	61	27	46	44	56	34
KPEIR (n=44)	50	50	34	46	46	23	71	13	64	13	46	32	58	27
UPR (n=14)	21	79	7	85	65	28	71	21	57	35	57	29	43	42
UW (n=99)	25	73	13	87	43	55	93	7	86	10	65	27	29	64
PSL (n=82)	51	49	33	61	52	40	70	27	47	50	26	60	64	37
Romania														
Total	46	49	29	60	46	41	74	19	81	8	42	48	64	30
PRM (n=86)	60	40	56	42	58	38	70	29	85	12	27	70	74	24
PUNR (n=23)	52	48	26	61	48	30	78	22	78	13	30	57	83	17
CDR (n=195)	36	62	24	73	43	51	90	8	94	4	58	36	50	46
PDSR (n=248)	62	31	37	49	48	34	64	28	71	11	29	59	71	21
APR (n=10)	47	44	27	66	56	39	74	20	88	4	46	45	63	34
UDMR (n=34)	3	91	6	85	21	56	89	3	91	3	47	32	56	36
Slovakia														
Total	33	65	41	57	63	32	39	55	72	22	34	52	43	49
SNS (n=68)	48	51	61	39	78	23	13	82	59	39	28	63	53	43
HZDS (n=283)	53	45	61	37	79	16	14	83	49	45	24	61	59	20
SDK (n=214)	22	76	23	74	51	44	71	25	92	5	49	39	29	64
SOP (n=126)	29	71	51	48	62	34	50	46	81	14	34	53	50	45
SDL (n=137)	24	75	27	61	69	29	34	63	82	18	33	58	45	53
SMK (n=59)	4	95	29	61	30	59	71	20	88	7	32	51	44	59

4. CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEANS' WORLD VIEW

Over the past decade, central and east Europeans have been more concerned about the economic prospects and, to a lesser extent, the political stability in their societies than about their involvement in the region or the world. In fact, many of those who advocate greater integration into Europe appear to do so out of belief that it will benefit their countries economically. Yet, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact has made it necessary for these countries to reevaluate their security needs as well as their relations with each other and with states and organizations outside the region. Although there are variations across the region, these publics show substantial interest in integration into existing European institutions.

4.1 Perceptions of the Security Environment

International Issues Take a Back Seat to the Economy

Faced with the challenges of increased economic insecurity and social change, it is not surprising that central and east Europeans seldom mention international concerns, including national security, as their top priority. When asked to name the most urgent issue facing their country, less than five percent volunteer security or national defense. Between 60 percent and 77 percent name an economic matter. When asked directly about the most important issue for world leaders to address, unemployment is mentioned most often as the most pressing global issue (Table 31). But many also name the situation in the Balkans, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and instability in the world financial markets as most critical.

" . . . for example the Marshall Plan did not cover us...and today, if we had lost the war like Germany and become a part of a different sphere of influence we would have been different today."

– Polish focus group participant, January 1999

The tendency to focus first on domestic concerns, particularly the economy, is not exclusive to transition societies. West Europeans also tend to name economic concerns ahead of international and security matters. In France, Germany and Italy, half name unemployment as the most important issue for world leaders to address. In Britain, proliferation concerns rival worry about unemployment (Table A-77).

Table 31: Most Important Issue for World Leaders to Address

	Bulgaria	Czech Rep.	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
Unemployment	30%	23%	31%	40%	32%	39%
Instability in the Balkans	34	20	13	16	15	17
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	10	18	21	11	12	11
Instability in world financial markets	6	13	8	4	16	13
Narcotics and drug trade	4	7	10	9	6	8
Environmental pollution	4	9	8	6	6	4
Terrorism	5	8	8	6	5	6
AIDS	1	1	1	4	3	1
Other (volunteered)	1	0	0	1	1	0

Office of Research Surveys: 1999

A Budding Global Perspective?

The predominance of domestic concerns is also evident when the domestic and international policy realms are pitted against one another. In all but Hungary, a majority agree that their country "should not worry about world affairs but just concentrate on taking care of problems at home" (Table 32). This tendency is strongest in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia, where the economic situation remains more difficult. However, in the countries which have had greater success with both economic reform and integration into European institutions, opinion is more divided. Half in Hungary and four in ten in the Czech Republic and Poland disagree with a focus on domestic matters.

Table 32: "Our country should not worry about world affairs but just concentrate on taking care of problems at home."

		1993	1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria	Agree	73%	81%	86%	72%
	Disagree	16	14	11	23
Czech Rep.	Agree	44%	64%	60%	58%
	Disagree	53	34	37	41
Hungary	Agree	49%	53%	54%	46%
	Disagree	47	46	44	53
Poland	Agree	67%	62%	68%	59%
	Disagree	28	30	23	41
Romania	Agree	n/a	66%	n/a	71%
	Disagree	n/a	33	n/a	23
Slovakia	Agree	59%	68%	n/a	71%
	Disagree	37	27	n/a	27

Office of Research Surveys: 1993-1999

Opinion in the latter three countries resembles opinion found among their western neighbors where the margin between those who agree and those who disagree is fairly narrow. The French (53% agree, 45% disagree) are inclined to agree that domestic concerns should take priority over world affairs. The British (41%, 56%) and Italians (45%, 49%) are inclined to disagree.

Security Threats Remain

Reflecting contemporary security concerns that sometimes extend beyond national borders, central and east Europeans do not see the world as any more secure than it was during the Cold War. Across the region more disagree than agree with the statement, "since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the world has become much safer" (Table 33). Only in Poland do half think the world is now safer. One-quarter of Bulgarians and Romanians are uncertain. Central and east European concern is shared by west European publics where less than one-third see the world as safer. Half or more in Germany (63%), France (59%), Italy (49%) and Britain (47%) disagree that the world has become safer.

Despite concern about world security in general, in most countries, fear of attack from another country had been declining over the course of the


Table 33: "Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the world has become much safer."

		1998	1999
Bulgaria	Agree	37%	35%
	Disagree	38	40
Czech Rep.	Agree	48%	42%
	Disagree	45	51
Hungary	Agree	39%	36%
	Disagree	51	52
Poland	Agree	55%	50%
	Disagree	34	36
Romania	Agree	45%	33%
	Disagree	34	40
Slovakia	Agree	35%	32%
	Disagree	51	54

Office of Research Surveys: 1998-1999

last decade. Until the Kosovo crisis, central and east Europeans were generally less concerned about their country being attacked than in the early 1990s. In 1999, before the Kosovo settlement, concern that their country may be attacked by another country in the next few years increased between ten and 25 percent over 1998 levels (Figure 28 and Table A-78). Among Bulgarians and Hungarians who are concerned about attack, Serbia is most often named as the most likely threat. Czechs, Poles and Romanians are worried most about Russia. Slovaks are currently most concerned about the U.S.

Figure 28: Fear of Attack



4.2 Membership in Europe and International Organizations

European Institutions

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent end of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, one way in which central and east Europeans apparently feel they could deal with current world threats is by joining established international and European organizations. Among central and east European publics, confidence in these organizations was initially modest, likely due to a combination of lack of awareness and Cold War impressions. Over the last decade, awareness of and confidence in international organizations, including NATO, the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), have approached the levels found in western Europe, particularly in the nations that recently joined NATO (Tables A-79 to A-82). The situation in Kosovo demonstrated that confidence in these institutions among NATO members, including new members, generally endures even in a crisis situation. Polling data also suggest that fluctuations in confidence are likely to be more pronounced in those countries that are not currently members of NATO.

"... the Warsaw treaty collapsed and for this reason we were left like this poor orphan Mary standing on the crossroads and looking for someone to take care of her. And the first person we managed to find was NATO."

– Polish focus group participant, January 1999

Joining the Club: NATO

In the early 1990s, in the wake of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, publics across central and eastern Europe expressed low levels of confidence in NATO. In part this may be due to a lack of familiarity with the Alliance. For example, in April 1990, half (57%) in Poland agreed that "Poland should remain part of the Warsaw Pact," however, somewhat more lacked (40%) than had (33%) confidence

in the alliance. When asked at the same time about confidence in NATO, a plurality (43%) gave no response. Among those who did respond, somewhat more expressed a lack of confidence in NATO (35%) than said they had confidence (22%).

Since 1990, central and east European publics have become more familiar with NATO – when asked about NATO far fewer now than previously say they “don’t know” or decline to give a response. Moreover, NATO’s image among central and east Europeans has become much more positive over the past decade. For example, confidence in

NATO has increased, particularly among the new NATO members: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (Figure 29). Most recently, Hungarians and Poles express the most confidence in the Alliance while confidence among Czech and Romanians has decreased slightly from 1998 to 1999 (Table A-79). In Bulgaria and Slovakia, where publics had been divided in 1998, majorities now lack confidence. The gap in confidence levels between those countries that have already joined and those not yet invited underscores the challenge to NATO to maintain and increase confidence in the Alliance among publics across the region.

NATO Membership Supported

The enlargement of NATO to include three countries formerly in the Warsaw Pact inaugurated the Alliance’s most dramatic adjustment to the post-1989 security conditions in Europe. Not long after joining the Alliance, the new member governments were faced with obligations of assisting NATO with its air campaign against Serbia; in some cases, against popular sentiment. Still, majorities in all but Slovakia continue to support their country’s membership or aspirations to membership. Among the new members, support has slipped slightly in the Czech Republic and Hungary but has remained steady in Poland (Table 34). Among candidate countries, support has

Figure 29: Confidence in NATO

% with fair amount or great deal of confidence --
average for each period




Table 34: Support for NATO Membership

		1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Czech Rep.	Favor	59%	60%	51%	59%	68%	61%
	Oppose	20	27	33	30	26	35
Hungary	Favor	56%	57%	57%	59%	76%	69%
	Oppose	16	28	27	31	19	27
Poland	Favor	–	91%	80%	83%	76%	78%
	Oppose	–	8	6	8	12	18
Bulgaria	Favor	–	55%	52%	57%	57%	54%
	Oppose	–	20	27	23	27	34
Romania	Favor	67%	–	79%	83%	85%	74%
	Oppose	4	–	7	9	9	11
Slovakia	Favor	48%	61%	46%	53%	56%	40%
	Oppose	22	24	32	35	34	55

Office of Research Surveys: 1994-1999

declined in Romania and even more so in Slovakia, where a majority is opposed to membership. Bulgarian support for membership has remained steady at about half. In Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia, support for membership is higher than confidence, but in new member states, levels of support and confidence are much closer (Figure 30).


Future NATO Enlargement

The three other central and east European countries that are not yet NATO members have had mixed expectations for future membership. Between four in ten and half in each of the countries not invited to join NATO at the Madrid Summit expect to join sometime in the next five years (Table 35). Expectations in Romania declined dramatically after peaking in 1998. In Slovakia, half expect membership even though as many are opposed to it. Bulgarian expectations have remained constant.

Having joined NATO, Czechs, Hungarians and Poles tend to support further enlargement of the Alliance. Two-thirds of Czechs and Hungarians, and three-quarters of Poles support further enlargement of the Alliance. Among west Europeans, support for expanding NATO further eastward is limited in Britain, France and Germany (four in ten or less in 1998) where the publics conceivably perceive more costs than benefits, but is greater in Italy (65%) where more public sympathy exists for a nation improving its circumstances through European integration.

For these countries, participation in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) remains an important link to western security structures. Office of Research surveys conducted in 1997 found that PfP participation was supported by solid majorities in Bulgaria (62%), Slovakia (75%) and Romania (81%).

Figure 30: Views of NATO



"[If Romania joined NATO, our situation] would change, because then Americans would come and invest in Romania. American businessmen would come and invest here, because it is very clear that NATO in fact means America."

– Romanian focus group participant, January 1999

Table 35: Likelihood of Membership Within Five Years

Percentage answering "somewhat" or "very" likely

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria	31%	29%	45%	41%	39%
Romania	–	55	56	70	45
Slovakia	42	39	40	43	52

Office of Research Surveys: 1995-1999

"If Romania were in NATO, the equipment and training of our military would have to be at the level of other NATO armies.... This would be a good thing, but ... the population would have to stand the costs of it, and this would be tough."

– Romanian focus group participant, January 1999

Some Balk at the Price of NATO Membership

While NATO membership in principle has generally been supported by central and east Europeans, taking on likely responsibilities associated with membership has been much less enthusiastically received (Tables 36, A-83 and A-84). Public reluctance to support specific NATO duties in the countries outside the alliance (and throughout central and eastern Europe prior to the recent expansion) appears to suggest an unwillingness to fulfill the basic premise of NATO. Yet by 1998, with NATO membership in sight, the publics in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland had become much more willing to accept those duties, indicating the potential for NATO accession to alter the opinion landscape. Among likely NATO responsibilities, allowing NATO troops to be stationed in their country receives the least support, and participating in peacekeeping missions receives the most. A more practical indicator of central and east European public willingness to fulfill NATO

Table 36: Responsibilities of Membership

If we join NATO there are certain things we may be asked to do. Please tell me if you would strongly support somewhat support, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose each of the following.

Percentage supporting each responsibility

	Bulgaria	Romania	Slovakia
Sending our troops to defend another NATO country	29	23	26
Regular, routine exercises in our country by NATO forces	33	32	28
Regular, routine flights over our country by NATO aircraft	30	26	24
Stationing NATO troops in our country	20	21	17
Providing our troops for NATO peacekeeping missions	30	38	44

Office of Research Surveys: 1999

commitments is reflected in opinion on recent events in the Balkans. Sizable majorities in 1998 in the Czech Republic (60%), Hungary (64%), Poland (67%) and Romania (65%) supported the involvement of their forces in Bosnia. Fewer, but still more than not, were supportive in Slovakia (54% to 38%), while Bulgarians were divided on the issue (46% to 41%). Opinion among most of these countries closely resembles views in western Europe where large majorities support their countries' participation in SFOR: Britain (74%), France (76%) and Germany (69%).

Joining the Club: the EU

Central and east Europeans see the European Union as another link for the future of their countries. As such, majorities across the region solidly support EU accession (Tables 37 and A-85). Support for EU membership has remained fairly consistent across the region since 1995, with support peaking between 1997 and 1998 then slipping slightly in 1999. Currently, about seven in ten or more in each country support EU membership.

Table 37: Support for EU Membership

Percentage who support joining EU

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria	75	78	79	82	78
Czech Rep.	72	66	70	82	71
Hungary	78	72	78	86	78
Poland	81	74	78	77	64
Romania	—	84	89	90	81
Slovakia	79	70	81	81	72


Office of Research Surveys: 1995-1999

West European attitudes toward extending the EU to include central and east European countries are mixed, however. The French (47% favor to 47% oppose) are evenly divided as are the Germans (45% to 48%). A majority of Italians (63%) favor expansion, while in Britain, more favor leaving the EU as it is (45%) than favor expanding it to the east (35%). In contrast to the other publics, two in ten in Britain are undecided or give no response. A 1997 Eurobarometer survey found that many residents of current EU countries expect that expansion would enhance the organizations' importance in the world, but many are wary of the financial costs of enlargement to their own country. In addition, an overall majority across the 15 members states believed that the "EU must reform the way its institutions work before welcoming new members."

Many Expect to Join the EU Soon

Surveyed before the EU issued invitations to begin accession talks in December 1999, fewer than in 1998 are confident that their country will join the EU within the next five years (Figure 31). Not surprisingly, in those countries likely to be among the first admitted into the EU, expectations of joining the EU are more widespread than in those countries further away from meeting the accession requirements. Czechs, Hungarians and Poles are solidly optimistic about the likelihood of their eventual accession. By contrast, Bulgarians, Romanians and Slovaks are less certain whether membership can be achieved within the next five years. Compared to 1998, fewer in Bulgaria and Romania expect EU membership sooner rather than later, but more than four in ten still retain confidence. To the extent such expectations contribute to support for economic, political and societal reform, declining expectations could serve to further dampen public tolerance for change. As a result, the gulf between those nations being integrated first and those left out of initial enlargement could widen.

Figure 31: Likelihood of Joining the EU Within the Next Five Years



Main EU Benefits/Costs Seen to Be Economic

When asked what would be the most important benefit of EU membership, most central and east Europeans mention higher living standards or a stronger economy. Slovak and Czech publics also cite job creation. As for the greatest disadvantage, Czechs say their firms may not be able to compete, Poles doubt their farmers' ability to compete and Slovaks worry about the inflow of foreign goods. Hungarians and Bulgarians mention "restricted sovereignty" as a possible problem, while a quarter of Romanians say there would be no disadvantages.

Despite any potential disadvantages to EU membership, far more central and east Europeans believe the economic policies and actions of the EU have already been helpful to their own country's economy (about four in ten across the region) than believe they have been harmful (about two in ten or fewer). Still, a third perceive little impact by the EU on their nation's economic circumstances. Importantly, among all three groups – including those critical of the EU's impact – more favor than oppose their country joining the union.

Confidence in EU Lower


Though their countries do not yet belong to the EU, half or more in each country express confidence in the EU's ability to deal effectively with European problems. However, in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Romania, about 10 percent fewer say they are confident than in 1998 (Table A-80). Elsewhere, confidence is largely unchanged from a year ago. Up through 1998, confidence in the EU across the region had remained steady or increased slightly over the decade. The range of opinions is similar to that found in western Europe, where just half in Britain and Germany say they have confidence in the EU's abilities, and seven in ten or better in France and Italy are confident.

Comparing confidence in the EU with support for membership shows the practical appeal of the organization. Throughout the region, as many or more support EU membership as express confidence in the organization's role in Europe (Figure 32). Importantly, even among those who say they have little or no confidence in the EU's European role:

- in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, more favor than oppose joining the EU.
- in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, just as many as not favor joining.
- only in Poland do more oppose membership.

Though lagging behind their support for joining the EU, publics in the region tend to support the EU taking a leading role in world affairs (Figure 32). Hungarians are the most supportive of a strong global role for the EU, coinciding with their widespread confidence in the organization, while Slovaks are the most reserved.

Figure 32: Views of the European Union



Relations with Neighbors

Bolstering the desire to integrate into Europe, publics have generally positive views toward other countries in the region, though a few exceptions remain (Table 38, next page). For the most part, three-quarters or more express a favorable opinion when asked about major western countries including Austria, Britain, France, Germany, Greece and the U.S. Not surprisingly, given the forced ties during the Cold War and earlier historic relations, Russia is broadly unpopular across the region, except in Bulgaria which had the closest ties during the previous period.

Views range widely from country to country when publics are asked about their more immediate neighbors. Broadly speaking, publics have less favorable views of the neighbors with which they have minority ethnic ties and/or historic border issues (see also Section 3). Bulgarians are most favorable toward their neighbors in general, but are less so toward Turkey. Czechs express a less favorable view of Germany, and Poles are less favorable toward Ukraine than toward other countries in the region. Romanians and Slovaks have less favorable views of Hungary and a majority of Hungarians hold unfavorable views of these countries in return.

Table 38: Opinion of Countries

Favorable opinion of each country...

<i>among publics in...</i>	Austria	Britain	Bulgaria	Czech R.	France	Germany	Greece	Hungary	Macedonia	Moldova	Poland	Romania	Russia	Serbia	Slovakia	Turkey	Ukraine	U.S.
Bulgaria	-	-	98	-	86	82	-	-	87	-	-	73	86	65	-	61	-	66
Czech R.	91	88	-	95	92	67	74	-	-	-	80	-	36	38	85	-	-	79
Hungary	92	-	-	54	-	87	86	-	-	-	71	22	25	7	39	-	-	84
Poland	84	-	-	78	87	83	-	81	-	-	86	-	26	-	73	-	38	85
Romania	-	-	61	-	88	91	82	59	-	67	79	80	34	47	-	-	50	79
Slovakia	92	75	-	92	88	79	-	53	-	-	82	-	52	42	95	-	-	59

Office of Research Surveys: 1999

4.3 Views of the Former Adversaries: The U.S. and Russia

The end of the Cold War has altered the international landscape in central and eastern Europe, but it has not diminished the importance of the United States and Russia to the region. Public opinion among central and east Europeans toward the U.S. and Russia reflects a mix of residual Cold War influences and pragmatic considerations.

Positive General Image of the United States

Across central and eastern Europe, favorable opinion toward the U.S. has remained high throughout the decade with seven in ten or more expressing positive views (Table 39, next page, and Table A-86). Poles and Romanians have generally been the most positive toward the U.S. since 1990. Bulgarians have tended to be less positive than others in the region. In the last year, favorable opinion has declined in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia, likely reflecting negative reaction to the U.S. role in the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia.

"...sometimes the United States is called the gendarme of the world. [It] is needed because [without it] there would be many unnecessary conflicts...it isn't a gracious role."

– Polish focus group participant, January 1999

Still, general opinion of the U.S. is on par with or even higher than that in Germany (79%), Britain (78%), Italy (77%) and France (63%). While the shifts resulting from the Kosovo air campaign point to the short-term volatility of views of the U.S., in all likelihood favorable opinion will return to former levels, particularly if the situation in the Balkans stabilizes.

Table 39: Opinion of the United States and Russia
percentage expressing a favorable opinion

		1990*	1991*	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria	<i>U.S.</i>	75	81	75	72	70	69	75	79	76	67
	<i>Russia</i>	44	77	74	79	81	85	86	90	87	86
Czech Rep.	<i>U.S.</i>	71	87	88	85	82	79	78	82	83	79
	<i>Russia</i>	25	46	38	27	39	34	33	46	38	37
Hungary	<i>U.S.</i>	81	83	76	84	79	75	77	84	85	83
	<i>Russia</i>	30	14	28	29	29	19	24	32	30	25
Poland	<i>U.S.</i>	84	89	84	81	84	78	80	87	86	85
	<i>Russia</i>	24	20	29	22	20	22	26	25	26	25
Romania	<i>U.S.</i>	79	81	76	80	80	—	89	93	89	79
	<i>Russia</i>	58	50	22	29	33	—	39	38	31	34
Slovakia	<i>U.S.</i>	75	86	82	83	81	82	78	77	—	58
	<i>Russia</i>	27	58	44	50	62	43	39	48	—	52

Office of Research Surveys: 1990-1999, *In 1990 and 1991, the question referred to the Soviet Union.

Image of Russia Remains Largely Negative

Central and east Europeans are much less inclined to express a favorable view of Russia⁴ than of the U.S. (Tables 39 and A-87). Only in Bulgaria, and most recently in Slovakia, has the level of favorable opinion of Russia rivaled views of the U.S. Since 1994, Bulgarians have actually been more likely to express a favorable view of Russia than of the U.S. In the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, opinion of Russia has remained fairly constant with about a third or fewer saying they have a favorable view. In Romania, favorable opinion of Russia was at half in 1990 and 1991, and then dropped dramatically to 22 percent in 1994, and has increased somewhat since then. Favorable opinion in Slovakia reached six in ten until 1994, and then dropped off to four in ten.

Less Enthusiasm for U.S. Leadership

The largely favorable overall image of the U.S. masks some specific concerns about the U.S. as a foreign policy actor. In each of the six countries, far fewer consider strong U.S. leadership in world affairs desirable for their country's interests than express a favorable opinion of the U.S. (Table 40). In all but Hungary and Poland, the view that strong U.S. leadership is desirable is held by fewer now than a year ago. Some of the decline is likely a reaction to the events surrounding Kosovo and may be short-lived.

Table 40: Desirability of U.S. Leadership
1997 1998 1999

Bulgaria	Desirable	37%	33%	25%
	Undesirable	42	49	61
Czech Rep.	Desirable	55	51	41
	Undesirable	33	42	51
Hungary	Desirable	58	65	63
	Undesirable	33	28	28
Poland	Desirable	71	58	57
	Undesirable	14	24	31
Romania	Desirable	73	—	48
	Undesirable	17	—	34
Slovakia	Desirable	37	31	21
	Undesirable	46	56	72

Office of Research Surveys: 1997-1999

⁴In 1990 and 1991, respondents were asked their view of the Soviet Union.

The mix of positive and negative opinion across the region is similar to views in western Europe. Two-thirds in Britain (69%) think U.S. world leadership is desirable, while only half in Germany (50%) and fewer in France (45%) and Italy (35%) agree. Yet, Italians are most likely to express confidence in the ability of the U.S. to deal with world problems and the French are least likely. West Europeans tend to think the U.S. does not generally consider the views of other countries when it pursues its foreign policy.

Similarly in central and eastern Europe, favorable opinion of the U.S. does not necessarily translate into support for U.S. leadership. In Hungary, Poland and Romania, those with a positive overall view of the U.S. tend to value U.S. leadership while those with a negative image tend to oppose it. Yet, in Bulgaria and Slovakia, even those with a favorable opinion of the U.S. tend to consider U.S. leadership undesirable for the interests of their country, and in the Czech Republic, opinion of U.S. leadership among those favorably disposed toward the U.S. is divided.

U.S. Influence Excessive

At least part of what undermines central and east Europeans' confidence in U.S. leadership may be the widely held view the U.S. is heavy-handed in its relations with individual countries. Half or more throughout the region say that the U.S. has "too much influence" over their own country's affairs (Tables 41 and A-88). The percentage who consider U.S. influence excessive in each of these countries has increased during the last decade, perhaps out of concern for the role of the U.S. as the only real superpower and perhaps reflecting some resentment of U.S. activities in the Balkans.

Table 41: U.S. Influence

Percentage who agree U.S. has too much influence on their country's affairs

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria	33	34	45	44	41	43	52	55	61
Czech Rep.	33	34	43	52	51	51	44	47	57
Hungary	–	26	23	39	39	37	41	44	52
Poland	37	34	48	43	38	46	38	39	48
Romania	29	23	21	35	–	42	47	50	46
Slovakia	43	43	44	48	40	45	45	46	63

Office of Research Surveys: 1991-1999

However, central and east Europeans are still less likely than their west European counterparts to criticize the U.S. for its impact on their domestic situation. Seven in ten in Italy (73%), France (70%) and Britain (68%) think U.S. influence in their country's affairs is excessive. Only somewhat fewer in Germany (60%) think so. Conceivably, the sentiment that U.S. involvement in their affairs will benefit rather than harm their country is more prevalent among central and east Europeans than among west Europeans.

Views on U.S. influence are related to age. The young (those under age 35) in the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and to a lesser degree in Hungary tend to think that U.S. influence is not excessive, while the opposite is true for those over age 50.

Many Support Involving Russia in Europe

A telling indicator that central and east Europeans have new perceptions about security threats is that publics across the region seem open to policies which will engage Russia in security discussions and relations rather than isolate it. Surveys conducted in 1997 found that majorities in most European publics do not believe that Russia is inherently aggressive. Only about a quarter in each country surveyed agreed with the statement "Russia is aggressive by nature." Poles were more ambivalent than other publics (Table A-89).

Despite the tendency to view Russia with disfavor, many in central and eastern Europe support developing closer relations with Russia over the long run (Table 42). Majorities in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia support closer ties with Russia, while Czechs and Romanians are more divided. In Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland even those unfavorable tend to support closer relations. In the Czech Republic and Romania, those favorable tend to support closer relations with Russia while those unfavorable do not.

Table 42: Future Relations with Russia						
"It is important in the long-run for our country to develop closer relations with Russia."						
	Bulgaria	Czech Rep.	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
Agree	80%	43%	62%	66%	42%	56%
Disagree	10	50	30	26	44	37
<i>Office of Research Surveys: 1999</i>						

Views toward relations with Russia are similar in western Europe. Publics in Britain (66%), Germany (65%) and France (54%) also support the development of closer relations. In Italy, the public is divided among those who favor closer relations (34%), those who are opposed (38%) and those who are uncertain (28%).

The pragmatic approach of central and east Europeans toward Russia is also apparent in their attitudes toward the possibility of future NATO membership for Russia (Table 43). Surveys conducted in 1998 found that in each country, more thought Russia should be allowed to join "when it meets all the qualifications for membership" than thought it should be excluded. Except in Poland and Romania, both those with positive and those with negative views of Russia tended to favor its having an opportunity to join NATO.

Table 43: Russia and NATO						
Do you think Russia should be allowed to join NATO when it meets all the qualifications for membership or do you think Russia should be excluded from full membership in NATO?						
	Bulgaria	Czech Rep.	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
Allowed	53%	54%	57%	45%	45%	57%
Excluded	15	29	30	34	36	20
Don't know	32	17	13	21	19	23
<i>Office of Research Surveys: 1998</i>						

In the Wall's Shadow: Attitudes in Eastern and Western Germany

Unlike other central and east European publics, east Germans very quickly found themselves a part of western Europe. With German reunification, those in the eastern länder automatically became members of both NATO and the EU. While their entry to the West was swift, east Germans' fundamental views toward western institutions and core values changed more slowly. In the early years of transition, east Germans more closely resembled central and east Europeans than west Germans in their views of democracy, economic reforms, international institutions and the U.S. A decade later, polling indicates that east Germans have moved toward a more west European outlook, although in some cases, west German attitudes are closer to those found in central and eastern Europe.

Definition of Democracy

In 1992, Germans in both parts of the country named equal justice as the most important element in a democracy (50% west, 42% east) (Table 44). Western Germans named two parties competing in elections (18%) and meeting basic needs (14%) and Eastern Germans named basic needs (28%) as the next most important. Grouping the components into political and economic factors, western Germans chose political elements (76%) as more important for a democracy than economic elements (22%). Those in the east were more divided (53% political to 46% economic).

By 1999, western Germans gave greater emphasis to economic aspects of democracy, in part due to a general economic downturn, the costs of reunification and increased debate about the future of the welfare state. While those in the west still lean toward the political definition of democracy, twice as many now as in 1992 name economic aspects (55% political to 42% economic). Opinion in the east (48% to 48%) remains very similar to that expressed in 1992. (For comparisons with other countries see Section 1, Tables 2 and 3.)

Table 44: Most Important Aspect of Democracy

	West		East	
	1992	1999	1992	1999
At least two strong parties competing in elections	18%	14%	9%	13%
A system of justice that treats everyone equally	50	33	42	29
Freedom to criticize the government	8	8	2	6
Total political	76	55	53	48
A government that guarantees economic equality among its	4	15	9	9
A government that guarantees basic economic needs for all	14	17	28	29
Economic prosperity in the country	5	10	9	10
Total economic	23	42	46	48

Office of Research Surveys: 1992-1999

Economic Attitudes

Despite large differences between the level of east and west German economic development at unification, eastern evaluations of both the economic situation in the country and household financial situation have been only slightly lower than in the west (Table 45). (For comparisons with other countries see Section 2, Tables 10 and 11.)

Table 45: Current Economic Situation

Country		West					East				
		1992	1994	1996	1998	1999	1992	1994	1996	1998	1999
	Good	73%	30%	29%	32%	51%	62%	26%	27%	30%	45%
	Bad	25	69	72	65	45	35	74	72	69	49
Household	Good	n/a	73%	80%	63%	69%	n/a	64%	71%	57%	60%
	Bad	n/a	25	21	31	25	n/a	34	26	42	31

Office of Research Surveys: 1992-1999

Yet, the public in the eastern länder is more likely to describe themselves as pensioners or unemployed than those in the west (in fact, actual unemployment rates are twice as high in the east as in the west. And of those unemployed, those in the east tend to say they have been jobless for longer than those in the west. In eastern Germany half (50%) say they have been unemployed for two years or longer, while in the west a third have been unemployed for the same period of time. Likely for these reasons, unemployment is more of a concern for eastern (66%) than for western (48%) residents.


Mixed Views on Free Market Components

Slightly more than half among west Germans support the free market (53% vs. 33% oppose) and the privatization of large business (56% vs. 28% oppose). Eastern Germans tend to be opposed to the free market (32% favor vs. 41% oppose) and privatization (37% favor vs. 48% oppose); in fact, they are more negative toward the free market than central and east Europeans (see Section 2, Table 13). When asked about foreign investment, however, those in the east are slightly more supportive (63% favor vs. 18% oppose) than those in the west (57% favor vs. 22% oppose).

Trans-Atlantic Ties

In the early 1990s, far fewer eastern Germans had a positive view of NATO, reflecting the negative connotations associated with NATO under the previous political system. But by the mid-1990s, views had grown close to those in the west. In 1996, nearly as many as in the west said NATO is

Figure 33: NATO Essential



Opinion of NATO is no doubt related to views of the U.S. which have evolved in a similar pattern (Figure 34). In the early 1990s, favorable opinion was slightly lower in the east than in the west. By 1996, eastern views were nearly as positive as those in the west, though they have decreased slightly since then.

Germans Support EU Membership, But Have Mixed Views about Its Benefits

A majority of Germans in both areas of the country in 1998 supported their membership in the European Union (60% in the east and 63% in the west), and about four in ten in each area now think that EU membership is beneficial to Germany (Table 46). But eastern views have not always coincided with western views on European integration. Although in 1991 two thirds in each area favored "European political union because it will strengthen European interests around the world," opinions diverged greatly by 1993 and again in 1996 (Figure 35). Even in these years, however, the direction of views moved in tandem.

Both eastern and western residents currently tend to support common European policies. Half of the public in both regions are in favor of the establishment of a common currency, and stronger majorities support common European foreign and

Figure 34: Opinion of the U.S.
percentage favorable




Table 46: EU Membership Beneficial

	West		East	
	1998	1999	1998	1999
Beneficial	35%	38%	36%	42%
Not beneficial	45	40	49	33
Don't know	20	23	15	25

Office of Research Surveys: 1998-1999

Figure 35: European Political Union
percentage support




Table 47: Support for Common European Polities

	West	East
Establishment of a common European currency that will replace the Deutsche Mark	51%	55%
The development of a common European foreign policy	77%	75%
The development of a common European defense force	69%	64%

Office of Research Surveys: 1999

1. The first part of the paper discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions.	2. It also highlights the need for regular audits to ensure the integrity of the data.
3. The second part of the paper focuses on the challenges faced by organizations in implementing effective record-keeping systems.	4. These challenges include limited resources, lack of training, and outdated technology.
5. The third part of the paper presents a comprehensive framework for designing a robust record-keeping system.	6. This framework includes guidelines for data collection, storage, and retrieval.
7. The fourth part of the paper discusses the role of technology in enhancing record-keeping processes.	8. It explores various digital tools and platforms that can streamline data management.
9. The fifth part of the paper examines the legal and ethical implications of record-keeping practices.	10. It emphasizes the importance of transparency and accountability in handling sensitive information.
11. The sixth part of the paper provides a detailed analysis of the impact of record-keeping on organizational performance.	12. It shows how accurate records can lead to better decision-making and improved efficiency.
13. The seventh part of the paper discusses the future trends in record-keeping technology.	14. It highlights the potential of artificial intelligence and blockchain in revolutionizing data management.
15. The eighth part of the paper concludes with a summary of the key findings and recommendations.	16. It stresses the need for continuous improvement and innovation in record-keeping practices.
17. The ninth part of the paper includes a list of references and a bibliography.	18. It provides a comprehensive overview of the literature related to record-keeping.
19. The tenth part of the paper contains a list of figures and tables.	20. It includes visual representations of the data and findings discussed in the paper.
21. The eleventh part of the paper includes a list of appendices.	22. It contains supplementary information that supports the main text of the paper.
23. The twelfth part of the paper includes a list of footnotes.	24. It provides additional details and clarifications for the main text.
25. The thirteenth part of the paper includes a list of endnotes.	26. It contains concluding remarks and final thoughts on the topic.
27. The fourteenth part of the paper includes a list of acknowledgments.	28. It expresses gratitude to the individuals and organizations that supported the research.
29. The fifteenth part of the paper includes a list of disclosures.	30. It provides information about any potential conflicts of interest or funding sources.
31. The sixteenth part of the paper includes a list of declarations.	32. It states the author's commitment to the highest standards of research integrity.
33. The seventeenth part of the paper includes a list of statements.	34. It provides a clear and concise summary of the research findings.
35. The eighteenth part of the paper includes a list of conclusions.	36. It presents the final thoughts and recommendations based on the research.
37. The nineteenth part of the paper includes a list of recommendations.	38. It provides practical advice for organizations looking to improve their record-keeping practices.
39. The twentieth part of the paper includes a list of suggestions.	40. It offers ideas for further research and exploration in the field.
41. The twenty-first part of the paper includes a list of proposals.	42. It presents a plan for future research and development.
43. The twenty-second part of the paper includes a list of plans.	44. It outlines the steps and timeline for implementing the proposed changes.
45. The twenty-third part of the paper includes a list of strategies.	46. It describes the methods and approaches used in the research.
47. The twenty-fourth part of the paper includes a list of tactics.	48. It details the specific actions and techniques employed during the study.
49. The twenty-fifth part of the paper includes a list of techniques.	50. It provides a detailed description of the experimental procedures.
51. The twenty-sixth part of the paper includes a list of methods.	52. It outlines the overall research methodology and design.
53. The twenty-seventh part of the paper includes a list of procedures.	54. It describes the specific steps and protocols followed during the data collection.
55. The twenty-eighth part of the paper includes a list of protocols.	56. It provides a detailed account of the ethical considerations and approvals.
57. The twenty-ninth part of the paper includes a list of guidelines.	58. It offers recommendations for ensuring the quality and reliability of the data.
59. The thirtieth part of the paper includes a list of standards.	60. It describes the criteria and benchmarks used to evaluate the research results.
61. The thirty-first part of the paper includes a list of criteria.	62. It provides a detailed analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the study.
63. The thirty-second part of the paper includes a list of benchmarks.	64. It compares the research findings with existing literature and industry standards.
65. The thirty-third part of the paper includes a list of standards.	66. It provides a detailed description of the data analysis methods.
67. The thirty-fourth part of the paper includes a list of procedures.	68. It outlines the steps and protocols for data interpretation and reporting.
69. The thirty-fifth part of the paper includes a list of protocols.	70. It provides a detailed account of the final conclusions and recommendations.
71. The thirty-sixth part of the paper includes a list of guidelines.	72. It offers practical advice for implementing the research findings.
73. The thirty-seventh part of the paper includes a list of standards.	74. It describes the criteria and benchmarks for successful implementation.
75. The thirty-eighth part of the paper includes a list of criteria.	76. It provides a detailed analysis of the impact and significance of the research.
77. The thirty-ninth part of the paper includes a list of benchmarks.	78. It compares the research findings with existing literature and industry standards.
79. The fortieth part of the paper includes a list of standards.	80. It provides a detailed description of the data analysis methods.
81. The forty-first part of the paper includes a list of procedures.	82. It outlines the steps and protocols for data interpretation and reporting.
83. The forty-second part of the paper includes a list of protocols.	84. It provides a detailed account of the final conclusions and recommendations.
85. The forty-third part of the paper includes a list of guidelines.	86. It offers practical advice for implementing the research findings.
87. The forty-fourth part of the paper includes a list of standards.	88. It describes the criteria and benchmarks for successful implementation.
89. The forty-fifth part of the paper includes a list of criteria.	90. It provides a detailed analysis of the impact and significance of the research.
91. The forty-sixth part of the paper includes a list of benchmarks.	92. It compares the research findings with existing literature and industry standards.
93. The forty-seventh part of the paper includes a list of standards.	94. It provides a detailed description of the data analysis methods.
95. The forty-eighth part of the paper includes a list of procedures.	96. It outlines the steps and protocols for data interpretation and reporting.
97. The forty-ninth part of the paper includes a list of protocols.	98. It provides a detailed account of the final conclusions and recommendations.
99. The fiftieth part of the paper includes a list of guidelines.	100. It offers practical advice for implementing the research findings.

APPENDIX

Methodology

Tables

METHODOLOGY

The results presented in this report are based on Office of Research surveys conducted in the last decade in various European countries. The Office of Research pioneered scientific polling in many central and east European nations by encouraging the establishment of reputable commercial and academic polling organizations, by providing training in survey research where needed and by on-site monitoring of the procedures of newly-formed polling operations.

Mass Public Opinion Surveys

Office of Research surveys in central and eastern Europe are based on face-to-face interviews with nationally representative probability samples of the adult population (age 18 and older). The number of respondents in a typical national survey sample is around 1,000, and the Office of Research applies this standard in nearly all of its country surveys. The Office of Research commissions local (operating in the target country) survey research organizations with expertise in social research and analysis to conduct its polls. Survey questions are prepared by the Office of Research staff with input from individuals and groups in the foreign affairs community. Questions are translated by the local polling organization and are reviewed and approved by the Office of Research staff. The local polling organization conducts the interviews (fieldwork) under the supervision of the Office of Research.

Nineteen times out of 20, results from samples like those used by the Office of Research will differ by no more than about four percentage points in either direction from what would be found if it were possible to interview every adult in each survey country. Sampling error is larger for subgroups within each population (e.g. males/female; specific age groups; specific party supporters). In addition to sampling error, the practical difficulties of conducting surveys of public opinion may introduce other sources of error into the results.

Trend comparisons in the report are based on results from Office of Research surveys using the same question and similar samples across countries and over time. In a few cases, data from telephone interviews in western Europe have been used in the analysis.

Focus Groups

Qualitative findings (quotes and summaries of comments) are drawn from focus group discussions conducted in January 1999 in four European countries to gain more insight into how people view the transatlantic relationship, international organizations and other security issues. The Office of Research commissioned local research firms specializing in qualitative research to recruit participants based on a screening questionnaire developed by the Office of Research. Five focus group discussions were conducted in each of four cities: Frankfurt, Germany (*Millward Brown*); Madrid, Spain (*Quota Union*); Warsaw, Poland (*Demoskop*) and Bucharest, Romania (*IMAS*). Participants were 20 years of age or older with at least a secondary education and a moderate interest in international affairs. Contractors also provided focus group moderators who were native speakers of the country's language.

In each city, groups were divided by political party preference. Two groups were composed of right-leaning participants, two of left-leaning and one of "undecideds." (In Germany, the fifth group was composed of Green Party supporters.). Specifically, the groups broke down as follows: Germany, Christian Democratic Union (CDU) (2 groups), Social Democratic Party (SPD) (2), Greens (1); Spain, People's Party (PP) (2), Socialist Party (PSOE) and United Left (IU) (2), undecided (1); Poland, Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) (1), Alliance of Democratic Left (SLD) and other left-wing parties (1); Freedom Union (UW) (1), Union of Real Politics and other right-wing parties (1), undecided (1); Romania, Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR) and ruling-coalition parties (2), Alliance for Romania and opposition coalition parties (2), undecided (1).

Table A-1: Satisfaction With Democracy

(1992-1993) "Democracy has turned out not to mean what I thought it would mean."

(1995-1999) "I thought democracy would be better than it has turned out to be."

		1992	1993	s1995	f1995	1998	1999
Bulgaria	Strongly agree	—	46%	45%	—	46%	45%
	Somewhat agree	—	33	33	—	35	32
	Somewhat disagree	—	6	10	—	9	10
	Strongly disagree	—	5	3	—	4	6
	Don't know	—	10	8	—	6	8
Czech Rep.	Strongly agree	—	17	—	39%	42	41
	Somewhat agree	—	38	—	39	39	38
	Somewhat disagree	—	28	—	15	13	14
	Strongly disagree	—	13	—	5	4	4
	Don't know	—	5	—	3	2	3
Hungary	Strongly agree	46%	—	—	52	43	35
	Somewhat agree	34	—	—	33	33	42
	Somewhat disagree	11	—	—	7	15	13
	Strongly disagree	3	—	—	4	6	5
	Don't know	6	—	—	4	3	5
Poland	Strongly agree	—	32	35	29	30	37
	Somewhat agree	—	35	44	48	41	37
	Somewhat disagree	—	18	11	14	13	14
	Strongly disagree	—	7	4	4	5	5
	Don't know	—	8	6	5	12	7
Romania	Strongly agree	—	—	—	—	31	36
	Somewhat agree	—	—	—	—	37	33
	Somewhat disagree	—	—	—	—	18	14
	Strongly disagree	—	—	—	—	9	7
	Don't know	—	—	—	—	5	10
Slovakia	Strongly agree	—	30	—	43	36	48
	Somewhat agree	—	42	—	38	45	38
	Somewhat disagree	—	18	—	12	12	9
	Strongly disagree	—	5	—	3	3	3
	Don't know	—	4	—	4	4	3

Office of Research Surveys: 1992-1999

Table A-2: Confidence in Government

"Regardless of which party is in power, the country is governed poorly."

		1996	s1997	f1997	1998
Bulgaria	Strongly agree	38%	37%	30%	30%
	Somewhat agree	39	35	35	38
	Somewhat disagree	13	17	20	16
	Strongly disagree	7	7	11	12
	Don't know	4	5	6	5
Czech Rep.	Strongly agree	—	—	26	26
	Somewhat agree	—	—	44	47
	Somewhat disagree	—	—	23	20
	Strongly disagree	—	—	4	3
	Don't know	—	—	4	5
Hungary	Strongly agree	—	—	46	25
	Somewhat agree	—	—	33	32
	Somewhat disagree	—	—	13	29
	Strongly disagree	—	—	6	10
	Don't know	—	—	3	4
Poland	Strongly agree	—	—	21	19
	Somewhat agree	—	—	32	36
	Somewhat disagree	—	—	27	26
	Strongly disagree	—	—	12	6
	Don't know	—	—	9	13
Romania	Strongly agree	—	—	21	—
	Somewhat agree	—	—	25	—
	Somewhat disagree	—	—	34	—
	Strongly disagree	—	—	17	—
	Don't know	—	—	4	—
Slovakia	Strongly agree	—	—	23	26
	Somewhat agree	—	—	47	41
	Somewhat disagree	—	—	21	24
	Strongly disagree	—	—	4	5
	Don't know	—	—	5	4

Office of Research Surveys: 1996-1998

Table A-3: Return to Security vs. Go On With More Changes

(1993-1996) "I would rather go back to the certainties of the old system than continue with change."

(1997-1999) "I would prefer to return to the security of the old system rather than go on with more changes."

		1993	1994	1996	1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria	Strongly agree	14%	20%	25%	21%	25%	17%
	Somewhat agree	20	25	25	20	21	23
	Somewhat disagree	16	23	19	22	21	25
	Strongly disagree	35	22	25	30	27	26
	Don't know	15	10	6	8	7	9
Czech Rep.	Strongly agree	4	8	—	8	6	8
	Somewhat agree	10	14	—	17	16	18
	Somewhat disagree	29	22	—	29	30	28
	Strongly disagree	53	52	—	39	43	41
	Don't know	4	4	—	7	6	5
Hungary	Strongly agree	28	26	—	22	23	14
	Somewhat agree	30	27	—	21	15	23
	Somewhat disagree	24	22	—	26	28	29
	Strongly disagree	13	17	—	27	33	27
	Don't know	5	9	—	5	1	6
Poland	Strongly agree	14	15	13	14	13	12
	Somewhat agree	23	28	16	19	19	23
	Somewhat disagree	31	29	28	25	25	30
	Strongly disagree	23	19	31	33	30	26
	Don't know	8	9	12	9	11	10
Romania	Strongly agree	—	10	—	15	18	16
	Somewhat agree	—	12	—	18	13	18
	Somewhat disagree	—	15	—	24	16	20
	Strongly disagree	—	58	—	40	49	39
	Don't know	—	6	—	3	4	7
Slovakia	Strongly agree	10	12	—	14	16	17
	Somewhat agree	20	24	—	23	21	25
	Somewhat disagree	36	32	—	35	33	31
	Strongly disagree	28	27	—	23	25	22
	Don't know	6	5	—	6	5	5

Office of Research Surveys: 1993-1999

Table A-4: Democracy – Best System for Us?

"Whatever the problems that democracy brings, it's the best system of government for us."

		1994	s1995	f1995	s1996	f1996	1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria	Strongly agree	–	21%	–	–	–	–	31%	25%
	Somewhat agree	–	37	–	–	–	–	30	29
	Somewhat disagree	–	18	–	–	–	–	15	20
	Strongly disagree	–	11	–	–	–	–	12	14
	Don't know	–	13	–	–	–	–	12	12
Czech Rep.	Strongly agree	–	–	27%	34%	–	–	35	20
	Somewhat agree	–	–	44	44	–	–	41	42
	Somewhat disagree	–	–	18	14	–	–	16	26
	Strongly disagree	–	–	5	3	–	–	5	8
	Don't know	–	–	6	5	–	–	4	5
Hungary	Strongly agree	–	–	24	37	–	–	32	27
	Somewhat agree	–	–	33	34	–	–	40	39
	Somewhat disagree	–	–	23	15	–	–	16	18
	Strongly disagree	–	–	12	7	–	–	5	7
	Don't know	–	–	9	8	–	–	7	7
Poland	Strongly agree	19%	21	25	–	23%	–	–	18
	Somewhat agree	40	38	46	–	44	–	–	40
	Somewhat disagree	19	22	13	–	12	–	–	22
	Strongly disagree	5	8	4	–	3	–	–	10
	Don't know	16	12	13	–	17	–	–	11
Romania	Strongly agree	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	37
	Somewhat agree	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	34
	Somewhat disagree	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	12
	Strongly disagree	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	8
	Don't know	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	9
Slovakia	Strongly agree	–	19	–	22	–	23%	15	16
	Somewhat agree	–	39	–	40	–	42	36	42
	Somewhat disagree	–	26	–	20	–	20	29	26
	Strongly disagree	–	9	–	8	–	9	13	12
	Don't know	–	7	–	10	–	7	7	5

Office of Research Surveys: 1994-1999

Table A-5: Most Important Feature of Democracy

"Which of the things on this card would you say is the most important in a democracy?"

	S1992	f1992	1993	1996	s1997	f1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria								
At least two strong political parties competing in elections	—	—	11%	8%	9%	6%	5%	6%
A government that guarantees economic equality among its citizens	—	—	12	9	13	8	9	8
A system of justice that treats everyone equally	—	—	32	33	31	29	27	29
Freedom to criticize the government	—	—	3	3	2	3	3	2
A government that guarantees basic economic needs for all citizens	—	—	16	24	27	29	29	24
Economic prosperity in the country	—	—	19	23	18	22	25	27
Don't know	—	—	8	—	—	4	2	3
Czech Republic								
At least two strong political parties competing in elections	—	—	12	8	—	11	7	8
A government that guarantees economic equality among its citizens	—	—	11	9	—	8	8	10
A system of justice that treats everyone equally	—	—	35	2	—	2	1	30
Freedom to criticize the government	—	—	1	27	—	27	28	2
A government that guarantees basic economic needs for all citizens	—	—	16	19	—	23	23	20
Economic prosperity in the country	—	—	23	28	—	27	31	28
Don't know	—	—	2	8	—	2	2	1
Hungary								
At least two strong political parties competing in elections	3%	4%	4	3	—	3	3	2
A government that guarantees economic equality among its citizens	9	10	7	10	—	10	8	10
A system of justice that treats everyone equally	21	20	23	27	—	18	19	22
Freedom to criticize the government	2	2	3	1	—	1	2	2
A government that guarantees basic economic needs for all citizens	26	26	25	31	—	30	25	25
Economic prosperity in the country	35	35	35	26	—	38	37	38
Don't know	3	3	2	3	—	—	6	1
Poland								
At least two strong political parties competing in elections	9	—	7	3	—	3	2	5
A government that guarantees economic equality among its citizens	14	—	10	11	—	12	10	9
A system of justice that treats everyone equally	13	—	15	14	—	16	13	15
Freedom to criticize the government	3	—	2	2	—	2	2	2
A government that guarantees basic economic needs for all citizens	14	—	23	26	—	31	32	22
Economic prosperity in the country	42	—	35	29	—	36	36	28
Don't know	5	—	7	15	—	4	5	17
Romania								
At least two strong political parties competing in elections	—	—	12	8	—	9	—	9
A government that guarantees economic equality among its citizens	—	—	9	11	—	14	—	16
A system of justice that treats everyone equally	—	—	23	19	—	21	—	19
Freedom to criticize the government	—	—	1	3	—	4	—	4
A government that guarantees basic economic needs for all citizens	—	—	27	24	—	23	—	21
Economic prosperity in the country	—	—	23	35	—	27	—	27
Don't know	—	—	4	—	—	3	—	4
Slovakia								
At least two strong political parties competing in elections	—	—	10	7	7	—	—	4
A government that guarantees economic equality among its citizens	—	—	14	10	12	—	—	14
A system of justice that treats everyone equally	—	—	16	21	19	—	—	23
Freedom to criticize the government	—	—	2	2	1	—	—	2
A government that guarantees basic economic needs for all citizens	—	—	25	27	25	—	—	28
Economic prosperity in the country	—	—	30	21	29	—	—	28
Don't know	—	—	2	12	7	—	—	1

Office of Research Surveys: 1992-1999

Table A-6: Meanings of Democracy – Bulgaria

"People associate democracy with diverse meanings such as those on this card [SHOW CARD]. For each of these, please tell me whether you think it is essential, important but not essential, not very important, or not important at all for a society to be called a democracy."

	s1993	f1993	1996	1997	1998	1999
<i>At least two strong political parties competing in elections</i>						
Essential	60%	49%	45%	51%	42%	47%
Important but not essential	25	31	34	31	39	34
Not very important	4	5	10	7	9	8
Not important at all	2	3	5	4	2	4
Don't know	10	12	6	8	8	9
<i>A government that guarantees economic equality among its citizens</i>						
Essential	47	43	47	48	48	44
Important but not essential	29	35	36	30	33	35
Not very important	10	11	10	13	11	12
Not important at all	6	4	3	5	4	4
Don't know	9	7	3	4	4	4
<i>A system of justice that treats everyone equally</i>						
Essential	81	71	84	86	82	84
Important but not essential	12	21	13	11	14	13
Not very important	1	2	1	–	1	1
Not important at all	–	–	–	–	–	–
Don't know	7	6	2	3	3	2
<i>Freedom to criticize the government</i>						
Essential	52	43	46	51	45	49
Important but not essential	30	35	33	32	34	33
Not very important	6	9	12	8	12	10
Not important at all	2	2	2	2	2	2
Don't know	10	11	6	7	7	6
<i>A government that guarantees basic economic needs for all citizens</i>						
Essential	63	59	66	72	69	66
Important but not essential	25	30	28	23	24	28
Not very important	3	4	3	2	3	3
Not important at all	1	1	–	1	1	1
Don't know	9	7	2	3	3	3
<i>Economic prosperity in the country</i>						
Essential	–	58	72	74	74	76
Important but not essential	–	32	22	22	20	20
Not very important	–	4	2	1	2	1
Not important at all	–	1	–	–	–	–
Don't know	–	6	3	3	4	3

Office of Research Surveys: 1993-1999

Table A-6 Continued: Meanings of Democracy – Czech Republic

"People associate democracy with diverse meanings such as those on this card [SHOW CARD]. For each of these, please tell me whether you think it is essential, important but not essential, not very important, or not important at all for a society to be called a democracy."

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
<i>At least two strong political parties competing in elections</i>							
Essential	65%	61%	51%	50%	39%	38%	40%
Important but not essential	23	27	32	34	34	38	34
Not very important	5	8	10	9	15	14	15
Not important at all	3	3	3	3	8	7	6
Don't know	4	1	5	–	4	4	5
<i>A government that guarantees economic equality among its citizens</i>							
Essential	25	–	29	40	39	37	44
Important but not essential	33	–	34	36	34	34	31
Not very important	21	–	21	15	15	17	14
Not important at all	15	–	11	6	8	9	8
Don't know	7	–	6	3	4	3	3
<i>A system of justice that treats everyone equally</i>							
Essential	84	–	82	76	79	77	79
Important but not essential	12	–	13	18	16	17	16
Not very important	1	–	2	2	3	2	3
Not important at all	1	–	1	1	1	1	1
Don't know	1	–	3	3	2	3	2
<i>Freedom to criticize the government</i>							
Essential	37	38	37	30	29	31	31
Important but not essential	35	34	33	35	36	32	34
Not very important	18	19	19	24	24	26	24
Not important at all	7	7	7	7	9	9	9
Don't know	3	2	4	3	2	3	2
<i>A government that guarantees basic economic needs for all citizens</i>							
Essential	57	–	54	58	59	55	59
Important but not essential	29	–	32	31	30	31	29
Not very important	9	–	8	8	7	9	8
Not important at all	2	–	3	1	2	2	2
Don't know	3	–	4	2	3	3	2
<i>Economic prosperity in the country</i>							
Essential	78	–	66	69	70	74	70
Important but not essential	15	–	27	25	23	20	23
Not very important	3	–	3	4	3	3	4
Not important at all	1	–	1	1	1	1	1
Don't know	2	–	3	2	2	2	1

Table A-6 Continued: Meanings of Democracy – Hungary

"People associate democracy with diverse meanings such as those on this card [SHOW CARD]. For each of these, please tell me whether you think it is essential, important but not essential, not very important, or not important at all for a society to be called a democracy."

	s1992	f1992	1993	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
<i>At least two strong political parties competing in elections</i>								
Essential	40%	40%	43%	34%	43%	41%	45%	39%
Important but not essential	39	40	30	39	31	28	28	30
Not very important	8	8	14	13	14	17	16	16
Not important at all	5	6	6	9	6	13	9	11
Don't know	7	6	6	6	5	1	1	4
<i>A government that guarantees economic equality among its citizens</i>								
Essential	49	49	46	32	55	51	52	54
Important but not essential	40	41	35	47	33	34	32	34
Not very important	5	5	12	12	7	10	11	8
Not important at all	2	2	4	6	2	5	4	2
Don't know	3	3	4	4	4	1	1	3
<i>A system of justice that treats everyone equally</i>								
Essential	63	61	70	70	79	73	79	78
Important but not essential	30	32	24	25	17	21	15	18
Not very important	3	3	3	2	1	3	5	2
Not important at all	1	1	1	1	–	2	1	–
Don't know	3	3	3	2	3	1	1	2
<i>Freedom to criticize the government</i>								
Essential	44	33	48	40	45	43	47	41
Important but not essential	39	42	32	37	37	32	33	36
Not very important	10	16	14	17	11	17	14	16
Not important at all	4	5	3	4	2	7	5	5
Don't know	4	4	4	3	4	1	1	3
<i>A government that guarantees basic economic needs for all citizens</i>								
Essential	67	61	67	53	73	77	78	75
Important but not essential	29	32	26	39	22	19	17	22
Not very important	1	3	4	4	3	3	3	2
Not important at all	1	1	1	1	–	1	1	–
Don't know	3	3	3	3	2	–	1	2
<i>Economic prosperity in the country</i>								
Essential	67	62	70	61	79	78	81	77
Important but not essential	29	33	24	33	18	19	15	20
Not very important	2	3	3	3	1	2	3	2
Not important at all	–	1	1	1	–	–	–	–
Don't know	2	2	2	2	2	–	1	1

Table A-6 Continued: Meanings of Democracy – Poland

"People associate democracy with diverse meanings such as those on this card [SHOW CARD]. For each of these, please tell me whether you think it is essential, important but not essential, not very important, or not important at all for a society to be called a democracy."

	1991	1992	s1993	f1993	1994	1995	1996	1998	1999
<i>At least two strong political parties competing in elections</i>									
Essential	39%	37%	40%	59%	31%	36%	35%	28%	32%
Important but not essential	35	35	38	23	45	43	41	44	43
Not very important	11	11	7	7	12	10	10	13	12
Not important at all	3	4	2	4	7	4	4	5	3
Don't know	12	14	12	8	6	8	10	11	10
<i>A government that guarantees economic equality among its citizens</i>									
Essential	34	32	40	46	71	45	39	38	42
Important but not essential	38	36	35	32	24	38	39	39	37
Not very important	15	15	15	12	3	10	11	12	11
Not important at all	6	8	4	5	1	3	4	4	5
Don't know	8	9	6	6	2	4	8	7	5
<i>A system of justice that treats everyone equally</i>									
Essential	65	64	74	84	78	75	70	65	69
Important but not essential	25	24	18	10	19	20	23	24	22
Not very important	2	2	2	2	1	2	3	3	4
Not important at all	1	1	1	1	–	1	1	1	1
Don't know	7	9	5	4	2	2	4	6	5
<i>Freedom to criticize the government</i>									
Essential	40	38	46	57	49	44	45	35	44
Important but not essential	40	38	33	26	35	40	36	40	38
Not very important	10	12	11	9	9	10	12	13	11
Not important at all	2	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2
Don't know	8	10	7	6	5	4	6	9	6
<i>A government that guarantees basic economic needs for all citizens</i>									
Essential	58	52	64	77	–	65	59	62	61
Important but not essential	31	32	27	16	–	28	32	29	29
Not very important	5	7	3	2	–	4	3	3	5
Not important at all	1	2	1	1	–	1	1	1	1
Don't know	6	8	5	3	–	2	4	6	5
<i>Economic prosperity in the country</i>									
Essential	73	64	73	77	–	77	69	71	71
Important but not essential	20	22	19	16	–	19	24	22	22
Not very important	2	5	2	3	–	2	2	2	2
Not important at all	1	1	1	1	–	1	1	–	1
Don't know	5	8	6	3	–	4	4	5	4

Table A-6 Continued: Meanings of Democracy – Romania

"People associate democracy with diverse meanings such as those on this card [SHOW CARD]. For each of these, please tell me whether you think it is essential, important but not essential, not very important, or not important at all for a society to be called a democracy."

	1993	1996	1997	1999
<i>At least two strong political parties competing in elections</i>				
Essential	44%	41%	37%	34%
Important but not essential	37	35	47	40
Not very important	7	11	11	11
Not important at all	2	5	2	5
Don't know	10	9	3	10
<i>A government that guarantees economic equality among its citizens</i>				
Essential	37	38	36	43
Important but not essential	37	40	44	38
Not very important	14	11	11	8
Not important at all	7	7	7	3
Don't know	6	4	2	8
<i>A system of justice that treats everyone equally</i>				
Essential	70	71	65	66
Important but not essential	26	23	28	26
Not very important	1	2	4	3
Not important at all	0	1	1	1
Don't know	3	3	2	5
<i>Freedom to criticize the government</i>				
Essential	36	33	36	37
Important but not essential	35	33	40	39
Not very important	18	22	18	14
Not important at all	2	9	4	3
Don't know	9	4	2	8
<i>A government that guarantees basic economic needs for all citizens</i>				
Essential	61	56	55	53
Important but not essential	32	38	36	36
Not very important	4	4	6	4
Not important at all	1	1	1	1
Don't know	1	3	2	6
<i>Economic prosperity in the country</i>				
Essential	67	73	65	64
Important but not essential	30	22	30	30
Not very important	1	2	3	1
Not important at all	3	–	1	–
Don't know	2	3	2	5

Table A-6 Continued: Meanings of Democracy – Slovakia

"People associate democracy with diverse meanings such as those on this card [SHOW CARD]. For each of these, please tell me whether you think it is essential, important but not essential, not very important, or not important at all for a society to be called a democracy."

	1993	1994	1996	1997	1999
<i>At least two strong political parties competing in elections</i>					
Essential	57%	56%	49%	44%	33%
Important but not essential	23	30	31	33	40
Not very important	10	8	11	12	17
Not important at all	5	4	4	4	6
Don't know	6	2	5	7	4
<i>A government that guarantees economic equality among its citizens</i>					
Essential	38	—	45	48	57
Important but not essential	34	—	36	31	29
Not very important	16	—	11	12	9
Not important at all	8	—	4	4	3
Don't know	5	—	4	5	2
<i>A system of justice that treats everyone equally</i>					
Essential	74	—	70	76	78
Important but not essential	19	—	22	16	17
Not very important	4	—	4	4	3
Not important at all	1	—	1	1	1
Don't know	3	—	4	4	2
<i>Freedom to criticize the government</i>					
Essential	32	31	33	32	32
Important but not essential	31	35	35	33	39
Not very important	24	24	22	23	20
Not important at all	8	7	7	6	6
Don't know	5	3	4	6	3
<i>A government that guarantees basic economic needs for all citizens</i>					
Essential	69	—	66	66	71
Important but not essential	22	—	25	24	22
Not very important	6	—	5	6	3
Not important at all	1	—	2	1	1
Don't know	2	—	3	3	3
<i>Economic prosperity in the country</i>					
Essential	81	—	69	76	77
Important but not essential	13	—	23	17	19
Not very important	2	—	3	3	2
Not important at all	1	—	1	1	1
Don't know	3	—	4	4	2

Office of Research Surveys: 1993-1999

Table A-7: Multiparty System

"A multiparty system is better than a one-party system."

		1990	1994	s1995	f1995	s1996	f1996	1997
Bulgaria	Strongly agree	—	—	—	—	45%	42%	55%
	Somewhat agree	—	—	—	—	28	26	21
	Somewhat disagree	—	—	—	—	9	10	7
	Strongly disagree	—	—	—	—	7	8	5
	Don't know	—	—	—	—	11	14	13
Czech Rep.	Strongly agree	—	61%	52%	—	55	—	—
	Somewhat agree	—	25	34	—	34	—	—
	Somewhat disagree	—	6	6	—	6	—	—
	Strongly disagree	—	2	2	—	2	—	—
	Don't know	—	6	6	—	3	—	—
Hungary*	Strongly agree	30%	50	—	44%	42	—	—
	Somewhat agree	41	23	—	24	25	—	—
	Somewhat disagree	17	9	—	13	13	—	—
	Strongly disagree	4	7	—	10	12	—	—
	Don't know	8	11	—	9	8	—	—
Poland*	Strongly agree	42	—	31	30	32	—	—
	Somewhat agree	31	—	30	36	37	—	—
	Somewhat disagree	8	—	15	12	10	—	—
	Strongly disagree	4	—	10	6	5	—	—
	Don't know	15	—	15	15	16	—	—
Romania	Strongly agree	46	42	—	—	—	—	—
	Somewhat agree	33	20	—	—	—	—	—
	Somewhat disagree	8	12	—	—	—	—	—
	Strongly disagree	5	15	—	—	—	—	—
	Don't know	7	11	—	—	—	—	—
Slovakia	Strongly agree	—	38	39	—	40	—	43
	Somewhat agree	—	36	33	—	35	—	35
	Somewhat disagree	—	12	14	—	13	—	12
	Strongly disagree	—	6	5	—	4	—	4
	Don't know	—	8	9	—	9	—	7

Office of Research Surveys: 1990-1997, * In Hungary and Poland (1990): "We need a multiparty democratic system."

Table A-8: Economy vs. Freedom of Speech

"Some people say that economic prosperity is the most important benefit of a democratic system of government. Others say that the freedom to speak and act freely is the most important benefit of a democracy. Which view comes closest to your own?"

		1994	s1995	f1995	1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria	Economic prosperity	–	–	67%	–	76%	68%
	Free speech	–	–	21	–	16	20
	Don't know	–	–	12	–	8	12
Czech Rep.	Economic prosperity	–	–	42	47%	51	52
	Free speech	–	–	49	46	43	41
	Don't know	–	–	10	7	6	7
Hungary	Economic prosperity	–	–	73	48	56	48
	Free speech	–	–	21	47	35	42
	Don't know	–	–	6	6	9	10
Poland	Economic prosperity	54%	43%	50	–	45	51
	Free speech	36	50	44	–	43	41
	Don't know	10	7	6	–	12	8
Romania	Economic prosperity	–	–	–	–	–	61
	Free speech	–	–	–	–	–	32
	Don't know	–	–	–	–	–	8
Slovakia	Economic prosperity	–	60	–	–	54	61
	Free speech	–	31	–	–	39	34
	Don't know	–	9	–	–	7	5

Office of Research Surveys: 1994-1999

Table A-9: Economic Equality vs. Political Liberties

"People have different ideas about democracy. Which do you think is more important for a democracy: economic equality or political liberties like freedom of speech?"

		1991	s1992	f1992	1994	s1995	f1995	s1996	f1996	1997
Bulgaria	Economic equality	40%	47%	—	—	—	62%	61%	62%	56%
	Political liberties	44	50	—	—	—	27	32	30	35
	Don't know	17	2	—	—	—	9	7	8	9
Czech Rep.	Economic equality	—	—	—	41%	39%	42	38	—	47
	Political liberties	—	—	—	50	52	48	55	—	46
	Don't know	—	—	—	9	9	10	7	—	7
Hungary	Economic equality	—	50	49%	56	65	—	61	—	—
	Political liberties	—	38	41	32	26	—	33	—	—
	Don't know	—	12	10	12	9	—	6	—	—
Poland	Economic equality	38	31	47	—	61	63	56	—	—
	Political liberties	51	51	42	—	31	31	30	—	—
	Don't know	11	18	11	—	8	6	14	—	—
Romania	Economic equality	41	36	32	49	—	—	51	—	—
	Political liberties	49	41	48	38	—	—	39	—	—
	Don't know	11	23	19	13	—	—	10	—	—
Slovakia	Economic equality	—	—	—	65	59	—	55	—	50
	Political liberties	—	—	—	27	33	—	41	—	42
	Don't know	—	—	—	8	8	—	5	—	8

Office of Research Surveys: 1991-1997

Table A-10: Freedom vs. Equality

"Which of these two statements comes closest to your own opinion:

I find that both freedom and equality are important. But if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom more important, that is, that everyone can live in freedom and develop without hindrance.

Certainly freedom and equality are important. But if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider equality more important, that is, that nobody is needy and that social class differences are not so strong."

		s1991	f1991	s1992	f1992	s1993	f1993	1994	s1995	f1995	s1996	f1996	1997
Bulgaria	Freedom	-	-	47%	-	44%	-	37%	-	35%	37%	-	-
	Equality	-	-	50	-	52	-	51	-	57	57	-	-
	Don't know	-	-	2	-	4	-	10	-	9	6	-	-
Czech Rep.	Freedom	53%	52%	51	50%	-	-	45	-	36	-	-	-
	Equality	39	43	43	45	-	-	50	-	59	-	-	-
	Don't know	8	5	7	5	-	-	5	-	5	-	-	-
Hungary	Freedom	-	44	-	-	-	40%	39	-	32	-	29%	-
	Equality	-	55	-	-	-	55	53	-	62	-	68	-
	Don't know	-	2	-	-	-	6	8	-	7	-	3	-
Poland	Freedom	55	-	47	-	43	43	-	38%	49	-	42	-
	Equality	38	-	45	-	48	49	-	57	46	-	50	-
	Don't know	7	-	8	-	9	8	-	5	5	-	9	-
Romania	Freedom	-	-	-	-	40	-	-	-	-	36	-	-
	Equality	-	-	-	-	50	-	-	-	-	56	-	-
	Don't know	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	9	-	-
Slovakia	Freedom	40	43	45	44	-	-	29	36	-	41	-	40%
	Equality	44	50	47	50	-	-	64	63	-	55	-	55
	Don't know	15	6	8	6	-	-	7	5	-	1	-	5

Office of Research Surveys: 1991-1997

Table A-11: Most Important Feature of Democracy (Western Europe)

"Which of the things on this card would you say is the most important in a democracy?"

	Britain		France		Germany		Italy	
	1992	1999	1992	1999	1992	1999	1992	1999
At least two strong political parties competing in elections	13%	14%	10%	16%	16%	14%	—	14%
A government that guarantees economic equality among its citizens	10	14	16	22	5	14	—	14
A system of justice that treats everyone equally	34	38	40	22	48	32	—	32
Freedom to criticize the government	7	12	4	7	7	7	—	5
A government that guarantees basic economic needs for all citizens	14	12	17	20	17	20	—	25
Economic prosperity in the country	9	7	11	12	6	10	—	9
Don't know	13	3	2	1	—	3	—	2

Office of Research Surveys: 1992-1999

Table A-12: Political System Since Communism

"Thinking about our country's political system under communism compared to our political system today – would you say that our political system today tends to be better or worse than under communism?"

	s1992	f1992	s1993	f1993	s1994	f1994	s1995	f1995	s1996	f1996	s1997	f1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria														
Better	55%	–	54%	46%	–	38%	54%	–	42%	32%	–	50%	49%	47%
Worse	20	–	26	32	–	46	39	–	45	53	–	37	36	36
Don't know	25	–	19	22	–	15	18	–	12	15	–	13	15	17
Czech Rep.														
Better	66	68%	–	73	–	67	54	–	62	–	–	53	56	55
Worse	19	24	–	16	–	24	30	–	28	–	–	37	36	35
Don't know	15	8	–	11	–	9	16	–	10	–	–	10	8	10
Hungary														
Better	49	42	–	36	–	38	28	–	32	–	–	31	40	42
Worse	33	47	–	55	–	44	63	–	58	–	–	61	47	47
Don't know	18	12	–	9	–	18	10	–	11	–	–	8	13	11
Poland														
Better	63	60	61	53	52%	–	50	60%	–	61	–	61	54	59
Worse	20	23	23	32	36	–	35	28	–	26	–	27	32	28
Don't know	17	17	16	15	12	–	15	12	–	13	–	13	14	14
Romania														
Better	67	70	69	–	–	55	–	–	57	–	–	56	56	50
Worse	16	17	20	–	–	34	–	–	37	–	–	41	40	39
Don't know	17	13	11	–	–	12	–	–	6	–	–	3	4	11
Slovakia														
Better	50	53	–	47	–	44	38	–	42	–	–	37	37	41
Worse	34	38	–	42	–	48	51	–	48	–	–	56	54	53
Don't know	15	9	–	11	–	8	11	–	10	–	–	7	9	6

Office of Research Surveys: 1992-1999

Table A-13: Strong Leader vs. Political Freedoms

"If we could find a strong leader who we thought could solve our country's problems, I wouldn't care if that leader took away many of the political freedoms we've gained since the fall of communism."

		1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	s1997	f1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria	Strongly agree	–	21%	22%	31%	–	35%	30%	32%	24%
	Somewhat agree	–	21	25	30	–	25	24	28	26
	Somewhat disagree	–	12	22	14	–	11	17	13	15
	Strongly disagree	–	27	18	15	–	14	20	18	22
	Don't know	–	19	13	11	–	14	9	8	13
Czech Rep.	Strongly agree	8%	10	7*	12	9%	–	10	10	12
	Somewhat agree	23	20	16	27	20	–	23	27	28
	Somewhat disagree	40	29	32	30	31	–	30	31	32
	Strongly disagree	25	34	38	21	31	–	31	28	24
	Don't know	5	8	7	10	9	–	6	5	6
Hungary	Strongly agree	–	14	18*	25	12	–	24	22	22
	Somewhat agree	–	24	26	30	18	–	29	26	34
	Somewhat disagree	–	24	23	21	25	–	24	26	19
	Strongly disagree	–	27	20	15	35	–	20	21	19
	Don't know	–	12	12	9	9	–	4	5	6
Poland	Strongly agree	–	29	24	28	17	–	20	20	19
	Somewhat agree	–	25	29	35	31	–	29	10	31
	Somewhat disagree	–	18	21	17	24	–	24	13	24
	Strongly disagree	–	18	15	11	14	–	20	32	17
	Don't know	–	10	11	9	13	–	7	5	9
Romania	Strongly agree	–	12	13*	–	21	–	29	–	34
	Somewhat agree	–	37	18	–	28	–	26	–	30
	Somewhat disagree	–	27	18	–	24	–	22	–	18
	Strongly disagree	–	17	38	–	23	–	21	–	12
	Don't know	–	7	13	–	5	–	3	–	7
Slovakia	Strongly agree	6	15	10	15	10	8	12	12	13
	Somewhat agree	26	27	23	26	23	19	23	25	30
	Somewhat disagree	37	27	32	28	27	31	32	30	27
	Strongly disagree	24	24	27	22	28	30	26	25	22
	Don't know	7	7	8	9	12	12	8	8	8

Office of Research Surveys: 1992-1999; * "If a non-democratic leader took power who could solve our country's economic problems, I wouldn't care if that leader took away many of the political freedoms we now have."

Table A-14: Grateful for Strong Leaders

"We should be grateful for leaders who tell us exactly what to do and how to do it."

		s1992	f1992	s1993	f1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Bulgaria	Strongly agree	16%	—	15%	—	7%	—	9%	—
	Somewhat agree	17	—	19	—	24	—	18	—
	Somewhat disagree	18	—	21	—	22	—	25	—
	Strongly disagree	32	—	30	—	29	—	38	—
	Don't know	17	—	15	—	17	—	11	—
Czech Rep.	Strongly agree	5	—	—	—	—	—	5	—
	Somewhat agree	23	—	—	—	—	—	21	—
	Somewhat disagree	38	—	—	—	—	—	41	—
	Strongly disagree	28	—	—	—	—	—	28	—
	Don't know	6	—	—	—	—	—	5	—
Hungary	Strongly agree	—	29%	—	10%	—	—	10	—
	Somewhat agree	—	26	—	18	—	—	21	—
	Somewhat disagree	—	24	—	28	—	—	29	—
	Strongly disagree	—	20	—	38	—	—	34	—
	Don't know	—	2	—	6	—	—	6	—
Poland	Strongly agree	7	—	8	10	10	28%	25	—
	Somewhat agree	13	—	18	20	28	35	36	—
	Somewhat disagree	37	—	33	34	31	17	18	—
	Strongly disagree	34	—	31	24	19	31	9	—
	Don't know	9	—	11	12	11	9	13	—
Romania	Strongly agree	10	13	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Somewhat agree	33	32	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Somewhat disagree	31	22	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Strongly disagree	11	20	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Don't know	15	13	—	—	—	—	—	—
Slovakia	Strongly agree	6	—	—	—	—	—	6	4%
	Somewhat agree	17	—	—	—	—	—	24	13
	Somewhat disagree	43	—	—	—	—	—	30	34
	Strongly disagree	27	—	—	—	—	—	32	40
	Don't know	8	—	—	—	—	—	8	8

Office of Research Surveys: 1992-1997

Table A-15: Role of Leaders

"A few strong leaders could make this country better than could parties and politicians who spend a lot of time debating."

		s1992	f1992	1993
Bulgaria	Strongly agree	—	—	—
	Somewhat agree	—	—	—
	Somewhat disagree	—	—	—
	Strongly disagree	—	—	—
	Don't know	—	—	—
Czech Republic	Strongly agree	35%	33%	—
	Somewhat agree	35	38	—
	Somewhat disagree	16	17	—
	Strongly disagree	6	6	—
	Don't know	8	5	—
Hungary	Strongly agree	—	—	—
	Somewhat agree	—	—	—
	Somewhat disagree	—	—	—
	Strongly disagree	—	—	—
	Don't know	—	—	—
Poland	Strongly agree	40	—	41%
	Somewhat agree	33	—	36
	Somewhat disagree	11	—	10
	Strongly disagree	5	—	4
	Don't know	11	—	10
Romania	Strongly agree	29	37	29
	Somewhat agree	44	35	41
	Somewhat disagree	12	10	14
	Strongly disagree	4	10	9
	Don't know	10	9	8
Slovakia	Strongly agree	27	24	—
	Somewhat agree	38	39	—
	Somewhat disagree	20	22	—
	Strongly disagree	8	9	—
	Don't know	8	7	—

Office of Research Surveys: 1992-1993

Table A-16: Order vs. Rights

"And what if you had to choose between the government focusing on maintaining order or on protecting the political rights like freedom of the press that we have now gained since 1989 in our country – should the government focus more on maintaining order or on protecting political rights?"

		1993	1994	1997
Bulgaria	Maintain order	–	74%	–
	Protect rights	–	18	–
	Don't know	–	8	–
Czech Rep.	Maintain order	65%	69	–
	Protect rights	30	24	–
	Don't know	4	7	–
Hungary	Maintain order	–	68	–
	Protect rights	–	21	–
	Don't know	–	11	–
Poland	Maintain order	–	–	–
	Protect rights	–	–	–
	Don't know	–	–	–
Romania	Maintain order	–	55	–
	Protect rights	–	35	–
	Don't know	–	11	–
Slovakia	Maintain order	68	73	61%
	Protect rights	26	20	29
	Don't know	6	7	11

Office of Research Surveys: 1993-1997

Table A-17: Confidence in Institutions and Organizations – National Government

"Now I would like to ask you about some institutions and organizations. Please tell me how much confidence you have in the following institutions and organizations. Do you have a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or no confidence in the national government?"

		s1990	f1990	s1991	f1991	s1992	f1992	s1993	f1993	1994	s1995	f1996	s1997	f1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria	Great deal	—	24%	41%	16%	23%	—	10%	5%	7%	—	13%	5%	31%	21%	17%
	Fair amount	—	19	29	34	24	—	27	26	27	—	30	12	34	32	30
	Not very much	—	46	21	35	28	—	32	40	39	—	34	37	21	30	32
	None	—	11	9	12	17	—	24	23	22	—	19	43	12	15	17
Czech Rep.*	Don't know	—	—	—	4	9	—	7	6	4	—	3	3	2	3	3
	Great deal	46%	38	24	17	16	22%	—	23	18	—	11	—	—	5	2
	Fair amount	42	48	53	38	47	48	—	52	52	—	42	—	—	27	20
	Not very much	7	10	17	36	28	21	—	19	22	—	40	—	—	50	62
Hungary	None	2	1	4	7	7	6	—	5	7	—	7	—	—	18	15
	Don't know	2	4	2	2	3	2	—	1	1	—	1	—	—	1	1
	Great deal	8	—	6	—	8	6	—	4	14	—	5	—	—	7	12
	Fair amount	38	—	28	—	32	24	—	20	44	—	34	—	—	36	44
Poland	Not very much	39	—	45	—	38	42	—	44	29	—	41	—	—	27	23
	None	12	—	18	—	20	27	—	31	9	—	18	—	—	28	14
	Don't know	4	—	3	—	3	2	—	2	4	—	2	—	—	1	3
	Great deal	17	5	4	4	4	3	5	8	3	2%	—	3	—	3	2
Romania	Fair amount	46	36	36	31	19	17	24	36	25	23	—	28	—	25	24
	Not very much	25	40	42	46	49	51	47	36	50	54	—	53	—	54	53
	None	5	10	14	14	20	25	20	12	19	18	—	14	—	13	15
	Don't know	7	9	4	5	9	5	4	9	4	4	—	3	—	5	5
Slovakia*	Great deal	38	20	—	10	8	7	6	—	8	—	8	—	—	7	8
	Fair amount	40	47	—	39	34	26	26	—	18	—	18	—	—	31	19
	Not very much	14	23	—	34	39	42	44	—	45	—	51	—	—	45	48
	None	4	8	—	10	11	18	19	—	25	—	21	—	—	17	24
Slovakia*	Don't know	4	3	—	7	8	6	6	—	5	—	3	—	—	1	2
	Great deal	37	27	5	5	6	20	—	12	10	—	9	—	—	6	9
	Fair amount	44	55	34	21	30	47	—	43	38	—	28	—	—	20	21
	Not very much	12	12	36	48	36	23	—	29	32	—	46	—	—	48	43
Slovakia*	None	2	2	21	22	25	8	—	14	18	—	15	—	—	25	25
	Don't know	4	5	4	5	3	2	—	2	2	—	3	—	—	2	3

Office of Research Surveys: 1990-1999; * Through 1992, figures given for the Czech Republic and Slovakia refer to opinions of the institutions of the former Czechoslovakia within the respective Czech and Slovak regions of that country.

Table A-18: Trust in Government

"How much do you trust the government to do what is right? Do you almost never, only some of the time, most of the time, or just about always trust the government to do what is right?"

"In general, one can rely on the government to do the right thing."

	1993	1994	1995	1996		1994	1996	1998	1999
Bulgaria					Bulgaria				
Almost always	—	4%	5%	3%	Strongly agree	—	5%	21%	19%
Most of the time	—	20	24	15	Somewhat agree	—	29	39	38
Sometimes	—	48	43	41	Somewhat disagree	—	41	20	22
Almost never	—	18	17	36	Strongly disagree	—	18	10	10
Don't know	—	10	10	5	Don't know	—	7	10	11
Czech Rep.					Czech Rep.				
Almost always	—	6	4	—	Strongly agree	—	8	3	2
Most of the time	—	36	29	—	Somewhat agree	—	51	35	25
Sometimes	—	47	57	—	Somewhat disagree	—	34	40	51
Almost never	—	9	9	—	Strongly disagree	—	6	16	20
Don't know	—	2	2	—	Don't know	—	2	5	2
Hungary					Hungary				
Almost always	1%	2	4	—	Strongly agree	—	3	16	7
Most of the time	25	39	15	—	Somewhat agree	—	26	34	31
Sometimes	63	49	50	—	Somewhat disagree	—	48	33	38
Almost never	6	4	29	—	Strongly disagree	—	21	16	20
Don't know	5	8	2	—	Don't know	—	2	1	4
Poland					Poland				
Almost always	—	—	21	15	Strongly agree	—	5	4	3
Most of the time	—	—	56	57	Somewhat agree	—	34	35	30
Sometimes	—	—	16	17	Somewhat disagree	—	30	28	35
Almost never	—	—	1	3	Strongly disagree	—	11	15	22
Don't know	—	—	6	7	Don't know	—	20	18	10
Romania					Romania				
Almost always	—	—	—	—	Strongly agree	7%	5	—	—
Most of the time	—	—	—	—	Somewhat agree	18	14	—	—
Sometimes	—	—	—	—	Somewhat disagree	47	48	—	—
Almost never	—	—	—	—	Strongly disagree	23	28	—	—
Don't know	—	—	—	—	Don't know	5	5	—	—
Slovakia					Slovakia				
Almost always	—	2	18	16	Strongly agree	—	16	8	4
Most of the time	—	19	48	49	Somewhat agree	—	49	26	33
Sometimes	—	57	24	24	Somewhat disagree	—	24	38	39
Almost never	—	18	7	7	Strongly disagree	—	7	23	21
Don't know	—	4	4	5	Don't know	—	5	5	2

Office of Research Surveys: 1993-1999

Table A-19: Trust in Government (Western Europe)

"In general, one can rely on the government to do the right thing."

	Britain	France	Germany	Italy
Strongly agree	7%	5%	6%	3%
Somewhat agree	41	41	46	33
Somewhat disagree	29	37	28	39
Strongly disagree	18	13	12	17
Don't know	5	4	8	8

Office of Research Surveys: 1999

Table A-20: Importance of Citizen Involvement

"Some people say that citizens' involvement in political life is an integral part of democratic solutions of political problems while other people believe that it's best to leave politics to elected officials. Which of these do you agree with more?"

		1993	1994	s1996	f1996	1997
Bulgaria	Citizens' involvement integral	—	42%	44%	46%	44%
	Leave to elected officials	—	41	44	40	47
	Don't know	—	16	12	14	9
Czech Rep.	Citizens' involvement integral	50%	51	65	—	—
	Leave to elected officials	44	43	31	—	—
	Don't know	6	6	5	—	—
Hungary	Citizens' involvement integral	57	39	41	—	—
	Leave to elected officials	36	53	54	—	—
	Don't know	7	8	5	—	—
Poland	Citizens' involvement integral	53	—	—	59	—
	Leave to elected officials	42	—	—	33	—
	Don't know	5	—	—	8	—
Romania	Citizens' involvement integral	—	37	40	—	—
	Leave to elected officials	—	51	54	—	—
	Don't know	—	2	7	—	—
Slovakia	Citizens' involvement integral	46	52	54	—	56
	Leave to elected officials	47	40	40	—	37
	Don't know	7	8	5	—	7

Office of Research Surveys: 1993-1997

Table A-21: Interest in Politics

"In general, how much interest do you have in politics? Do you have a great deal, a fair amount, not very much or no interest at all in politics?"

s1990 f1990 s1991 f1991 s1992 f1992 s1993 f1993 s1994 f1994 s1995 f1995 s1996 f1996 1997																
Bulgaria	Great deal	-	27%	16%	20%	17%	-	16%	11%	-	12%	-	9%	12%	8%	13%
	Fair amount	-	43	38	48	48	-	49	44	-	48	-	46	41	49	50
	Not very much	-	18	30	15	17	-	19	21	-	24	-	25	25	26	23
	No interest at all	-	11	16	15	16	-	15	21	-	15	-	20	21	15	13
	Don't know	-	1	1	2	1	-	2	3	-	1	-	1	1	2	1
Czech Rep.	Great deal	33%	-	17	23	17	21%	-	20	37%	14	-	8	-	-	-
	Fair amount	49	-	53	51	51	52	-	47	49	48	-	33	-	-	-
	Not very much	13	-	20	18	23	19	-	24	16	26	-	44	-	-	-
	No interest at all	4	-	9	7	10	8	-	9	-	12	-	16	-	-	-
	Don't know	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hungary	Great deal	-	-	-	7	12	10	-	-	-	7	-	10	9	-	-
	Fair amount	-	-	-	30	36	33	-	-	-	34	-	33	34	-	-
	Not very much	-	-	-	41	33	38	-	-	-	39	-	36	39	-	-
	No interest at all	-	-	-	21	19	19	-	-	-	20	-	22	18	-	-
	Don't know	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Poland	Great deal	-	-	6	9	7	7	6	6	5	-	6%	6	-	6	-
	Fair amount	-	-	35	32	32	31	29	36	30	-	28	29	-	35	-
	Not very much	-	-	44	33	42	44	49	38	44	-	44	46	-	40	-
	No interest at all	-	-	14	26	18	17	20	20	20	-	21	18	-	18	-
	Don't know	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	1	-
Romania	Great deal	8	10	-	10	4	6	4	-	-	5	-	-	4	-	-
	Fair amount	23	53	-	27	20	22	21	-	-	16	-	-	14	-	-
	Not very much	50	32	-	39	41	41	44	-	-	42	-	-	51	-	-
	No interest at all	18	4	-	24	33	29	31	-	-	36	-	-	31	-	-
	Don't know	1	-	-	-	3	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-
Slovakia	Great deal	21	-	15	20	15	15	-	14	-	12	12	-	15	-	14
	Fair amount	58	-	55	48	53	54	-	45	-	45	45	-	44	-	43
	Not very much	16	-	23	20	20	20	-	27	-	30	25	-	27	-	31
	No interest at all	6	-	8	12	12	11	-	13	-	12	18	-	14	-	11
	Don't know	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-

Table A-22: Political Efficacy at the National Level

"Do you believe that people like yourself can have some effect on the way political decisions are made at the national level – most of the time, sometimes, rarely, or never?"

		s1990	f1990	s1991	f1991	s1992	f1992	s1993	f1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Bulgaria	Most of the time	–	–	–	7%	9%	11%	–	7%	8%	–	6%	5%	5%
	Sometimes	–	–	–	15	17	18	–	16	14	–	18	16	13
	Rarely	–	–	–	20	21	16	–	22	23	–	26	28	23
	Never	–	–	–	45	43	45	–	47	47	–	44	46	57
	Don't know	–	–	–	13	11	10	–	9	8	–	6	4	3
Czech Rep.	Most of the time	3%	4%	3	3	4	3%	–	–	4	1	–	3	2
	Sometimes	30	12	12	11	13	11	–	–	16	3	–	12	14
	Rarely	26	24	26	28	31	32	–	–	32	21	–	31	35
	Never	36	60	54	55	49	51	–	–	48	73	–	54	48
	Don't know	5	–	5	2	4	2	–	–	1	2	–	1	1
Hungary	Most of the time	6	–	5	–	2	1	–	–	–	4	–	1	3
	Sometimes	15	–	17	–	9	10	–	–	–	12	–	10	16
	Rarely	25	–	32	–	25	27	–	–	–	25	–	34	39
	Never	52	–	41	–	61	61	–	–	–	55	–	54	42
	Don't know	2	–	4	–	2	2	–	–	–	4	–	–	1
Poland	Most of the time	–	–	1	1	3	1	2	–	–	–	–	1	1
	Sometimes	–	–	6	7	10	11	11	–	–	–	–	11	9
	Rarely	–	–	42	24	24	25	24	–	–	–	–	35	31
	Never	–	–	49	66	60	58	61	–	–	–	–	49	57
	Don't know	–	–	2	2	4	4	2	–	–	–	–	3	3
Romania	Most of the time	–	–	–	6	7	8	5	–	–	7	4	9	–
	Sometimes	–	–	–	27	7	21	19	–	–	20	9	24	–
	Rarely	–	–	–	21	23	26	25	–	–	22	34	31	–
	Never	–	–	–	38	26	36	44	–	–	45	47	34	–
	Don't know	–	–	–	8	37	9	8	–	–	6	7	3	–
Slovakia	Most of the time	4	3	3	2	2	2	–	–	3	2	3	–	–
	Sometimes	28	10	10	9	12	11	–	–	11	4	12	–	–
	Rarely	29	21	27	22	26	26	–	–	28	17	37	–	–
	Never	33	67	56	64	57	59	–	–	57	74	46	–	–
	Don't know	6	–	3	3	3	2	–	–	2	3	2	–	–

Table A-23: Political Efficacy at the Local Level

"Do you believe that people like yourself can have some effect on the way political decisions are made at the local level – most of the time, sometimes, rarely, or never?"

		s1991	f1991	s1992	f1992	s1993	f1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Bulgaria	Most of the time	10%	13%	15%	-	13%	-	11%	-	10%	7%	8%
	Sometimes	18	27	22	-	21	-	23	-	25	26	20
	Rarely	19	20	18	-	22	-	25	-	28	29	27
	Never	39	30	36	-	37	-	34	-	31	35	43
	Don't know	15	10	9	-	7	-	7	-	5	4	2
Czech Rep.	Most of the time	17	16	15	13%	-	15%	3	-	-	6	7
	Sometimes	34	32	32	30	-	33	17	-	-	26	31
	Rarely	26	26	32	35	-	32	47	-	-	36	36
	Never	19	24	18	20	-	20	31	-	-	31	25
	Don't know	4	3	3	2	-	1	2	-	-	1	1
Hungary	Most of the time	8	-	5	4	-	-	5	-	-	4	4
	Sometimes	26	-	17	17	-	-	15	-	-	17	22
	Rarely	32	-	30	33	-	-	27	-	-	37	39
	Never	27	-	44	44	-	-	48	-	-	42	34
	Don't know	8	-	3	3	-	-	4	-	-	1	1
Poland	Most of the time	5	3	4	3	3	-	-	6%	-	3	2
	Sometimes	16	16	17	20	18	-	-	20	-	25	21
	Rarely	51	30	28	25	24	-	-	33	-	39	38
	Never	27	49	49	49	53	-	-	39	-	30	35
	Don't know	2	2	3	3	2	-	-	3	-	3	3
Romania	Most of the time	-	-	14	13	11	-	12	-	4	12	-
	Sometimes	-	-	31	29	27	-	22	-	17	32	-
	Rarely	-	-	23	24	24	-	23	-	41	27	-
	Never	-	-	25	28	34	-	38	-	33	27	-
	Don't know	-	-	7	6	5	-	5	-	6	3	-
Slovakia	Most of the time	12	12	11	8	-	9	3	-	-	5	-
	Sometimes	31	27	32	30	-	27	12	-	-	27	-
	Rarely	34	33	35	32	-	36	43	-	-	38	-
	Never	21	26	20	28	-	26	39	-	-	29	-
	Don't know	3	3	2	2	-	2	3	-	-	2	-

Table A-24: Confidence in Institutions and Organizations – Parliament

"Now I would like to ask you about some institutions and organizations. Please tell me how much confidence you have in the following institutions and organizations. Do you have a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or no confidence in the parliament?"

		s1990	f1990	s1991	f1991	s1992	f1992	s1993	f1993	1994	1995	s1996	f1996	s1997	f1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria	Great deal	–	19%	–	22%	13%	–	–	4%	2%	–	–	3%	–	11%	9%	7%
	Fair amount	–	32	–	36	24	–	–	14	14	–	–	10	–	31	25	24
	Not very much	–	39	–	34	37	–	–	33	35	–	–	34	–	36	37	36
	None	–	10	–	8	21	–	–	42	41	–	–	51	–	19	26	29
Czech Rep.*	Don't know	–	–	–	–	6	11	–	7	8	–	–	3	11	4	3	4
	Great deal	24%	12	7	–	9	4	12%	–	4	2	–	5%	–	1	1	1
	Fair amount	47	42	43	–	26	28	44	–	29	34	–	24	–	15	17	14
	Not very much	19	37	33	–	44	42	29	–	43	37	–	48	–	53	52	58
Hungary	None	5	5	13	–	18	22	8	–	21	23	–	22	–	30	29	26
	Don't know	4	4	4	–	4	4	6	–	4	4	–	1	–	2	2	2
	Great deal	7	–	5	–	–	4	3	–	2	9	–	4	–	5	11	7
	Fair amount	36	–	25	–	–	23	19	–	23	42	–	30	–	30	45	41
Poland**	Not very much	40	–	40	–	–	37	37	–	42	32	–	42	–	35	26	34
	None	14	–	27	–	–	32	36	–	30	13	–	22	–	29	16	16
	Don't know	5	–	5	–	–	5	5	–	3	5	–	2	–	2	2	2
	Great deal	16	4	2	–	3	4	2	3	6	3	3%	–	3	–	3	2
Romania	Fair amount	43	28	28	–	24	23	14	13	30	24	–	–	–	31	26	29
	Not very much	22	36	43	–	44	45	44	43	37	46	–	–	–	47	49	48
	None	4	16	21	–	20	15	33	35	13	21	–	–	–	14	16	17
	Don't know	15	17	7	–	9	13	7	7	14	7	6	–	5	–	7	4
Slovakia*	Great deal	–	10	–	–	6	4	2	4	–	4	–	4	–	5	5	2
	Fair amount	–	53	–	–	41	24	18	20	–	15	–	18	–	25	16	13
	Not very much	–	27	–	–	37	39	39	43	–	42	–	50	–	51	44	48
	None	–	5	–	–	9	22	32	26	–	31	–	25	–	19	34	33
Slovakia*	Don't know	–	5	–	–	7	12	9	8	–	8	–	4	–	2	2	3
	Great deal	22	17	5	–	5	5	14	–	4	3	–	6	–	3	4	2
	Fair amount	52	46	36	–	21	24	42	–	29	25	–	27	–	20	20	27
	Not very much	17	25	34	–	45	36	29	–	42	36	–	48	–	48	51	50
Slovakia*	None	5	8	20	–	24	29	10	–	21	32	–	16	–	27	22	19
	Don't know	4	5	5	–	5	5	5	–	4	4	–	3	–	3	3	2

Office of Research Surveys: 1990-1999; * Through 1992, figures given for the Czech Republic and Slovakia refer to opinions of the institutions of the former Czechoslovakia within the respective Czech and Slovak regions of that country. ** Poland 1990-91: "Sejm"

Table A-25: Confidence in Institutions and Organizations – Local Government

"Now I would like to ask you about some institutions and organizations. Please tell me how much confidence you have in the following institutions and organizations. Do you have a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or no confidence in the local government?"

		s1990	f1990	s1991	f1991	s1992	f1992	s1993	f1993	1994	1995	s1996	f1996	s1997	f1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria	Great deal	-	24%	41%	12%	16%	-	8%	4%	4%	-	12%	9%	12%	12%	8%	9%
	Fair amount	-	19	29	27	22	-	22	20	19	-	33	23	31	31	30	27
	Not very much	-	42	21	37	30	-	34	41	40	-	34	38	30	36	38	36
	None	-	15	9	20	20	-	27	27	33	-	17	28	24	19	22	24
	Don't know	-	-	-	4	12	-	9	7	4	-	4	3	4	3	2	5
		-	-	15	10	13	11%	-	9	8	-	-	-	-	5	7	7
Czech Rep.	Great deal	-	-	37	40	48	46	-	43	41	-	-	-	-	39	41	48
	Fair amount	-	-	18	35	24	29	-	32	33	-	-	-	-	41	41	37
	Not very much	-	-	9	8	7	9	-	12	13	-	-	-	-	12	10	7
	None	-	-	21	7	8	4	-	3	5	-	-	-	-	2	2	2
Hungary	Great deal	6%	-	7	-	12	12	-	9	13	-	-	-	-	16	18	20
	Fair amount	34	-	38	-	38	40	-	35	40	-	-	-	-	41	45	41
	Not very much	35	-	29	-	25	28	-	36	30	-	-	-	-	26	22	24
	None	21	-	11	-	10	12	-	15	11	-	-	-	-	16	14	13
	Don't know	4	-	15	-	15	9	-	6	6	-	-	-	-	2	1	2
		-	2	1	1	2	2	5	5	3	-	-	3	-	3	3	4
Poland	Great deal	-	16	17	15	20	26	31	28	28	-	-	32	-	30	30	32
	Fair amount	-	42	49	49	49	44	44	38	43	-	-	46	-	48	46	45
	Not very much	-	14	21	24	18	20	13	18	15	-	-	12	-	13	13	14
	None	-	26	12	11	11	9	7	11	10	-	-	8	-	6	9	6
Romania	Great deal	-	11	-	8	9	6	6	-	5	-	7	-	-	6	9	4
	Fair amount	-	38	-	28	36	28	26	-	19	-	24	-	-	31	27	24
	Not very much	-	29	-	39	33	41	40	-	39	-	41	-	-	47	42	49
	None	-	14	-	22	12	20	23	-	32	-	26	-	-	15	21	20
	Don't know	-	8	-	4	10	5	5	-	5	-	3	-	-	1	2	3
		-	-	17	13	15	13	-	10	12	-	-	-	-	5	8	6
Slovakia	Great deal	-	-	45	39	51	45	-	46	40	-	-	-	-	40	35	42
	Fair amount	-	-	18	33	21	30	-	30	26	-	-	-	-	43	46	43
	Not very much	-	-	8	10	8	9	-	11	18	-	-	-	-	9	9	7
	None	-	-	12	6	5	3	-	3	3	-	-	-	-	3	3	2
	Don't know	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table A-26: Confidence in Institutions and Organizations – Courts / Judiciary

"Now I would like to ask you about some institutions and organizations. Please tell me how much confidence you have in the following institutions and organizations. Do you have a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or no confidence in the courts / judiciary?"

		s1990	f1990	s1991	f1991	s1992	f1992	s1993	f1993	1994	1995	s1996	f1996	s1997	f1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria	Great deal	–	–	30%	23%	20%	–	13%	7%	4%	–	6%	5%	8%	6%	6%	6%
	Fair amount	–	–	18	24	22	–	20	22	11	–	19	14	20	19	13	16
	Not very much	–	–	27	30	21	–	28	36	38	–	40	35	35	43	35	40
	None	–	–	26	18	18	–	25	24	38	–	29	40	32	25	42	31
	Don't know	–	–	–	6	20	–	14	12	7	–	5	6	6	5	5	7
Czech Rep.*	Great deal	5%	4%	8	5	7	6%	–	9	5	–	4	–	–	2	3	3
	Fair amount	33	26	27	30	38	32	–	36	38	–	33	–	–	20	24	25
	Not very much	37	34	21	39	29	37	–	33	32	–	47	–	–	51	50	49
	None	19	16	8	14	11	17	–	13	19	–	12	–	–	25	20	21
	Don't know	7	20	36	12	14	8	–	9	6	–	4	–	–	2	3	2
Hungary	Great deal	7	–	12	–	12	13	–	12	16	–	9	–	–	13	14	14
	Fair amount	42	–	40	–	34	35	–	39	46	–	50	–	–	37	42	44
	Not very much	34	–	21	–	22	22	–	25	20	–	26	–	–	28	26	24
	None	10	–	9	–	11	11	–	12	9	–	10	–	–	16	16	14
	Don't know	7	–	19	–	21	20	–	12	10	–	7	–	–	7	2	5
Poland	Great deal	–	3	4	4	7	8	12	11	9	9%	–	6	–	7	5	4
	Fair amount	–	32	37	40	25	37	41	35	37	37	–	38	–	37	36	31
	Not very much	–	29	31	27	33	31	27	30	31	33	–	39	–	38	37	43
	None	–	13	13	14	16	12	9	14	13	13	–	11	–	13	14	16
	Don't know	–	23	15	16	20	13	11	11	10	8	–	6	–	6	8	6
Romania	Great deal	–	–	–	14	16	13	9	–	10	–	20	–	–	14	13	10
	Fair amount	–	–	–	37	37	30	33	–	27	–	30	–	–	32	27	22
	Not very much	–	–	–	30	27	31	33	–	36	–	36	–	–	39	37	42
	None	–	–	–	–	9	15	15	–	19	–	11	–	–	13	20	22
	Don't know	–	–	–	–	9	10	10	–	8	–	3	–	–	2	3	4
Slovakia*	Great deal	2	5	5	5	5	6	–	7	5	–	7	–	6	5	6	4
	Fair amount	21	34	30	29	42	38	–	38	33	–	42	–	39	33	29	28
	Not very much	47	33	22	40	28	33	–	32	31	–	35	–	39	44	47	48
	None	15	10	10	15	13	13	–	14	23	–	10	–	11	15	14	18
	Don't know	6	19	33	11	12	9	–	8	8	–	6	–	5	4	5	2

Office of Research Surveys: 1990-1999; * Through 1992, figures given for the Czech Republic and Slovakia refer to opinions of the institutions of the former Czechoslovakia within the respective Czech and Slovak regions of that country.

Table A-27: Judicial System

"If I were wrongly accused of a crime, I'm sure our judicial system would find me innocent."

		1993	1994	1995	s1996	f1996	1997	1999
Bulgaria	Strongly agree	–	4%	9%	7%	6%	–	6%
	Somewhat agree	–	18	18	33	22	–	19
	Somewhat disagree	–	32	25	25	31	–	34
	Strongly disagree	–	28	31	25	33	–	27
	Don't know	–	18	16	10	8	–	14
Czech Rep.	Strongly agree	–	10	7	9	–	–	5
	Somewhat agree	–	36	26	39	–	–	31
	Somewhat disagree	–	32	38	35	–	–	41
	Strongly disagree	–	12	21	10	–	–	19
	Don't know	–	10	8	8	–	–	4
Hungary	Strongly agree	–	30	20	23	–	–	10
	Somewhat agree	–	37	29	36	–	–	29
	Somewhat disagree	–	19	27	25	–	–	35
	Strongly disagree	–	6	14	10	–	–	19
	Don't know	–	8	10	6	–	–	7
Poland	Strongly agree	–	–	10	10	8	–	6
	Somewhat agree	–	–	28	34	31	–	32
	Somewhat disagree	–	–	30	31	34	–	34
	Strongly disagree	–	–	19	13	13	–	14
	Don't know	–	–	12	12	13	–	14
Romania	Strongly agree	11%	13	–	24	–	–	12
	Somewhat agree	31	29	–	31	–	–	21
	Somewhat disagree	28	24	–	24	–	–	32
	Strongly disagree	18	26	–	17	–	–	27
	Don't know	12	8	–	3	–	–	8
Slovakia	Strongly agree	–	8	11	16	–	14%	5
	Somewhat agree	–	30	26	39	–	40	33
	Somewhat disagree	–	35	32	27	–	31	40
	Strongly disagree	–	12	15	8	–	7	18
	Don't know	–	15	16	11	–	8	4

Office of Research Surveys: 1993-1999

Table A-28: Confidence in Institutions and Organizations – Police

"Now I would like to ask you about some institutions and organizations. Please tell me how much confidence you have in the following institutions and organizations. Do you have a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or no confidence in the police?"

		s1990	f1990	s1991	f1991	s1992	f1992	s1993	f1993	1994	1995	s1996	f1996	s1997	f1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria	Great deal	–	41%	–	43%	–	–	–	18%	12%	7%	–	13%	–	16%	18%	13%
	Fair amount	–	17	19	–	–	–	–	28	29	23	–	26	24	30	31	32
	Not very much	–	25	27	–	–	–	–	26	33	33	–	35	36	33	29	31
	None	–	16	11	–	–	–	–	20	19	31	–	22	26	18	17	19
Czech Rep.*	Don't know	–	–	–	–	–	–	8	8	4	–	–	4	3	3	4	5
	Great deal	5%	6	–	7%	10%	6%	–	5	4	–	–	3	–	2	3	4
	Fair amount	28	25	–	28	40	34	–	41	39	–	–	31	–	27	33	36
	Not very much	37	37	–	46	35	42	–	37	38	–	–	48	–	51	47	47
Hungary	None	27	25	–	16	12	14	–	15	17	–	–	17	–	20	16	13
	Don't know	3	8	–	3	4	3	–	3	1	–	–	2	–	1	1	–
	Great deal	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	15	–	–	9	–	10	16	8
	Fair amount	44	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	48	–	–	47	–	39	36	35
Poland	Not very much	34	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	25	–	–	31	–	33	31	34
	None	12	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	9	–	–	12	–	18	17	22
	Don't know	3	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	3	–	–	1	–	1	–	1
	Great deal	4	3	4	4	–	–	18	–	–	–	–	–	11	–	9	7
Romania	Fair amount	18	27	41	36	–	–	46	–	–	–	–	–	44	–	42	39
	Not very much	35	39	37	40	–	–	25	–	–	–	–	–	34	–	35	39
	None	31	17	13	12	–	–	7	–	–	–	–	–	8	–	12	9
	Don't know	12	13	5	8	–	–	5	–	–	–	–	–	3	–	2	4
Slovakia*	Great deal	13	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	23	–	18	19	14
	Fair amount	41	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	34	–	35	34	31
	Not very much	29	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	30	–	35	35	38
	None	9	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	11	–	11	13	15
Slovakia*	Don't know	8	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2	–	1	1	2
	Great deal	3	6	–	7	7	7	–	6	6	–	–	5	–	4	5	4
	Fair amount	35	34	–	31	41	35	–	38	36	–	–	38	–	30	29	31
	Not very much	38	33	–	43	33	37	–	36	33	–	–	41	–	47	47	48
Slovakia*	None	19	18	–	15	13	15	–	18	21	–	–	13	–	17	18	15
	Don't know	5	10	–	14	6	5	–	3	4	–	–	3	–	3	2	1

Office of Research Surveys: 1990-1999 ; * Through 1992, figures given for the Czech Republic and Slovakia refer to opinions of the institutions of the former Czechoslovakia within the respective Czech and Slovak regions of that country.

Table A-29: Confidence in Institutions and Organizations – Army / Military

"Now I would like to ask you about some institutions and organizations. Please tell me how much confidence you have in the following institutions and organizations. Do you have a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or no confidence in the army?"

		s1990	f1990	s1991	f1991	s1992	f1992	s1993	f1993	1994	1995	s1996	f1996	s1997	f1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria	Great deal	–	57%	65%	48%	39%	–	42%	28%	24%	–	33%	33%	37%	34%	36%	26%
	Fair amount	–	10	9	29	25	–	30	34	35	–	40	33	35	43	34	38
	Not very much	–	14	10	12	13	–	11	21	22	–	17	19	16	15	19	20
	None	–	19	16	6	7	–	6	8	11	–	6	9	7	5	6	9
	Don't know	–	–	–	5	17	–	10	9	8	–	4	6	4	4	5	8
Czech Rep.*	Great deal	13%	10	12	12	11	11%	–	9	6	–	3	–	–	3	3	5
	Fair amount	36	34	36	31	38	34	–	36	35	–	30	–	–	29	31	40
	Not very much	30	29	24	33	27	31	–	32	33	–	51	–	–	49	47	42
	None	18	14	12	19	15	16	–	16	20	–	14	–	–	17	16	11
	Don't know	3	14	16	5	9	7	–	7	6	–	2	–	–	2	3	2
Hungary	Great deal	10	–	12	–	13	12	–	12	20	–	12	–	–	12	14	13
	Fair amount	47	–	38	–	35	34	–	36	42	–	50	–	–	38	39	40
	Not very much	27	–	22	–	21	24	–	26	22	–	26	–	–	33	28	30
	None	9	–	11	–	15	15	–	15	7	–	10	–	–	16	18	14
	Don't know	8	–	18	–	16	16	–	11	9	–	3	–	–	2	2	3
Poland	Great deal	18	10	14	19	19	17	27	29	22	19%	–	22	–	21	17	19
	Fair amount	41	47	56	52	36	46	45	43	48	46	–	53	–	49	50	54
	Not very much	19	21	19	17	25	22	15	15	18	23	–	18	–	22	21	18
	None	10	7	5	4	8	6	5	6	5	5	–	3	–	4	5	4
	Don't know	13	16	6	9	12	9	8	8	7	7	–	4	–	4	7	5
Romania	Great deal	52	41	–	37	36	40	49	–	38	–	47	–	–	43	39	31
	Fair amount	39	44	–	46	46	41	38	–	41	–	40	–	–	45	46	48
	Not very much	5	10	–	10	11	11	8	–	11	–	9	–	–	9	12	16
	None	–	2	–	4	2	2	2	–	2	–	2	–	–	2	2	3
	Don't know	4	3	–	4	5	6	4	–	8	–	2	–	–	1	1	2
Slovakia*	Great deal	17	12	15	11	8	15	–	14	13	–	15	–	13	16	21	16
	Fair amount	42	42	36	36	37	41	–	48	47	–	49	–	50	45	45	48
	Not very much	24	25	23	34	33	25	–	24	23	–	27	–	28	30	27	27
	None	13	6	11	13	13	10	–	8	9	–	5	–	5	6	9	6
	Don't know	4	15	15	7	9	9	–	6	8	–	4	–	4	4	3	3

Office of Research Surveys: 1990-1999; * Through 1992, figures given for the Czech Republic and Slovakia refer to opinions of the institutions of the former Czechoslovakia within the respective Czech and Slovak regions of that country.

Table A-30: Confidence in Institutions and Organizations – Church

"Now I would like to ask you about some institutions and organizations. Please tell me how much confidence you have in the following institutions and organizations. Do you have a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or no confidence in the church?"

	s1990 f1990 s1991 f1991 s1992 f1992 s1993 f1993 s1994 f1994 s1995 f1995 s1996 f1996 s1997 f1997 s1998 f1998 s1999 f1999															
Bulgaria	Great deal	–	42%	50%	26%	27%	–	20%	13%	14%	–	16%	16%	–	17%	18%
	Fair amount	–	10	14	25	16	–	22	21	28	–	26	26	–	30	30
	Not very much	–	20	17	21	19	–	21	22	28	–	25	25	–	24	26
	None	–	28	18	24	20	–	23	26	21	–	21	21	–	19	17
Czech Rep.	Don't know	–	–	–	5	17	–	14	18	9	–	12	12	–	9	9
	Great deal	23%	25	20	12	12	13%	–	9	9	–	8	–	–	8	7
	Fair amount	26	29	26	24	30	26	–	22	25	–	20	–	–	18	19
	Not very much	19	19	15	26	21	25	–	26	26	–	33	–	–	30	33
Hungary	None	26	15	15	28	25	25	–	35	33	–	34	–	–	37	31
	Don't know	6	16	24	10	12	11	–	9	7	–	5	–	–	7	5
	Great deal	23	–	16	–	20	19	–	13	16	–	14	–	–	15	13
	Fair amount	43	–	39	–	35	33	–	31	37	–	35	–	–	32	29
Poland	Not very much	21	–	21	–	21	20	–	28	23	–	26	–	–	26	28
	None	9	–	14	–	14	18	–	23	16	–	21	–	–	25	29
	Don't know	4	–	10	–	11	10	–	5	8	–	4	–	–	3	3
	Great deal	44	26	19	18	19	17	21	23	21	19%	–	23	–	18	18
Romania	Fair amount	35	38	38	35	30	31	32	33	35	34	–	39	–	39	39
	Not very much	14	18	27	28	31	31	26	28	29	28	–	27	–	27	31
	None	4	9	15	16	16	19	18	15	15	17	–	9	–	12	10
	Don't know	4	9	2	4	4	2	3	1	2	2	–	2	–	3	3
Slovakia	Great deal	34	33	–	36	36	43	49	–	48	–	55	–	–	47	43
	Fair amount	40	42	–	36	39	36	34	–	32	–	29	–	–	34	33
	Not very much	13	15	–	17	16	13	10	–	13	–	12	–	–	14	14
	None	4	6	–	9	6	6	4	–	4	–	3	–	–	5	6
Slovakia	Don't know	8	4	–	3	3	2	3	–	3	–	1	–	–	1	2
	Great deal	36	35	25	18	18	23	–	20	20	–	14	–	12%	12	16/6**
	Fair amount	31	34	31	26	30	32	–	34	30	–	31	–	33	32	30/21
	Not very much	18	18	17	27	19	22	–	23	21	–	32	–	34	34	29/25
Slovakia	None	11	8	16	25	29	19	–	20	25	–	20	–	18	19	20/24
	Don't know	4	5	10	4	4	3	–	4	4	–	3	–	3	4	6/24

Office of Research Surveys: 1990-1999; * Poland 1990-1991: "the episcopate of the Roman Catholic Church."

** Slovakia 1998: Catholic / Lutheran

Table A-31: Trust in People

"Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people."

	s1992	f1992	s1993	f1993	1994	s1996	f1996	s1997	f1997
Bulgaria									
Most people can be trusted	40%	—	36%	36%	—	40%	39%	41%	—
Can't be too careful	53	—	57	58	—	56	56	55	—
Don't know	8	—	8	7	—	4	5	4	—
Czech Rep.									
Most people can be trusted	25	24%	—	25	—	19	—	—	—
Can't be too careful	73	73	—	73	—	79	—	—	—
Don't know	3	3	—	2	—	2	—	—	—
Hungary									
Most people can be trusted	—	23	—	—	21%	19	—	—	—
Can't be too careful	—	75	—	—	76	80	—	—	—
Don't know	—	2	—	—	4	1	—	—	—
Poland									
Most people can be trusted	19	—	19	—	21	—	13	—	—
Can't be too careful	77	—	80	—	76	—	84	—	—
Don't know	4	—	1	—	3	—	3	—	—
Romania									
Most people can be trusted	19	20	24	—	16	21	—	—	—
Can't be too careful	77	76	75	—	81	78	—	—	—
Don't know	4	5	2	—	3	1	—	—	—
Slovakia									
Most people can be trusted	15	17	—	23	20	23	—	19	23%
Can't be too careful	82	77	—	75	78	75	—	79	75
Don't know	2	6	—	2	2	2	—	2	2

Office of Research Surveys: 1992-1997

Table A-32: "Most People Can Be Trusted"

"Most people can be trusted."

	1990	s1991	f1991	s1992	f1992	s1993	f1993	s1994	f1994
Bulgaria									
Strongly agree	–	27%	24%	25%	–	24%	14%	–	12%
Somewhat agree	–	29	39	31	–	37	29	–	37
Somewhat disagree	–	26	23	23	–	23	29	–	31
Strongly disagree	–	13	12	13	–	9	21	–	15
Don't know	–	5	6	7	–	8	8	–	5
Czech Rep.									
Strongly agree	–	9	9	9	13%	–	8	–	8
Somewhat agree	–	37	45	35	38	–	30	–	33
Somewhat disagree	–	41	36	43	38	–	41	–	40
Strongly disagree	–	11	8	11	9	–	17	–	17
Don't know	–	3	1	2	1	–	3	–	2
Hungary									
Strongly agree	6%	–	6	6	12	–	–	–	9
Somewhat agree	30	–	26	24	28	–	–	–	21
Somewhat disagree	50	–	31	44	42	–	–	–	41
Strongly disagree	12	–	34	25	18	–	–	–	26
Don't know	1	–	3	1	–	–	–	–	3
Poland									
Strongly agree	13	13	7	9	10	12	–	13%	–
Somewhat agree	38	38	36	35	31	39	–	43	–
Somewhat disagree	36	38	41	35	41	35	–	29	–
Strongly disagree	10	9	13	18	14	10	–	12	–
Don't know	4	2	3	3	5	4	–	4	–
Romania									
Strongly agree	15	–	6	3	7	6	–	–	5
Somewhat agree	38	–	33	29	22	29	–	–	23
Somewhat disagree	28	–	48	58	53	55	–	–	50
Strongly disagree	8	–	12	6	12	9	–	–	19
Don't know	10	–	2	3	6	2	–	–	3
Slovakia									
Strongly agree	–	7	6	7	10	–	7	–	7
Somewhat agree	–	35	38	33	36	–	29	–	29
Somewhat disagree	–	45	43	43	43	–	39	–	41
Strongly disagree	–	12	11	14	10	–	21	–	20
Don't know	–	2	2	3	2	–	4	–	3

Office of Research Surveys: 1990-1994

Table A-33: Current Economic System Relative to Communist System

"If you compare the economic situation of our country during the previous communist system with the current economic situation, would you say that the current situation is in general better or worse than the one of the communist system?"

	w1992	s1992	f1992	s1993	f1993	1994	s1995	f1995	s1997	f1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria*												
Better	–	21%	–	21%	–	13%	14%	–	10%	19%	20%	15%
Worse	–	63	–	69	–	79	77	–	83	74	72	79
Don't know	–	16	–	10	–	7	9	–	6	7	8	7
Czech Rep.												
Better	–	32	43%	–	–	57	–	56%	–	43	44	31
Worse	–	57	52	–	–	35	–	33	–	50	51	62
Don't know	–	10	5	–	–	8	–	11	–	8	5	7
Hungary												
Better	21%	–	18	–	20%	20	16	–	–	24	40	31
Worse	70	–	75	–	73	68	78	–	–	70	50	59
Don't know	8	–	7	–	7	12	5	–	–	7	10	10
Poland												
Better	21	19	–	31	41	38	41	53	–	62	56	52
Worse	69	67	–	59	51	53	47	37	–	25	30	40
Same	8	8	–	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	–	12	n/a	n/a
Don't know	2	6	–	9	9	10	12	9	–	–	13	7
Romania												
Better	–	22	16	21	–	28	–	–	–	35	33	27
Worse	–	61	71	68	–	63	–	–	–	61	64	67
Don't know	–	17	13	11	–	9	–	–	–	4	4	7
Slovakia												
Better	–	17	22	–	–	14	17	–	27	30	27	12
Worse	–	74	71	–	–	81	74	–	65	63	65	85
Don't know	–	9	6	–	–	5	9	–	8	7	7	3

Office of Research Surveys: 1992-1999; *If you compare the economic situation of our country before the 10th of November with the current economic situation, would you say that the current situation is in general better or worse than before the 10th of November?"

Table A-34: Current Economic Situation

"How would you describe the current economic situation in [Survey Country]?"

	1990	s1991	f1991	s1992	f1992	s1993	f1993	1994	s1995	f1995	s1996	f1996	s1997	f1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria*																
Very good	—	—	1%	—	—	—	1%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Fairly good	—	3	33	22	—	18	15	9	15	—	14	4	2	10	12	12
Fairly bad	—	22	25	47	—	50	48	46	56	—	54	37	35	47	48	46
Very bad	—	70	38	20	—	28	33	42	25	—	31	58	62	42	40	40
Don't know	—	4	4	11	—	4	3	2	3	—	2	1	1	1	1	2
Czech Rep.																
Very good	—	1	1	1	1%	—	2	3	2	2%	3	—	—	1	1	1
Fairly good	—	14	23	32	35	—	51	52	48	51	51	—	—	26	26	13
Fairly bad	—	55	51	51	48	—	38	34	42	39	38	—	—	52	53	57
Very bad	—	29	23	13	13	—	8	7	5	5	6	—	—	20	20	28
Don't know	—	2	2	4	3	—	2	3	4	3	4	—	—	1	2	1
Hungary																
Very good	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Fairly good	—	9	—	18	12	—	8	9	—	8	11	—	—	16	26	26
Fairly bad	—	57	—	55	59	—	59	59	—	57	60	—	—	61	59	57
Very bad	—	32	—	24	27	—	31	31	—	33	28	—	—	20	11	14
Don't know	—	2	—	3	2	—	2	2	—	1	1	—	—	2	4	3
Poland																
Very good	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	1	1	—	1	2
Fairly good	14	19	11	14	—	25	—	27	29	43	—	35	53	—	48	41
Fairly bad	54	50	51	55	—	52	—	59	54	44	—	49	32	—	38	43
Very bad	27	29	35	27	—	20	—	10	10	7	—	9	3	—	6	10
Don't know	4	1	2	4	—	2	—	4	6	5	—	6	11	—	8	5
Romania																
Very good	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	1	1	—
Fairly good	9	—	11	18	11	15	—	25	—	—	22	—	—	19	19	11
Fairly bad	59	—	59	56	51	59	—	50	—	—	53	—	—	51	44	52
Very bad	30	—	27	14	29	19	—	20	—	—	21	—	—	28	34	37
Don't know	2	—	3	12	8	7	—	5	—	—	4	—	—	2	3	1
Slovakia																
Very Good	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—
Fairly Good	—	5	—	19	14	—	8	9	12	—	26	—	—	27	21	6
Fairly Bad	—	52	—	55	57	—	54	56	64	—	56	—	—	53	56	49
Very Bad	—	42	—	23	25	—	36	32	21	—	14	—	—	18	20	44
Don't know	—	1	—	3	3	—	1	2	2	—	4	—	—	2	3	1

Office of Research Surveys: 1990-1999

Table A-35: Household's Current Financial Situation

"And how would you describe your household's financial situation at the present time. Would you say it is very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad?"

	1990	1991	1992	s1993	f1993	1994	s1995	f1995	s1996	f1996	s1997	f1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria	***			*	*									
Very good	1%	—	—	1%	1%	1%	1%	—	—	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
Fairly good	36	—	—	11	12	10	40	—	42	26	21	29	31	29
Neither good nor bad	46	—	—	43	39	35	n/a	—	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Fairly bad	1	—	—	28	31	33	38	—	38	40	41	37	36	35
Very bad	5	—	—	16	16	20	20	—	19	33	37	34	32	35
Don't know	—	—	—	2	1	1	—	—	1	1	1	—	—	1
Czech Rep.			*			*								
Very good	3	—	7%	—	—	2	—	3%	3	—	—	3	2	2
Fairly good	58	—	26	—	—	20	—	53	56	—	—	51	51	47
Neither good nor bad	n/a	—	45	—	—	46	—	n/a	n/a	—	—	n/a	n/a	n/a
Fairly bad	34	—	19	—	—	23	—	36	34	—	—	35	38	41
Very bad	3	—	2	—	—	8	—	8	6	—	—	10	7	9
Don't know	2	—	1	—	—	1	—	1	1	—	—	1	2	1
Hungary														
Very good	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	2
Fairly good	—	—	—	7	—	—	—	35	34	—	—	31	39	41
Neither good nor bad	—	—	—	52	—	—	—	n/a	n/a	—	—	n/a	n/a	n/a
Fairly bad	—	—	—	27	—	—	—	43	48	—	—	49	45	43
Very bad	—	—	—	13	—	—	—	21	16	—	—	19	15	13
Don't know	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	1	1
Poland														
Very good	1	—	1	1	—	1	1	2	—	1	—	1	1	2
Fairly good	32	—	12	12	—	40	42	48	—	47	—	50	48	45
Neither good nor bad	48	—	44	44	—	n/a	n/a	n/a	—	n/a	—	n/a	n/a	n/a
Fairly bad	10	—	29	27	—	45	41	39	—	39	—	34	35	38
Very bad	7	—	14	16	—	13	14	11	—	10	—	12	12	14
Don't know	2	—	—	1	—	1	1	1	—	3	—	3	4	1
Romania														
Very good	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	1	1	—
Fairly good	18	17	—	—	—	13	—	—	27	—	—	25	31	23
Neither good nor bad	48	45	—	—	—	40	—	—	n/a	—	—	n/a	n/a	n/a
Fairly bad	21	28	—	—	—	28	—	—	44	—	—	40	33	39
Very bad	10	10	—	—	—	18	—	—	28	—	—	34	36	36
Don't know	2	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1
Slovakia	**													
Very Good	3	—	—	—	1	1	1	—	2	—	1	1	3	1
Fairly Good	57	—	—	—	9	8	30	—	40	—	40	40	43	30
Fairly Bad	36	—	—	—	43	42	51	—	47	—	47	47	42	52
Very Bad	2	—	—	—	33	31	17	—	10	—	11	10	10	16
Don't know	1	—	—	—	14	17	1	—	2	—	2	1	2	2

Office of Research Surveys: 1990-1999; * "How would you rate your income situation?"; ** "household's standard of living"; *** "household's economic situation"

Table A-36: Household Situation

"Compared to 12 months ago, do you think that the financial situation of your household has gotten a lot better, a little better, stayed the same, gotten a little worse, or a lot worse?"

	1990	s1991	f1991	w1992	s1992	f1992	s1993	f1993	1994	1997
Bulgaria	*	*	**		**					
Lot better	1%	1%	1%	—	2%	—	1%	2%	1%	—
Little better	7	6	7	—	14	—	13	11	8	7
Same	27	18	23	—	24	—	23	28	19	18
Little worse	38	40	35	—	32	—	34	31	35	31
Lot worse	24	32	32	—	25	—	28	28	37	42
Don't know	2	2	3	—	3	—	2	1	2	2
Czech Rep.		**								
Lot better	—	1	—	—	4	5	—	5	—	—
Little better	—	4	—	—	14	16	—	20	—	—
Same	—	32	—	—	30	30	—	41	—	—
Little worse	—	42	—	—	34	32	—	24	—	—
Lot worse	—	21	—	—	17	15	—	10	—	—
Don't know	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Hungary		**			**	**				
Lot better	—	1	—	—	1	1	—	1	1	—
Little better	—	4	—	—	8	13	—	9	9	—
Same	—	16	—	—	26	22	—	29	28	—
Little worse	—	35	—	—	35	34	—	36	34	—
Lot worse	—	44	—	—	30	25	—	25	28	—
Don't know	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	—
Poland										
Lot better	2	2	2	2%	3	—	2	3	—	—
Little better	23	18	10	11	13	—	13	10	—	—
Same	36	26	22	25	29	—	27	25	—	—
Little worse	32	28	31	31	30	—	33	29	—	—
Lot worse	8	25	34	30	24	—	25	32	—	—
Don't know	—	1	1	2	1	—	—	—	—	—
Romania										
Lot better	1	—	4	—	3	1	2	—	—	—
Little better	24	—	35	—	25	17	15	—	—	—
Same	36	—	34	—	29	33	27	—	—	—
Little worse	29	—	24	—	38	39	45	—	—	—
Lot worse	9	—	2	—	4	9	9	—	—	—
Don't know	1	—	—	—	1	1	1	—	—	—
Slovakia										
Lot better	—	1	—	—	3	2	—	2	—	—
Little better	—	2	—	—	12	13	—	9	—	—
Same	—	22	—	—	27	30	—	30	—	—
Little worse	—	42	—	—	32	34	—	33	—	—
Lot worse	—	33	—	—	26	21	—	27	—	—
Don't know	—	1	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	—

Office of Research Surveys: 1992-1997

Table A-37: Household's Financial Situation Over Next Year

"And over the next 12 months, do you expect that the financial situation of your household will:"

	s1990	f1990	w1991	s1991	f1991	s1992	f1992	s1993	f1993	s1994	f1994
Bulgaria	*										
Improve a lot	–	1%	–	2%	1%	4%	–	3%	2%	1%	1%
Improve a little	–	14	–	23	24	24	–	22	17	8	18
Stay the same	–	21	–	20	24	20	–	26	33	24	28
Worsen a little	–	24	–	18	14	12	–	19	19	36	21
Worsen a lot	–	24	–	18	12	14	–	14	18	27	19
Don't know	–	17	–	18	25	26	–	16	11	5	14
Czech Rep.	*										
Improve a lot	1%	4	1	1	–	3	4%	–	4	–	2
Improve a little	6	19	4	12	–	21	22	–	21	–	20
Stay the same	46	23	16	27	–	38	31	–	47	–	46
Worsen a little	33	32	40	30	–	21	27	–	20	–	19
Worsen a lot	5	16	40	26	–	10	13	–	6	–	10
Don't know	8	6	–	4	–	6	3	–	2	–	3
Hungary	**										
Improve a lot	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	1	–
Improve a bit	–	–	–	–	10	12	–	–	–	26	–
Stay the same	–	–	–	–	22	27	–	–	–	40	–
Worsen a bit	–	–	–	–	36	33	–	–	–	21	–
Worsen a lot	–	–	–	–	29	24	–	–	–	6	–
Don't know	–	–	–	–	4	4	–	–	–	7	–
Poland	***										
Improve a lot	5	4	–	2	2	2	2	1	–	–	–
Improve a bit	33	32	–	21	20	16	20	16	–	–	–
Stay the same	25	n/a	–	29	26	26	37	37	–	–	–
Worsen a bit	16	25	–	25	26	24	20	23	–	–	–
Worsen a lot	8	15	–	15	16	22	11	15	–	–	–
Don't know	14	24	–	9	11	11	9	9	–	–	–
Romania											
Improve a lot	–	2	–	–	2	1	1	2	–	–	1
Improve a bit	–	25	–	–	34	27	22	30	–	–	18
Stay the same	–	22	–	–	22	22	24	22	–	–	22
Worsen a bit	–	26	–	–	21	20	17	20	–	–	32
Worsen a lot	–	12	–	–	3	3	5	5	–	–	14
Don't know	–	14	–	–	19	27	32	23	–	–	13
Slovakia	* *										
Improve a lot	1	5	2	1	–	3	2	–	2	–	3
Improve a bit	10	22	5	8	–	16	16	–	16	–	11
Stay the same	45	25	19	20	–	33	28	–	40	–	39
Worsen a bit	27	26	35	35	–	23	30	–	22	–	25
Worsen a lot	10	15	37	31	–	18	18	–	15	–	18
Don't know	8	8	1	5	–	7	6	–	6	–	4

Office of Research Surveys: 1990-1994; * "Standard of living of your household;" ** "material situation;" *** "personal economic situation"

Table A-38: Household's Living Standard in Five Years

"Five years from now do you expect that the financial situation of your household will have improved a lot, improved a little, remained the same, declined a little or declined a lot?"

	s1990	f1990	s1991	f1991	s1992	f1992	s1993	f1993	1994	1995	s1996	f1996	s1997	f1997
Bulgaria														
Improve a lot	–	8%	15%	12%	14%	–	8%	4%	5%	2%	4%	2%	–	6%
Improve a little	–	33	32	31	23	–	30	28	28	39	35	28	–	40
Stay the same	–	13	8	8	7	–	10	13	11	28	24	20	–	24
Decline a little	–	9	4	3	4	–	6	6	10	7	6	8	–	9
Decline a lot	–	8	6	4	6	–	5	9	9	4	3	9	–	5
Don't know	–	30	36	41	47	–	42	40	38	20	28	33	–	17
Czech Rep.														
		*	*											
Improve a lot	–	17	14	–	14	16%	–	10	7	6	6	–	–	4
Improve a little	–	37	44	–	34	39	–	36	31	32	30	–	–	22
Stay the same	–	22	14	–	18	19	–	24	29	41	33	–	–	43
Decline a little	–	14	7	–	9	8	–	12	15	12	14	–	–	18
Decline a lot	–	9	6	–	4	4	–	6	9	5	4	–	–	10
Don't know	–	1	14	–	22	14	–	13	9	3	14	–	–	3
Hungary														
Improve a lot	–	–	5	–	7	6	–	3	–	3	3	–	–	4
Improve a little	–	–	35	–	39	35	–	33	–	27	32	–	–	37
Stay the same	–	–	16	–	13	15	–	31	–	29	23	–	–	31
Decline a little	–	–	14	–	16	18	–	18	–	21	16	–	–	14
Decline a lot	–	–	14	–	10	10	–	7	–	14	3	–	–	11
Don't know	–	–	17	–	16	15	–	7	–	6	23	–	–	3
Poland														
Improve a lot	5%	19	10	10	9	8	7	6	4	6	–	5	–	4
Improve a bit	33	34	39	37	33	36	33	39	31	44	–	36	–	39
Stay the same	25	n/a	13	11	13	16	18	21	38	31	–	26	–	36
Decline a bit	16	4	10	9	11	10	11	13	12	6	–	9	–	9
Decline a lot	8	5	6	6	10	5	8	9	4	2	–	3	–	3
Don't know	16	40	22	28	25	23	23	12	11	11	–	21	–	10
Romania														
Improve a lot	–	10	–	12	9	5	9	–	4	–	6	–	–	6
Improve a bit	–	42	–	35	29	30	38	–	24	–	39	–	–	42
Stay the same	–	9	–	6	5	5	8	–	8	–	19	–	–	25
Decline a bit	–	7	–	6	5	6	5	–	13	–	8	–	–	14
Decline a lot	–	3	–	3	2	2	3	–	12	–	3	–	–	4
Don't know	–	28	–	38	50	53	38	–	40	–	25	–	–	10
Slovakia														
			*											
Improve a lot	–	15	7	–	9	11	–	7	5	4	6	–	6%	4
Improve a bit	–	33	33	–	28	37	–	32	26	30	30	–	32	27
Stay the same	–	19	16	–	13	18	–	23	23	40	29	–	29	44
Decline a bit	–	18	14	–	11	10	–	9	16	13	12	–	12	16
Decline a lot	–	14	10	–	12	8	–	10	13	6	5	–	7	5
Don't know	–	1	20	–	28	16	–	20	17	7	18	–	14	5

Office of Research Surveys: 1990-1997; * "Standard of living"

Table A-39: Fear of Job Loss In Next Year

"How worried are you that you or someone in your family may lose their job in the next year – very worried, somewhat worried, not very worried, not worried at all?"

	1994	s1995	f1995	s1996	f1996	s1997	f1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria									
Very worried	33%	40%	–	44%	51%	46%	42%	49%	49%
Somewhat worried	33	38	–	32	33	32	32	29	30
Not very worried	13	11	–	11	9	10	11	10	10
Not worried at all	9	8	–	11	6	10	13	10	10
Don't know	12	3	–	2	1	2	3	3	2
Czech Rep.									
Very worried	12	–	13%	12	–	–	17	18	29
Somewhat worried	24	–	26	22	–	–	27	30	39
Not very worried	34	–	34	36	–	–	30	29	19
Not worried at all	21	–	25	28	–	–	23	22	12
Don't know	9	–	3	3	–	–	3	2	1
Hungary									
Very worried	43	–	46	46	–	–	46	38	–
Somewhat worried	26	–	31	23	–	–	23	22	–
Not very worried	20	–	7	7	–	–	9	11	–
Not worried at all	9	–	14	23	–	–	22	28	–
Don't know	3	–	2	2	–	–	1	2	–
Poland									
Very worried	20	28	21	–	23	–	23	29	30
Somewhat worried	28	37	34	–	34	–	30	34	35
Not very worried	26	21	29	–	25	–	27	21	21
Not worried at all	17	9	11	–	15	–	16	12	12
Just lost job	5	3	3	–	n/a	–	n/a	n/a	n/a
Don't know	6	3	3	–	4	–	4	4	3
Romania									
Very worried	20	–	–	35	–	–	40	43	42
Somewhat worried	28	–	–	27	–	–	27	24	28
Not very worried	14	–	–	17	–	–	15	12	15
Not worried at all	16	–	–	18	–	–	17	17	11
Don't know	22	–	–	3	–	–	2	4	4
Slovakia									
Very worried	21	29	–	24	–	24	24	27	36
Somewhat worried	38	42	–	39	–	39	38	39	37
Not very worried	21	17	–	20	–	20	24	23	16
Not worried at all	10	10	–	15	–	15	12	10	10
Don't know	10	3	–	3	–	3	2	1	1

Office of Research Surveys: 1994-1999

Table A-40: Economy Over Next Year

"Over the next 12 months, do you expect the economic situation in [Survey Country] will get a lot better, get a little better, stay the same, get a little worse, get a lot worse?"

	s1990	f1990	1991	1994	s1996	f1996	1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria									
A lot better	—	—	2%	—	1%	1%	2%	1%	1%
A little better	—	—	30	—	21	11	40	33	23
Stay the same	—	—	16	—	40	23	24	41	28
A little worse	—	—	20	—	19	21	15	11	23
A lot worse	—	—	18	—	9	37	9	5	13
Don't know	—	—	14	—	10	7	12	9	11
Czech Rep.									
A lot better	3%	5%	3	—	2	—	—	1	1
A little better	29	32	25	—	29	—	—	20	11
Stay the same	26	14	26	—	50	—	—	50	41
A little worse	31	33	25	—	11	—	—	21	36
A lot worse	5	13	17	—	2	—	—	3	7
Don't know	6	4	5	—	5	—	—	5	4
Hungary									
A lot better	—	—	—	1%	—	—	—	4	2
A little better	—	—	—	10	—	27	—	52	30
Stay the same	—	—	—	34	—	34	—	26	36
A little worse	—	—	—	31	—	30	—	9	20
A lot worse	—	—	—	20	—	4	—	3	8
Don't know	—	—	—	4	—	5	—	8	6
Poland									
A lot better	4	2	1	2	—	1	—	3	1
A little better	42	48	29	27	—	28	—	33	28
Stay the same	17	n/a	23	44	—	44	—	41	37
A little worse	18	24	27	15	—	14	—	11	19
A lot worse	8	9	14	5	—	5	—	4	9
Don't know	11	17	7	7	—	9	—	9	5
Romania									
A lot better	14	2	3	—	1	—	—	4	3
A little better	59	41	43	—	34	—	—	43	19
Stay the same	8	31	17	—	36	—	—	17	31
A little worse	10	13	16	—	16	—	—	24	26
A lot worse	1	4	2	—	3	—	—	8	16
Don't know	8	9	20	—	9	—	—	4	6
Slovakia									
A lot better	5	3	—	—	3	—	2	1	1
A little better	24	29	17	—	27	—	22	24	21
Stay the same	22	13	21	—	46	—	42	46	27
A little worse	29	31	28	—	14	—	19	15	25
A lot worse	8	17	27	—	6	—	9	6	22
Don't know	12	8	7	—	5	—	7	7	4

Office of Research Surveys: 1990-1999

Table A-41: Economy in Five Years

"Five years from now, do you expect the economic situation in [Survey Country] will get a lot better, get a little better, stay the same, get a little worse, or get a lot worse?"

	1993	1994	s1995	f1995	1997
Bulgaria					
Get a lot better	—	—	3%	—	—
Get a little better	—	—	46	—	—
Stay the same	—	—	21	—	—
Get a little worse	—	—	8	—	—
Get a lot worse	—	—	3	—	—
Don't know	—	—	19	—	—
Czech Republic					
Get a lot better	—	—	—	11%	3%
Get a little better	—	—	—	48	39
Stay the same	—	—	—	27	25
Get a little worse	—	—	—	8	22
Get a lot worse	—	—	—	3	5
Don't know	—	—	—	3	6
Hungary					
Get a lot better	2%	3%	—	3	5
Get a little better	40	32	—	41	48
Stay the same	25	20	—	20	17
Get a little worse	16	18	—	16	13
Get a lot worse	9	13	—	13	9
Don't know	8	15	—	8	7
Poland					
Get a lot better	10	7	5	9	7
Get a little better	54	51	47	53	54
Stay the same	14	18	26	19	19
Get a little worse	8	8	9	5	7
Get a lot worse	5	3	4	2	2
Don't know	10	12	9	12	11
Slovakia					
Get a lot better	—	—	7	—	—
Get a little better	—	—	41	—	—
Stay the same	—	—	28	—	—
Get a little worse	—	—	12	—	—
Get a lot worse	—	—	6	—	—
Don't know	—	—	6	—	—

Office of Research Surveys: 1993-1997

Table A-42: Support for a Free Market Economy

"Do you personally feel that the creation of a free market economy, that is one largely free from state control, is right or wrong for [survey country]'s future?"

	1991	s1992	f1992	s1993	f1993	s1994	f1994	s1995	f1995	s1996	f1996	s1997	f1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria															
Right	-	51%	-	53%	50%	38%	43%	48%	-	48%	48%	53%	54%	51%	48%
Wrong	-	23	-	25	28	37	35	32	-	37	32	28	27	30	32
Don't know	-	26	-	22	22	24	23	20	-	15	20	20	19	19	20
Czech Rep.															
Right	-	58	51%	-	54	-	53	-	44%	42	-	-	35	42	40
Wrong	-	22	34	-	34	-	33	-	39	37	-	-	46	46	46
Don't know	-	20	14	-	12	-	14	-	17	21	-	-	19	12	14
Hungary															
Right	-	-	62	-	54	50	50	-	52	52	-	-	43	59	45
Wrong	-	-	19	-	26	32	25	-	28	25	-	-	40	27	38
Don't know	-	-	19	-	20	18	25	-	20	23	-	-	17	14	17
Poland															
Right	-	48	-	48	51	51	-	50	52	-	53	-	54	50	46
Wrong	-	34	-	37	36	36	-	30	26	-	26	-	27	29	39
Don't know	-	18	-	15	13	13	-	20	22	-	21	-	19	22	15
Romania															
Right	35%	36	37	44	-	-	46	-	-	54	-	-	45	41	42
Wrong	48	39	46	45	-	-	40	-	-	39	-	-	45	51	48
Don't know	17	25	17	11	-	-	14	-	-	7	-	-	10	9	11
Slovakia															
Right	-	46	43	-	41	-	40	35	-	38	-	-	36	35	34
Wrong	-	28	40	-	42	-	40	42	-	37	-	-	42	52	52
Don't know	-	27	17	-	17	-	20	23	-	25	-	-	22	13	14

Office of Research Surveys: 1991-1999

Table A-43: State-Run or Market Economy

"How would you describe the current [Survey Country] economy? Is it a market economy, state-driven (state-controlled) economy, or something in-between? Please place your views on this scale."

		s1995	f1995	s1996	f1996	1997	1999*
Bulgaria							
Market Economy	1	13%	—	8%	14%	—	11%
	2	25	—	21	21	—	33
	3	33	—	38	32	—	24
State-driven Economy	4	19	—	21	20	—	12
Don't know		11	—	12	14	—	20
Czech Republic							
Market Economy	1	—	14%	10	—	—	10
	2	—	48	42	—	—	39
	3	—	28	30	—	—	32
State-driven Economy	4	—	8	8	—	—	7
Don't know		—	1	11	—	—	13
Hungary							
Market Economy	1	—	11	12	—	—	15
	2	—	26	39	—	—	36
	3	—	36	29	—	—	26
State-driven Economy	4	—	18	9	—	—	12
Don't know		—	9	11	—	—	11
Poland							
Market Economy	1	19	18	—	17	—	17
	2	40	38	—	35	—	36
	3	25	24	—	26	—	24
State-driven Economy	4	9	10	—	11	—	10
Don't know		8	9	—	10	—	13
Romania							
Market Economy	1	—	—	12	—	—	11
	2	—	—	32	—	—	40
	3	—	—	28	—	—	33
State-driven Economy	4	—	—	18	—	—	12
Don't know		—	—	10	—	—	4
Slovakia							
Market Economy	1	10	—	7	—	8%	10
	2	25	—	31	—	33	33
	3	35	—	33	—	34	32
State-driven Economy	4	17	—	15	—	11	11
Don't know		14	—	15	—	14	15

Office of Research Surveys: 1995-1999; *1999 wording: "In your view, would you characterize the economy today as mostly a free market economy, mostly a state-controlled economy, or something in between? Please place your views on this scale."

Table A-44: Reform Speed

"Looking back over the past ten years, if economic reform could have been handled differently, which option would you choose for our country's economic reform?"

	More radical	More gradual	None	Don't know
Bulgaria	48%	31	5	17
Czech Rep	36%	47	6	12
Hungary	21%	65	8	7
Poland	26%	56	6	11
Romania	61%	14	16	9
Slovakia	33%	53	7	8

Office of Research Surveys: 1999

Table A-45: Radical-Gradual Reform and Living Standards

"Let's presume that economic reform brings along some economic hardships and we have to select one of three alternatives. (a) Radical reform, which reduces our living standard a great deal but at the same time will bring remarkable growth in the next few years; (b) Gradual economic reform which will not reduce the living standard that much but also means slower economic growth; (c) Economic reform is not necessary, the present system is good enough. Which would you prefer?"

	1990	w1991	s1991	f1991	1992
Bulgaria					
Radical reform	42%	—	43%	45%	—
Gradual reform	42	—	43	37	—
No reform	2	—	2	2	—
Don't know	15	—	12	16	—
Czech Rep.					
Radical reform	—	—	50	—	—
Gradual reform	—	—	41	—	—
No reform	—	—	5	—	—
Don't know	—	—	4	—	—
Hungary					
Radical reform	—	—	14	—	14%
Gradual reform	—	—	74	—	78
No reform	—	—	3	—	2
Don't know	—	—	9	—	6
Poland					
Radical reform	30	13%	17	12	13
Gradual reform	50	75	72	75	75
No reform	1	5	6	5	5
Don't know	19	8	5	8	8
Romania					
Radical reform	42	—	—	40	—
Gradual reform	45	—	—	51	—
No reform	2	—	—	3	—
Don't know	11	—	—	7	—
Slovakia					
Radical reform	—	—	19	—	—
Gradual reform	—	—	60	—	—
No reform	—	—	12	—	—
Don't know	—	—	8	—	—

Office of Research Surveys: 1990-1992

Table A-46: Satisfaction with Economic Reform

"How satisfied are you with the progress of economic reform in our country?"

	w1991	s1991	f1991	s1992	f1992	1993
Bulgaria						
Very satisfied	—	7%	4%	6%	—	2%
Somewhat satisfied	—	40	20	30	—	17
Not very satisfied	—	27	42	26	—	39
Not at all satisfied	—	16	20	21	—	31
Don't know	—	11	14	17	—	12
Czech Republic						
Very satisfied	—	3	—	4	4%	—
Somewhat satisfied	—	36	—	39	38	—
Not very satisfied	—	46	—	41	43	—
Not at all satisfied	—	12	—	9	10	—
Don't know	—	3	—	8	4	—
Hungary						
Very satisfied	—	—	—	1	1	—
Somewhat satisfied	—	12	—	18	12	—
Not very satisfied	—	56	—	55	54	—
Not at all satisfied	—	29	—	20	26	—
Don't know	—	2	—	6	6	—
Poland						
Very satisfied	1%	1	1	1	1	1
Somewhat satisfied	23	37	25	23	24	32
Not very satisfied	45	45	50	45	52	46
Not at all satisfied	24	14	19	24	15	14
Don't know	6	3	6	6	8	7
Romania						
Very satisfied	—	—	1	1	1	1
Somewhat satisfied	—	—	27	28	20	25
Not very satisfied	—	—	54	46	50	52
Not at all satisfied	—	—	9	7	16	11
Don't know	—	—	9	19	14	11
Slovakia						
Very satisfied	—	1	—	3	1	—
Somewhat satisfied	—	13	—	23	23	—
Not very satisfied	—	56	—	53	55	—
Not at all satisfied	—	27	—	17	14	—
Don't know	—	3	—	5	8	—

Office of Research Surveys: 1991-1993


Table A-47: Employment by Sector*

"[IF EMPLOYED:] What kind of firm do you work for?"

		State sector	Private sector	Self-employed	Co-op/other
Bulgaria	1991	81%	6	2	12
	1999	51%	30	7	11
Czech Rep.	1991	81%	4	3	12
	1999	39%	44	15	2
Hungary	1991	28%	43	9	19
	1999	38%	52	10	1
Poland	1991	57%	12	15	17
	1999	33%	40	17	10
Romania	1991	74%	18	—	7
	1999	48%	34	18	—
Slovakia	1991	85%	2	1	12
	1999	51%	38	8	3

*Percentage of total number employed

Office of Research Surveys: 1991-1999

Figure A-1: Experience of Unemployment

Office of Research Surveys: 1999

Table A-48: Employment Preferences

"All things considered, would you like to work for a private company or would you prefer to work for a state-controlled company? [DO NOT READ CHOICES. IF VOLUNTEERED: I intend to become/I am a private entrepreneur/self-employed; It is all the same to me]."

	1990	s1991	f1991	s1992	f1992	1999
Bulgaria						
Private	29%	30%	28%	21%	—	—
State	41	48	52	47	—	—
Start own	11	9	6	4	—	—
No difference	18	13	9	10	—	—
Don't know	1	—	6	13	—	—
Czech Rep.						
Private	—	28	—	32	—	31%
State	—	32	—	22	—	50
Foreign capital	—	22	—	21	—	n/a
Start own	—	n/a	—	3	—	5
No difference	—	8	—	13	—	11
Don't know	—	10	—	10	—	3
Hungary						
Private	—	—	34	34	32%	—
State	—	—	34	35	38	—
Start own	—	—	8	11	13	—
No difference	—	—	10	13	12	—
Don't know	—	—	15	6	5	—
Poland						
Private	27	15	22	26	—	—
State	39	32	12	50	—	—
Start own	17	34	46	4	—	—
No difference	9	16	16	15	—	—
Don't know	8	3	6	5	—	—
Romania						
Private	22	—	12	31	—	29
State	47	—	43	46	—	51
Start own	11	—	30	6	—	3
No difference	13	—	n/a	n/a	—	11
Don't know	8	—	15	17	—	6
Slovakia						
Private	—	39	—	22	—	20
State	—	24	—	32	—	68
Foreign capital	—	22	—	17	—	n/a
Start own	—	n/a	—	3	—	4
No difference	—	6	—	16	—	5
Don't know	—	9	—	11	—	3

Office of Research Surveys: 1990-1999

Table A-49: Interest in Self-Employment

"Some people are considering going into business for themselves while others prefer to work for someone else. Are you seriously considering going into business for yourself or not?"

	1991	1992	1993	1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria						
Yes	23%	22%	24%	15%	16%	13%
No	59	66	63	73	67	75
Already has	n/a	n/a	n/a	6	5	6
Don't know	16	13	13	6	12	7
Czech Rep.						
Yes	15	16	10	14	16	15
No	78	61	75	76	79	79
Already has	4	6	9	n/a	n/a	n/a
Don't know	3	17	7	9	5	6
Hungary						
Yes	22	15	18	23	30	23
No	73	78	73	69	66	76
Already has	n/a	6	8	n/a	n/a	n/a
Don't know	5	2	1	8	4	1
Poland						
				*	*	
Yes	24	17	—	9	12	21
No	66	70	—	32	30	75
Already has	n/a	8	—	n/a	n/a	n/a
Don't know	10	6	—	58	58	4
Romania						
Yes	—	21	—	31	33	27
No	—	70	—	65	64	69
Already has	—	n/a	—	n/a	n/a	n/a
Don't know	—	9	—	4	3	4
Slovakia						
Yes	17	15	13	—	13	15
No	77	63	71	—	82	82
Already has	1	5	5	—	n/a	n/a
Don't know	5	18	10	—	5	3

Office of Research Surveys: 1991-1999, * Filtered by those employed

Table A-50: Price Controls versus Availability

"Some people feel prices should be allowed to rise so that products will be available, even if everyone can't afford them. Others feel prices should be kept low, even if it means that products are sometimes not available. Which opinion generally comes closer to your point of view?"

	1993	1994
Bulgaria		
Allowed to rise	34%	—
Kept Low	60	—
Don't know	6	—
Czech Rep.		
Allowed to rise	49	45%
Kept Low	47	50
Don't know	4	5
Hungary		
Allowed to rise	—	31
Kept Low	—	60
Don't know	—	9
Poland		
Allowed to rise	53	—
Kept Low	44	—
Don't know	3	—
Romania		
Allowed to rise	—	43
Kept Low	—	38
Don't know	—	19
Slovakia		
Allowed to rise	26	21
Kept Low	71	75
Don't know	3	4

Office of Research Surveys: 1993-1994

Table A-51: Prices Free or State Control of Basic Goods Prices

"Some people say that prices for all goods and services should be set by the market, according to what people will pay. Others say that while most prices should be set by the market, the state should control the prices of some essential or basic items. Which view is closer to your own?"

	Bulgaria	Czech Rep.	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
All set by market	19%	26%	19%	17%	21%	14%
State control basic prices	78	71	78	80	79	83
Don't know	3	3	3	3	3	3

Office of Research Surveys: 1999

Table A-52: Private Ownership of Businesses

"Some people feel that the majority of businesses should be privately owned. Others think that only some businesses should be privately owned and that the government should continue to run the majority of businesses in our country. Which of the two alternatives is closest to your own view?"

	1990	s1991	f1991	s1992	f1992	s1993	f1993	1994	s1995	f1995	s1996	f1996
Bulgaria												
Private	34%	—	24%	22%	—	22%	17%	22%	20%	—	19%	28%
State	56	—	59	55	—	64	64	64	65	—	72	61
Don't know	10	—	17	23	—	14	19	14	14	—	9	10
Czech Rep.												
Private	—	—	—	63	60%	—	64	58	—	54%	50	—
State	—	—	—	27	32	—	29	33	—	37	43	—
Don't know	—	—	—	10	8	—	7	9	—	9	7	—
Hungary												
Private	—	—	—	41	42	—	33	31	29	—	37	—
State	—	—	—	48	51	—	60	60	63	—	57	—
Don't know	—	—	—	10	8	—	7	10	8	—	7	—
Poland												
Private	39	45%	35	40	45	38	33	36	41	44	—	39
State	48	49	59	50	47	53	60	58	52	51	—	54
Don't know	13	6	6	10	9	9	8	7	7	5	—	7
Romania												
Private	40	—	—	31	36	36	—	39	—	—	46	—
State	56	—	—	59	56	57	—	54	—	—	47	—
Don't know	4	—	—	10	9	7	—	7	—	—	7	—
Slovakia												
Private	—	—	—	44	42	—	39	38	32	—	34	—
State	—	—	—	47	51	—	53	54	62	—	59	—
Don't know	—	—	—	9	7	—	8	8	6	—	7	—

Office of Research Surveys: 1990-1996

Table A-53: Ownership of Small Businesses

"Some people feel that the majority of small businesses should be privately owned. Others think that only some small businesses should be privately owned and that the government should continue to run the majority of small businesses in our country. Which of the two alternatives is closest to your own views?"

	s1997	f1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria				
Private	65%	63%	61%	63%
State	21	27	28	26
Don't know	13	11	11	11
Czech Rep.				
Private	—	—	82	81
State	—	—	14	14
Don't know	—	—	5	5
Hungary*				
Private	—	65	67	66
State	—	29	27	27
Don't know	—	5	6	6
Poland				
Private	—	65	60	69
State	—	30	32	27
Don't know	—	5	8	4
Romania				
Private	—	71	—	61
State	—	25	—	29
Don't know	—	4	—	10
Slovakia				
Private	72	68	—	66
State	22	27	—	30
Don't know	7	5	—	4

Office of Research Surveys: 1997-1999; * In Hungary: "...and that the government should run the majority..."

Table A-54: Opinion of Private Businesspeople

1991-1994: "Please tell me if you have a very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative or very negative feeling about the following groups of people or organizations?: People who run their own business"

1995-1997: "Please tell me if you have a very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative or very negative feeling about the following groups of people living in [Survey Country]? Private businesspeople"

	s1991	f1991	s1992	f1992	s1993	f1993	1994	1997
Bulgaria								
Very positive	26%	44%	51%	—	43%	19%	26%	23%
Somewhat positive	21	24	24	—	30	37	34	34
Somewhat negative	26	6	6	—	10	19	19	22
Very negative	16	7	7	—	8	14	14	15
Don't know	11	12	12	—	10	11	7	5
Czech Rep.								
Very positive	21	—	19	16%	—	16	—	9
Somewhat positive	43	—	44	47	—	63	—	53
Neutral	24	—	28	26	—	n/a	—	n/a
Somewhat negative	6	—	7	9	—	16	—	27
Very negative	1	—	1	1	—	2	—	7
Don't know	4	—	1	2	—	4	—	5
Hungary								
Very positive	16	—	—	19	—	—	—	5
Somewhat positive	35	—	—	60	—	—	—	48
Neutral	32	—	—	n/a	—	—	—	n/a
Somewhat negative	8	—	—	14	—	—	—	34
Very negative	3	—	—	2	—	—	—	8
Don't know	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	5
Poland								
Very positive	5	—	14	—	16	16	—	—
Somewhat positive	46	—	47	—	61	58	—	—
Neutral	34	—	25	—	n/a	n/a	—	—
Somewhat negative	10	—	7	—	13	17	—	—
Very negative	2	—	2	—	4	4	—	—
Don't know	3	—	5	—	6	5	—	—
Romania								
Very positive	—	—	17	13	—	—	—	—
Somewhat positive	—	—	54	45	—	—	—	—
Neutral	—	—	n/a	n/a	—	—	—	—
Somewhat negative	—	—	16	26	—	—	—	—
Very negative	—	—	4	9	—	—	—	—
Don't know	—	—	9	8	—	—	—	—
Slovakia								
Very positive	12	—	12	8	—	—	—	—
Somewhat positive	37	—	35	34	—	—	—	—
Neutral	34	—	34	32	—	—	—	—
Somewhat negative	11	—	14	20	—	—	—	—
Very negative	2	—	3	2	—	—	—	—
Don't know	4	—	2	4	—	—	—	—

Office of Research Surveys: 1991-1997

Table A-55: Ownership of Large Businesses

"Some people feel that the majority of large businesses should be privately owned. Others think that only some large businesses should be privately owned and that the government should continue to run the majority of large businesses in our country. Which of the two alternatives is closest to your own views?"

	s1997	f1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria				
Private	23%	27%	23%	27%
State	63	63	68	61
Don't know	13	10	10	12
Czech Republic				
Private	—	26	27	28
State	—	68	68	68
Don't know	—	6	6	4
Hungary*				
Private	—	20	23	20
State	—	75	69	75
Don't know	—	4	8	5
Poland				
Private	—	25	20	23
State	—	67	71	73
Don't know	—	8	8	4
Romania				
Private	—	36	—	39
State	—	60	—	50
Don't know	—	4	—	11
Slovakia				
Private	19	16	11	9
State	74	80	85	87
Don't know	7	4	4	4

Office of Research Surveys: 1997-1999; * In Hungary, "...the government should run the..."

Table A-56: Foreign Investment

"There are different opinions about foreign investment. Some people think that foreign investment is necessary and will have a positive influence on the development of our economy. Others say that foreign investment is dangerous because it allows outsiders too much control over our affairs. Which view is closer to your own?"

	1990	s1991	f1991	s1992	f1992	s1993	f1993	1994	s1995	f1995	s1996	f1996	s1997	f1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria*																
Necessary	-	-	44%	41%	-	43%	43%	42%	42%	-	48%	53%	63%	52%	46%	43%
Dangerous	-	-	33	30	-	33	31	35	32	-	30	29	20	22	25	24
Both	-	-	n/a	n/a	-	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	-	n/a	n/a	n/a	14	16	16
Don't know	-	-	23	29	-	24	26	23	25	-	22	19	18	12	14	17
Czech Rep.																
Necessary	-	51	-	59	53	-	55	50	-	46	46	-	-	49	58	59
Dangerous	-	44	-	31	37	-	34	39	-	44	43	-	-	40	32	32
Don't know	-	5	-	10	10	-	11	11	-	10	11	-	-	11	9	9
Hungary																
Necessary	-	-	-	49	55	-	43	39	44	-	34	-	-	48	56	53
Dangerous	-	-	-	40	35	-	49	50	46	-	57	-	-	47	38	41
Don't know	-	-	-	11	10	-	8	11	9	-	9	-	-	4	6	6
Poland																
Necessary	37	57	45	44	47	41	41	42	45	45	42	-	-	47	40	40
Dangerous	44	34	40	37	40	48	46	47	45	45	46	-	-	44	48	54
Don't know	19	9	15	18	12	11	13	11	10	10	13	-	-	10	12	7
Romania																
Necessary	-	-	63	51	49	52	-	52	-	-	61	-	-	63	60	55
Dangerous	-	-	22	27	28	30	-	33	-	-	29	-	-	31	33	35
Don't know	-	-	15	22	23	18	-	15	-	-	10	-	-	7	6	10
Slovakia																
Necessary	-	42	-	59	53	-	54	49	45	-	53	-	-	57	54	57
Dangerous	-	52	-	30	36	-	34	38	40	-	35	-	-	35	36	35
Don't know	-	6	-	11	11	-	13	13	15	-	13	-	-	9	10	8

Office of Research: 1990-1999; * Bulgaria 1997-1999; "Both" accepted as volunteered response.

Table A-57: Unemployment and Modernization

"Some people feel there should be no unemployment in [Survey Country], even if it means that the [Survey Country] economy will not improve and modernize in the near future. Others feel some unemployment in [Survey Country] is acceptable, if that's what it takes to improve and modernize the economy. Generally, which position comes closer to your point of view?"

	1993	1994	s1995	f1995	1999
Bulgaria					
Unacceptable	47%	47%	48%	—	49%
Acceptable	46	46	46	—	46
Don't know	7	7	6	—	5
Czech Rep.					
Unacceptable	17	18	—	14%	22
Acceptable	78	77	—	81	77
Don't know	5	5	—	5	2
Hungary					
Unacceptable	30	33	—	59	44
Acceptable	66	63	—	40	55
Don't know	4	4	—	1	2
Poland					
Unacceptable	53	57	48	46	34
Acceptable	46	43	50	52	64
Don't know	2	1	2	2	2
Romania					
Unacceptable	—	30	—	—	33
Acceptable	—	55	—	—	57
Don't know	—	15	—	—	11
Slovakia					
Unacceptable	26	27	36	—	33
Acceptable	71	70	62	—	65
Don't know	3	3	2	—	3

Office of Research Surveys: 1993-1999

Table A-58: Job Creation

"In your opinion, who is better able to create new jobs – the national government or private businesses?"*

	1998	1999
Bulgaria		
Government	33%	25%
Private Enterprise	42	39
Both equally	17	23
Don't know	8	13
Czech Rep.		
Government	22	21
Private Enterprise	47	49
Both equally	26	25
Don't know	4	5
Hungary		
Government	35	24
Private Enterprise	28	34
Both equally	34	39
Don't know	3	3
Poland		
Government	34	41
Private Enterprise	44	43
Both equally	11	13
Don't know	11	3
Romania		
Government	–	43
Private Enterprise	–	32
Both equally	–	22
Don't know	–	4
Slovakia		
Government	38	30
Private Enterprise	33	38
Both equally	24	27
Don't know	5	5

Office of Research Surveys: 1998-1999; *"Both equally" accepted if volunteered.

Table A-59: Support for Multiethnic State

"Some people say that it would be better if [Survey Country] was composed of only one nationality group. Others say that we can live together in harmony with different nationality groups. Which view is closer to your own?"

		1992	s1993	f1993	1994	s1996	f1996	1997	1998
Bulgaria	One 1	—	15%	13%	—	13%	9%	7%	9%
	2	—	10	12	—	16	19	14	14
	3	—	18	23	—	31	33	32	33
	Many 4	—	51	46	—	37	36	42	40
	Don't know	—	6	7	—	4	4	5	5
Czech Rep.	One	—	—	—	19%	18%	—	—	14%
		—	—	—					
		—	—	—	78	81	—	—	83
	Many	—	—	—					
	Don't know	—	—	—	4	2	—	—	3
Hungary	One 1	12%	—	8%	11%				
	2	9	—	10	15	10%	—	—	21%
	3	18	—	24	29				
	Many 4	54	—	56	42	89	—	—	76
	Don't know	4	—	2	4	1	—	—	3
Poland	One	—	26%	21%	26%				
		—	17	29	27	—	—	—	17%
		—	21	23	25				
	Many	—	31	25	19	—	—	—	76
	Don't know	—	6	3	3	—	—	—	6
Romania	One	—	6%	—	12%				
		—	3	—	6	12%	—	—	19%
		—	19	—	18				
	Many	—	68	—	59	84	—	—	79
	Don't know	—	4	—	6	3	—	—	2
Slovakia	One 1	13%	—	10%					
	2	13	—	10	9%	8%	—	8%	18%
	3	27	—	26					
	Many 4	44	—	52	88	89	—	89	80
	Don't know	3	—	3	3	3	—	3	2

Office of Research Surveys: 1992-1998; In Bulgaria and Slovakia (1992-1993) "... Where on this scale would you place your own opinion?" [four point scale].

Table A-60: Evaluation of Ethnic Relations

"How would you describe relations between ethnic groups in [Survey Country] today? Would you say they are very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad?"

		s1991	f1991	s1992	f1992	1993	1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria	Very good	—	23%	33%	—	40%	—	10%	16%
	Somewhat good	—	40	35	—	31	—	64	63
	Total good	—	63	68	—	71	—	74	79
	Somewhat bad	—	22	18	—	13	—	19	14
	Very bad	—	13	13	—	5	—	2	3
	Total bad	—	35	31	—	18	—	21	17
	Don't know	—	2	1	—	11	—	6	5
Czech Rep.	Very good	8%	7	13	23%	28	—	1	2
	Somewhat good	53	37	39	51	55	—	22	23
	Total good	61	44	52	74	83	—	23	25
	Somewhat bad	27	26	27	17	13	—	60	58
	Very Bad	11	29	19	6	2	—	15	14
	Total bad	38	55	46	23	15	—	75	72
	Don't know	1	1	3	2	2	—	3	4
Hungary	Very good	—	—	—	45	—	—	2	3
	Somewhat good	—	—	—	35	—	—	46	46
	Total good	—	—	—	80	—	—	48	49
	Somewhat bad	—	—	—	13	—	—	40	35
	Very Bad	—	—	—	3	—	—	9	8
	Total bad	—	—	—	16	—	—	49	43
	Don't know	—	—	—	4	—	—	4	8
Poland*	Very good	—	27%	32%	—	26%	—	2%	3%
	Somewhat good	—	39	34	—	41	—	60	60
	Total good	—	66	66	—	67	—	62	63
	Somewhat bad	—	14	16	—	17	—	24	21
	Very bad	—	8	7	—	6	—	2	1
	Total bad	—	22	23	—	23	—	26	22
	Don't know	—	11	11	—	10	—	13	16
Romania	Very good	—	16	21	22%	26	—	—	3%
	Somewhat good	—	44	50	49	57	—	—	69
	Total good	—	60	71	71	83	—	—	72
	Somewhat bad	—	20	14	15	8	—	—	18
	Very Bad	—	14	7	6	2	—	—	4
	Total bad	—	34	21	21	10	—	—	22
	Don't know	—	6	8	8	8	—	—	6
Slovakia	Very good	14	12	13	24	35	3%	—	4
	Somewhat good	50	42	42	45	42	48	—	45
	Total good	64	54	55	69	77	51	—	49
	Somewhat bad	27	23	26	20	15	37	—	41
	Very Bad	9	21	15	7	6	6	—	8
	Total bad	36	44	41	27	21	43	—	49
	Don't know	1	2	5	3	3	6	—	3

Office of Research Surveys: 1991-1999; *response options 1991-1993: "essentially good, all we need is just a little more tolerance and respect; not exactly good, but I believe that all disputed questions will be solved judiciously; rather bad, they complicate the situation in [survey country] and this will not change easily; the situation is very serious and the nationalist disputes threaten to result in a grave crisis."

Table A-61: Country Exists Exclusively for Dominant Ethnic Group

"[Survey country] is only for [Dominant ethnic group]."

For example "Bulgaria is only for Bulgarians."

		s1993	f1993	1994	s1995	f1995	s1996	f1996	1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria	Strongly agree	22%	25%	18%	25%	—	20%	20%	23%	22%	18%
	Somewhat agree	17	19	18	19	—	26	22	26	18	24
	Total agree	39	44	36	44	—	46	42	59	40	42
	Somewhat disagree	20	19	24	26	—	23	26	24	26	23
	Strongly disagree	32	30	31	23	—	25	28	24	28	28
	Total disagree	52	49	55	49	—	48	54	48	54	51
	Don't know	9	6	10	7	—	3	4	4	5	7
Czech Rep.	Strongly agree	—	8	13	13	—	12	—	—	8	9
	Somewhat agree	—	19	21	23	—	18	—	—	18	22
	Total agree	—	27	34	36	—	30	—	—	26	31
	Somewhat disagree	—	38	39	43	—	43	—	—	39	36
	Strongly disagree	—	33	26	18	—	25	—	—	33	32
	Total disagree	—	72	65	61	—	68	—	—	72	68
	Don't know	—	2	1	3	—	3	—	—	2	2
Hungary	Strongly agree	—	28	37	30	—	39	—	—	42	39
	Somewhat agree	—	22	29	29	—	23	—	—	30	33
	Total agree	—	50	66	59	—	62	—	—	72	72
	Somewhat disagree	—	25	21	24	—	20	—	—	20	17
	Strongly disagree	—	23	10	13	—	14	—	—	8	9
	Total disagree	—	48	31	37	—	34	—	—	28	26
	Don't know	—	3	4	4	—	4	—	—	1	2
Poland	Strongly agree	22	24	17	16	15	20	17	—	20	18
	Somewhat agree	21	39	23	19	21	24	19	—	19	22
	Total agree	43	63	40	35	36	44	36	—	39	40
	Somewhat disagree	34	25	34	34	40	32	28	—	30	32
	Strongly disagree	19	6	23	28	22	20	34	—	24	24
	Total disagree	53	31	57	62	62	52	62	—	54	56
	Don't know	4	6	3	3	3	4	3	—	7	4
Romania	Strongly agree	4	—	12	—	—	—	—	—	32	23
	Somewhat agree	9	—	19	—	—	—	—	—	16	23
	Total agree	13	—	31	—	—	—	—	—	48	46
	Somewhat disagree	40	—	15	—	—	—	—	—	19	22
	Strongly disagree	43	—	48	—	—	—	—	—	30	27
	Total disagree	83	—	63	—	—	—	—	—	49	49
	Don't know	5	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	3	6
Slovakia	Strongly agree	—	8	8	9	—	9	—	8	10	12
	Somewhat agree	—	14	16	18	—	12	—	13	17	21
	Total agree	—	22	24	26	—	21	—	21	27	33
	Somewhat disagree	—	38	40	42	—	39	—	36	32	35
	Strongly disagree	—	38	34	29	—	38	—	41	38	30
	Total disagree	—	76	74	71	—	77	—	77	70	65
	Don't know	—	1	2	2	—	3	—	3	2	2

Office of Research Surveys: 1993-1999

Table A-62: Too Many Foreigners

"There are too many non-[Dominant ethnic group] living in this country."

For example, "There are too many non-Bulgarians living in this country."*

		1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria	Strongly agree	—	17%	—	15%	15%	11%
	Somewhat agree	—	30	—	26	26	24
	Total agree	—	47	—	41	41	35
	Somewhat disagree	—	22	—	25	25	27
	Strongly disagree	—	14	—	18	17	20
	Total disagree	—	36	—	43	42	47
	Don't know	—	18	—	16	17	19
Czech Rep.	Strongly agree	17%	13	15%	14	11	12
	Somewhat agree	32	30	36	32	26	34
	Total agree	49	43	51	46	37	46
	Somewhat disagree	35	36	37	35	39	40
	Strongly disagree	13	15	8	13	19	12
	Total disagree	48	51	45	48	58	52
	Don't know	3	5	5	6	6	3
Hungary*	Strongly agree	27	27	26	45	34	37
	Somewhat agree	24	30	27	28	31	35
	Total agree	51	57	53	73	65	72
	Somewhat disagree	26	23	27	18	25	19
	Strongly disagree	14	13	13	7	8	7
	Total disagree	40	36	40	25	33	26
	Don't know	9	8	7	2	2	3
Poland	Strongly agree	—	9	13	7	8	6
	Somewhat agree	—	20	24	22	18	19
	Total agree	—	29	37	29	26	25
	Somewhat disagree	—	36	38	40	44	49
	Strongly disagree	—	25	15	23	21	19
	Total disagree	—	61	53	63	65	68
	Don't know	—	11	10	8	9	7
Romania*	Strongly agree	10	—	—	14	—	11
	Somewhat agree	23	—	—	21	—	18
	Total agree	33	—	—	35	—	29
	Somewhat disagree	32	—	—	38	—	32
	Strongly disagree	17	—	—	24	—	28
	Total disagree	49	—	—	62	—	60
	Don't know	17	—	—	4	—	11
Slovakia	Strongly agree	10	10	—	9	—	10
	Somewhat agree	32	34	—	25	—	31
	Total agree	42	44	—	34	—	41
	Somewhat disagree	37	37	—	44	—	39
	Strongly disagree	15	12	—	14	—	18
	Total disagree	52	49	—	58	—	57
	Don't know	6	8	—	7	—	3

Office of Research Surveys: 1994-1999; *All Hungary and 1999 Romania – "There are too many foreigners . . ."

Table A-63: Romanian Opinion of Ethnic Groups

"Please tell me if you have a very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative or very negative feeling about the following groups of people living in Romania."

		s1992	f1992	1993	1994	1996	1997	1998	1999
Romanians	Very favorable	27%	29%	22%	24%	34%	—	34%	23%
	Somewhat favorable	66	61	69	68	61	—	57	68
	Total Favorable	93	90	91	92	95	—	91	91
	Somewhat unfavorable	4	5	5	5	4	—	7	6
	Very unfavorable	1	1	1	1	—	—	1	1
	Total Unfavorable	5	6	6	6	4	—	8	7
	Don't know	3	4	4	2	1	—	1	—
Hungarians	Very favorable	2	5	5	3	5	4%	6	5
	Somewhat favorable	24	35	48	44	51	46	44	52
	Total Favorable	26	40	53	47	56	50	50	57
	Somewhat unfavorable	41	38	31	35	28	33	30	27
	Very unfavorable	20	7	5	8	11	15	16	11
	Total Unfavorable	61	45	36	43	39	48	46	38
	Don't know	13	14	12	11	6	2	4	6
Roma	Very favorable	—	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Somewhat favorable	8	9	9	11	11	10	12	17
	Total Favorable	8	10	10	12	12	11	13	18
	Somewhat unfavorable	38	35	37	32	31	37	39	47
	Very unfavorable	48	50	50	53	54	52	45	33
	Total Unfavorable	86	85	87	85	85	89	84	80
	Don't know	6	5	4	4	2	1	2	2
Jews	Very favorable	2	3	5	4	—	8	10	9
	Somewhat favorable	50	43	54	58	—	68	55	63
	Total Favorable	52	46	59	62	—	76	65	72
	Somewhat unfavorable	15	14	10	9	—	14	18	14
	Very unfavorable	4	4	2	5	—	4	4	1
	Total Unfavorable	19	18	12	14	—	18	22	15
	Don't know	29	36	29	23	—	6	14	14
Germans	Very favorable	—	—	—	—	—	22	24	24
	Somewhat favorable	—	—	—	—	—	70	64	66
	Total Favorable	—	—	—	—	—	92	88	90
	Somewhat unfavorable	—	—	—	—	—	4	5	2
	Very unfavorable	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—
	Total Unfavorable	—	—	—	—	—	5	6	2
	Don't know	—	—	—	—	—	3	6	7

Office of Research Surveys: 1992-1999

Table A-64: Slovak Opinion of Ethnic Groups

"Please tell me if you have a very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative or very negative feeling about the following groups of people living in [Czechoslovakia/Slovakia]."

		1991	s1992	f1992*	1993	1994	1995	1996	s1997	f1997	1998	1999
Slovaks	Very favorable	53%	57%	53%	69%	—	—	62%	60%	—	65%	60%
	Somewhat favorable	33	33	41	24	—	—	34	35	—	31	35
	Total Favorable	86(10)	90(7)	94	93	—	—	96	95	—	96	95
	Somewhat unfavorable	3	2	3	2	—	—	2	2	—	3	4
	Very unfavorable	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
	Total Unfavorable	3	2	5	2	—	—	2	2	—	4	5
	Don't know	1	1	1	5	—	—	2	3	—	—	1
Hungarians	Very favorable	7	8	8	9	8%	13%	12	11	12%	14	17
	Somewhat favorable	19	18	29	37	39	37	37	38	34	31	38
	Total Favorable	26(34)	26(28)	37	46	47	50	49	49	46	45	55
	Somewhat unfavorable	20	24	40	33	35	33	29	32	31	28	29
	Very unfavorable	15	19	21	16	14	15	17	14	19	25	14
	Total Unfavorable	35	43	61	49	49	48	46	46	50	53	43
	Don't know	3	2	3	5	4	1	4	5	4	3	2
Czechs	Very favorable	15	17	18	29	32	40	22	26	26	30	35
	Somewhat favorable	44	39	60	61	59	52	66	63	63	57	57
	Total Favorable	59(26)	56(26)	78	90	91	92	88	89	89	87	92
	Somewhat unfavorable	9	11	18	5	5	6	6	5	7	9	6
	Very unfavorable	3	5	3	1	2	1	2	1	1	3	1
	Total Unfavorable	12	16	21	6	7	7	8	6	8	12	7
	Don't know	3	2	2	4	2	—	4	4	3	1	1
Roma	Very favorable	—	—	3	3	2	4	4	3	5	4	8
	Somewhat favorable	—	—	8	9	10	13	10	14	10	11	19
	Total Favorable	—	—	11	12	12	17	14	17	15	15	27
	Somewhat unfavorable	—	—	30	32	33	31	33	39	38	31	41
	Very unfavorable	—	—	56	53	53	50	50	40	44	53	31
	Total Unfavorable	—	—	86	85	86	81	83	79	82	84	72
	Don't know	—	—	4	3	2	3	3	4	3	2	1
Jews	Very favorable	8	6	6	—	7	14	12	13	14	17	25
	Somewhat favorable	21	27	46	—	53	52	53	55	59	46	51
	Total Favorable	29(43)	33(41)	52	—	60	66	65	68	73	63	76
	Somewhat unfavorable	16	11	29	—	18	17	14	14	13	19	12
	Very unfavorable	7	8	10	—	8	7	4	3	3	6	2
	Total Unfavorable	23	19	39	—	26	24	18	17	16	25	14
	Don't know	6	7	9	—	14	10	17	16	11	12	10
Germans	Very favorable	—	—	—	—	—	—	13	13	13	—	25
	Somewhat favorable	—	—	—	—	—	—	62	64	64	—	59
	Total Favorable	—	—	—	—	—	—	75	77	77	—	84
	Somewhat unfavorable	—	—	—	—	—	—	12	11	12	—	9
	Very unfavorable	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	2	—	1
	Total Unfavorable	—	—	—	—	—	—	13	12	14	—	10
	Don't know	—	—	—	—	—	—	13	12	9	—	6

Office of Research Surveys: 1991-1999; *Half sample, n=536; **1991-1992 neutral response accepted and noted in parentheses

Table A-65: Hungarian Opinion of Ethnic Groups

"Please tell me if you have a very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative or very negative feeling about the following groups of people living in Hungary."

		1991*	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Hungarians	Very favorable	—	37%	47%	46%	—	—	—	—	28%
	Somewhat favorable	—	54	45	45	—	—	—	—	61
	Total Favorable	—	91	92	91	—	—	—	—	89
	Somewhat unfavorable	—	5	5	3	—	—	—	—	7
	Very unfavorable	—	1	1	1	—	—	—	—	1
	Total Unfavorable	—	6	6	4	—	—	—	—	8
	Don't know	—	3	2	5	—	—	—	—	3
Roma	Very favorable	2%	1	4	3	2%	2%	2%	3%	2
	Somewhat favorable	5	13	16	18	16	11	12	12	16
	Total Favorable	7(20)	14	20	21	18	13	14	15	18
	Somewhat unfavorable	21	41	35	34	40	36	33	38	39
	Very unfavorable	48	40	42	39	36	47	50	43	39
	Total Unfavorable	69	81	77	73	76	83	83	81	78
	Don't know	5	5	4	6	6	5	3	3	4
Germans	Very favorable	—	15	16	—	19	20	15	28	25
	Somewhat favorable	—	57	55	—	64	56	67	58	60
	Total Favorable	—	72	71	—	83	76	82	86	85
	Somewhat unfavorable	—	8	12	—	5	6	9	7	5
	Very unfavorable	—	1	2	—	1	1	2	2	1
	Total Unfavorable	—	9	14	—	6	7	11	9	6
	Don't know	—	19	15	—	11	17	7	5	9
Slovaks	Very favorable	—	7	9	—	5	4	3	7	5
	Somewhat favorable	—	48	49	—	47	39	46	42	44
	Total Favorable	—	55	58	—	52	41	49	49	49
	Somewhat unfavorable	—	16	23	—	23	22	26	29	30
	Very unfavorable	—	3	5	—	7	9	12	13	7
	Total Unfavorable	—	19	28	—	30	31	38	42	37
	Don't know	—	27	15	—	18	26	14	10	14
Romanians	Very favorable	1	5	7	7	3	3	2	6	2
	Somewhat favorable	5	34	42	36	29	25	28	30	29
	Total Favorable	6(27)	39	49	43	32	28	30	36	31
	Somewhat unfavorable	25	27	27	30	36	33	40	39	44
	Very unfavorable	36	12	10	13	20	21	22	19	16
	Total Unfavorable	61	39	37	43	56	54	62	58	60
	Don't know	7	23	13	15	12	19	8	6	9
Jews	Very favorable	—	11	15	14	16	8	12	17	12
	Somewhat favorable	—	54	53	55	64	53	63	59	54
	Total Favorable	—	65	68	69	80	61	75	76	66
	Somewhat unfavorable	—	13	14	10	8	14	12	12	16
	Very unfavorable	—	4	4	5	2	6	4	4	3
	Total Unfavorable	—	17	18	15	10	20	16	16	19
	Don't know	—	19	15	16	10	20	10	8	15

Office of Research Surveys: 1991-1999; * neutral response accepted and noted in parentheses

Table A-66: Bulgarian Opinion of Ethnic Groups

"Please tell me if you have a very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative or very negative feeling about the following groups of people living in Bulgaria."

		s1991	f1991	1992	s1993	f1993	1994	1995	s1996	f1996	s1997	f1997	1998	1999
Bulgarians	Very favorable	–	–	70%	–	74%	75%	–	88%	89%	90%	86%	84%	81%
	Somewhat favorable	–	–	21	–	21	21	–	10	9	8	12	14	16
	Total Favorable	–	–	91	–	95	96	–	98	98	98	98	98	97
	Somewhat unfavorable	–	–	3	–	2	1	–	–	–	1	1	1	1
	Very unfavorable	–	–	1	–	1	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–
	Total Unfavorable	–	–	4	–	3	1	–	1	–	1	1	1	1
	Don't know	–	–	5	–	3	3	–	–	1	1	1	2	2
Turks	Very favorable	21%	25%	21	23%	24	29	27%	30	30	31	35	27	33
	Somewhat favorable	17	22	21	34	34	34	33	32	36	39	33	37	39
	Total Favorable	38	47	42	57	58	63	60	62	66	70	68	64	72
	Somewhat unfavorable	30	24	18	22	22	19	19	15	18	17	17	18	14
	Very unfavorable	19	27	28	13	13	11	17	19	14	11	12	14	10
	Total Unfavorable	49	51	46	35	35	30	36	34	32	28	29	32	24
	Don't know	13	2	12	9	8	8	4	4	3	3	3	4	4
Roma	Very favorable	–	14	10	6	10	18	15	20	20	19	21	16	26
	Somewhat favorable	–	16	12	9	16	24	18	18	18	20	20	25	29
	Total Favorable	–	30	22	15	26	42	33	38	38	39	41	41	55
	Somewhat unfavorable	–	26	21	22	23	28	23	22	28	29	27	29	27
	Very unfavorable	–	42	48	56	45	25	41	37	31	31	30	28	15
	Total Unfavorable	–	68	69	78	68	53	64	59	59	60	57	57	42
	Don't know	–	3	9	7	5	6	3	3	3	2	2	3	3
Jews	Very favorable	–	44	34	–	–	–	35	–	–	–	40	43	44
	Somewhat favorable	–	35	28	–	–	–	39	–	–	–	37	36	36
	Total Favorable	–	79	62	–	–	–	74	–	–	–	77	79	80
	Somewhat unfavorable	–	7	6	–	–	–	8	–	–	–	7	5	4
	Very unfavorable	–	7	6	–	–	–	5	–	–	–	4	2	2
	Total Unfavorable	–	14	12	–	–	–	13	–	–	–	11	7	6
	Don't know	–	7	25	–	–	–	12	–	–	–	12	14	15
Macedonians	Very favorable	–	–	–	–	25	–	36	38	–	–	–	–	–
	Somewhat favorable	–	–	–	–	45	–	44	41	–	–	–	–	–
	Total Favorable	–	–	–	–	70	–	80	79	–	–	–	–	–
	Somewhat unfavorable	–	–	–	–	10	–	6	9	–	–	–	–	–
	Very unfavorable	–	–	–	–	6	–	4	3	–	–	–	–	–
	Total Unfavorable	–	–	–	–	16	–	10	12	–	–	–	–	–
	Don't know	–	–	–	–	14	–	9	8	–	–	–	–	–
Germans	Very favorable	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	50	46
	Somewhat favorable	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	30	35
	Total Favorable	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	80	81
	Somewhat unfavorable	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	3	3
	Very unfavorable	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2	1
	Total Unfavorable	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	5	4
	Don't know	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	13	16

Table A-67: Polish Opinion of Ethnic Groups

"Please tell me if you have a very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative or very negative feeling about the following groups of people living in Poland."**

		1992	s1993*	f1993	1994	s1995	f1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Poles	Very favorable	—	24%	22%	14%	—	—	—	—	—	14%
	Somewhat favorable	—	69	61	68	—	—	—	—	—	72
	Total Favorable	—	93	83	82	—	—	—	—	—	86
	Somewhat unfavorable	—	6	13	13	—	—	—	—	—	11
	Very unfavorable	—	—	1	2	—	—	—	—	—	1
	Total Unfavorable	—	6	14	15	—	—	—	—	—	12
	Don't know	—	1	3	4	—	—	—	—	—	3
Jews	Very favorable	1%	2	2	2	5%	3%	3%	3%	4%	2
	Somewhat favorable	16	33	37	39	52	47	44	42	50	47
	Total Favorable	17(41)	35	39	41	57	50	47	45	54	49
	Somewhat unfavorable	20	27	22	24	20	23	24	25	22	24
	Very unfavorable	10	11	14	11	5	7	8	7	7	8
	Total Unfavorable	30	38	36	35	25	30	32	32	29	32
	Don't know	13	27	25	24	18	20	22	23	16	18
Germans	Very favorable	—	1	2	2	7	6	7	8	—	5
	Somewhat favorable	—	29	34	44	65	63	60	60	—	65
	Total Favorable	—	30	36	46	72	69	67	68	—	70
	Somewhat unfavorable	—	34	29	22	13	14	17	15	—	14
	Very unfavorable	—	12	12	8	3	3	3	3	—	3
	Total Unfavorable	—	46	41	30	16	17	20	18	—	17
	Don't know	—	23	24	25	11	14	13	14	—	14
Roma	Very favorable	1	1	—	—	3	1	1	1	2	2
	Somewhat favorable	6	17	18	—	28	26	20	22	34	33
	Total Favorable	7 (31)	18	18	—	31	27	21	23	36	35
	Somewhat unfavorable	33	34	34	—	37	36	41	42	38	40
	Very unfavorable	21	32	35	—	23	27	26	22	15	15
	Total Unfavorable	54	66	69	—	60	63	67	64	53	55
	Don't know	8	16	12	—	10	9	12	12	11	10
Russians	Very favorable	—	—	—	2	3	1	1	1	1	1
	Somewhat favorable	—	—	—	23	37	33	33	27	36	40
	Total Favorable	—	—	—	25	40	34	34	28	37	41
	Somewhat unfavorable	—	—	—	26	39	40	39	42	36	38
	Very unfavorable	—	—	—	20	11	15	11	19	14	12
	Total Unfavorable	—	—	—	46	50	55	50	61	50	50
	Don't know	—	—	—	29	11	11	10	11	14	10
Ukrainians	Very favorable	—	1	1	—	2	1	1	1	1	—
	Somewhat favorable	—	24	21	—	34	31	30	24	28	—
	Total Favorable	—	25	22	—	36	32	31	25	29	—
	Somewhat unfavorable	—	31	32	—	36	37	38	41	37	—
	Very unfavorable	—	20	25	—	11	17	12	20	17	—
	Total Unfavorable	—	51	57	—	47	54	50	61	54	—
	Don't know	—	25	20	—	16	15	15	14	17	—

Office of Research Surveys: 1992-1999; *half sample n=467; **1992 neutral response accepted and noted in parentheses

Table A-68: Czech Opinion of Ethnic Groups

"Please tell me if you have a very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative or very negative feeling about the following groups of people living in [Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic].""**

		1991	s1992	f1992*	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Czechs	Very favorable	56%	54%	54%	63%	—	—	67%	—	63%	58%
	Somewhat favorable	35	39	42	34	—	—	30	—	34	37
	Total Favorable	91(6)	93(6)	96	97	—	—	97	—	97	95
	Somewhat unfavorable	1	1	2	2	—	—	1	—	2	4
	Very unfavorable	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Total Unfavorable	1	1	2	2	—	—	1	—	2	4
	Don't know	—	—	1	2	—	—	2	—	1	1
Slovaks	Very favorable	12	10	13	19	26%	38%	20	27%	30	28
	Somewhat favorable	25	29	47	66	58	52	65	59	57	60
	Total Favorable	37(29)	39(32)	60	85	84	90	85	86	87	88
	Somewhat unfavorable	22	20	32	8	10	6	1	10	11	10
	Very unfavorable	12	8	6	3	4	2	3	3	2	1
	Total Unfavorable	34	28	38	11	14	8	4	13	13	11
	Don't know	1	1	1	4	2	2	2	2	1	1
Roma	Very favorable	—	—	1	1	2	3	1	3	5	5
	Somewhat favorable	—	—	6	7	6	14	10	16	24	25
	Total Favorable	—	—	7	8	8	17	11	19	29	30
	Somewhat unfavorable	—	—	31	35	35	36	40	40	44	45
	Very unfavorable	—	—	58	55	55	44	47	40	27	24
	Total Unfavorable	—	—	89	90	90	80	87	80	71	69
	Don't know	—	—	3	2	2	2	2	2	1	2
Germans	Very favorable	—	—	—	7	7	16	6	14	15	15
	Somewhat favorable	—	—	—	56	55	48	54	56	55	59
	Total Favorable	—	—	—	63	62	64	60	70	70	74
	Somewhat unfavorable	—	—	—	17	25	25	28	20	23	20
	Very unfavorable	—	—	—	4	7	8	8	7	5	4
	Total Unfavorable	—	—	—	21	32	33	36	27	28	24
	Don't know	—	—	—	17	6	4	5	3	3	3
Jews	Very favorable	—	9%	10%	—	13	31	15	23	23	24
	Somewhat favorable	—	30	54	—	57	53	60	61	58	60
	Total Favorable	—	39(45)	64	—	70	84	75	84	81	84
	Somewhat unfavorable	—	6	17	—	15	9	9	6	10	9
	Very unfavorable	—	3	6	—	3	2	2	2	2	2
	Total Unfavorable	—	9	23	—	18	11	11	8	12	11
	Don't know	—	7	12	—	12	6	14	9	7	5

Office of Research Surveys: 1993-1998; *Half sample, n=588; **1991-1992 neutral response accepted and noted in parentheses

Table A-69: West European Opinion of Minority Groups

"Please tell me if you have a very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative or very negative feeling about the following groups of people living in [SURVEY COUNTRY]?"*

		Britain				France				Germany				
		1992	1994	1998	1999	1992	1994	1998	1999	1992**	1994	1998	1999	
Jews	Very positive	8%	—	29%	37%	6%	7%	7%	14%	5%	6%	8%	3%	12%
	Somewhat positive	17	—	49	43	39	65	61	56	17	16	49	29	51
	Total positive	25(58)	—	78	80	45(24)	72	68	70	22(57)	22(59)	57	32	63
	Somewhat negative	9	—	8	8	13	15	16	15	11	13	16	40	15
	Very negative	3	—	3	4	7	5	8	6	6	2	7	12	7
	Total negative	12	—	11	12	20	20	24	21	17	15	23	52	22
	Don't know	4	—	11	7	11	8	8	10	4	4	20	16	14
Roma	Very positive	—	—	12	15	—	3	6	9	—	—	2	2	7
	Somewhat positive	—	—	33	37	—	38	35	33	—	—	19	15	22
	Total positive	—	—	45	52	—	41	41	42	—	—	21	17	29
	Somewhat negative	—	—	29	27	—	35	38	33	—	—	37	41	34
	Very negative	—	—	15	14	—	16	17	17	—	—	25	29	28
	Total negative	—	—	44	41	—	51	55	50	—	—	62	70	62
	Don't know	—	—	11	7	—	9	5	9	—	—	18	13	10
Immigrants***	Very positive	5	6%	13	17	3	4	4	9	5	1	2	9	7
	Somewhat positive	14	39	33	39	24	43	36	45	29	14	36	46	36
	Total positive	19(38)	45	46	56	27(12)	47	40	54	34(53)	15(52)	38	55	43
	Somewhat negative	26	32	33	27	32	31	35	26	10	23	31	22	33
	Very negative	14	16	14	11	20	16	17	11	2	4	11	6	11
	Total negative	40	48	47	38	52	47	52	37	12	27	42	28	44
	Don't know	3	6	8	6	9	7	8	9	1	5	20	18	12
Americans	Very positive	12%	16%	21%	27%	8%	6%	8%	15%	7%	2%	12%	16%	18%
	Somewhat positive	27	57	54	53	49	66	67	60	34	22	67	61	61
	Total positive	39(43)	73	75	80	57(13)	72	75	75	41(46)	24(55)	79	77	79
	Somewhat negative	11	17	13	10	16	22	15	14	10	14	10	12	13
	very negative	4	5	4	5	7	4	4	3	2	2	2	3	3
	Total negative	15	22	17	15	23	26	19	17	12	16	12	15	16
	Don't know	3	5	8	5	7	4	6	8	2	6	10	8	7
Arabs	Very positive	3	5	—	—	3	4	4	9	3	—	4	4	8
	Somewhat positive	10	26	—	—	18	40	29	32	23	5	43	34	44
	Total positive	13(42)	31	—	—	21(13)	44	33	41	26(46)	5(42)	47	38	52
Turks	Somewhat negative	22	31	—	—	29	30	36	34	19	33	24	39	31
[France '94 only]	Very negative	17	24	—	—	29	18	26	19	7	14	12	12	11
North Africans	Total negative	39	55	—	—	58	48	62	53	26	47	36	51	42
	Don't know	6	15	—	—	8	8	6	7	2	6	17	10	7

Office of Research Surveys: 1992-1999; 1994 only "Please tell me if you have a very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative, or very negative feeling about the following groups of people?"; *neutral response accepted and noted in parentheses; **first column is western Germany, second column is eastern Germany, ***in Germany: "Gastarbeiter"

Table A-70: Romanian Views on the Rights of Minority Groups/Hungarians

"The Hungarian minority in Romania is seeking various rights. Which of the following rights do you think they should have?"

		1991	s1992	f1992	1993	1994	1996	1998
The unlimited right to establish organizations and associations to preserve and develop their traditions and culture.	Strongly agree	27%	21%	28%	31%	37%	40%	39%
	Somewhat agree	54	53	53	53	45	35	31
	Total agree	81	74	81	84	82	75	70
	Somewhat disagree	11	13	9	7	8	12	9
	Strongly disagree	3	3	2	3	3	9	17
	Total disagree	14	16	11	10	11	21	26
	Don't know	6	10	9	7	7	4	4
The right to conduct primary and secondary classes in school in their own language.*	Strongly agree	16	16	21	22	26	28	27
	Somewhat agree	41	41	46	47	40	34	24
	Total agree	57	57	67	69	66	62	51
	Somewhat disagree	27	27	20	18	18	14	15
	Strongly disagree	10	7	6	9	10	21	33
	Total disagree	37	34	26	27	28	35	48
	Don't know	6	10	8	4	6	3	2
The right to conduct university classes in their own language.	Strongly agree	—	—	15	14	16	17	19
	Somewhat agree	—	—	19	23	26	23	19
	Total agree	—	—	34	37	42	40	38
	Somewhat disagree	—	—	29	27	26	22	15
	Strongly disagree	—	—	24	26	24	35	45
	Total disagree	—	—	53	53	50	57	60
	Don't know	—	—	13	10	8	4	3
The right to have their own representatives in parliament.	Strongly agree	21	19	28	27	27	36	39
	Somewhat agree	52	48	46	48	49	39	33
	Total agree	73	67	74	75	76	75	72
	Somewhat disagree	15	17	11	12	11	10	9
	Strongly disagree	6	5	5	6	7	11	16
	Total disagree	21	22	16	18	18	21	25
	Don't know	6	11	10	7	7	4	3
The right to have radio and television shows in their own language.	Strongly agree	17	16	23	23	—	35	35
	Somewhat agree	49	45	46	49	—	43	36
	Total agree	66	61	69	72	—	78	71
	Somewhat disagree	22	20	17	15	—	9	10
	Strongly disagree	6	8	6	7	—	11	18
	Total disagree	28	28	23	22	—	20	28
	Don't know	6	11	8	6	—	2	2

Office of Research Surveys: 1991-1998; *1991-1994 "The right to conduct classes in school in their own language."

Table A-71: Slovak Views on the Rights of Minority Groups/Hungarians

"The Hungarian minority in Slovakia is seeking various rights. Which of the following rights do you think they should have?" [1992-1994 "Minority groups in Slovakia are seeking their rights . . ."]

		f1992	f1993		1994	1997
The unlimited right to establish organizations and associations to preserve and develop their traditions and culture.	Strongly agree	27%	34%		28%	22%
	Somewhat agree	42	42		45	36
	Total agree	69	76		73	58
	Somewhat disagree	–	15		18	25
	Strongly disagree	7	6		6	13
	Total disagree	7	21		24	38
	Don't know	3	3		3	5
			(a)	(b)		
The right to conduct classes in school in their own language.*	Strongly agree	20	21	13	17	16
	Somewhat agree	35	38	23	36	32
	Total agree	55	59	36	53	48
	Somewhat disagree	29	25	37	27	28
	Strongly disagree	13	14	24	17	21
	Total disagree	42	39	61	44	49
	Don't know	3	2	3	3	4
The right to conduct university classes in their own language.	Strongly agree	9	9	–	–	–
	Somewhat agree	15	15	–	–	–
	Total agree	24	24	–	–	–
	Somewhat disagree	37	35	–	–	–
	Strongly disagree	37	37	–	–	–
	Total disagree	74	72	–	–	–
	Don't know	3	4	–	–	–
The right to have their own representatives in parliament.	Strongly agree	24	34	21	22	22
	Somewhat agree	50	48	48	46	46
	Total agree	74	82	69	68	68
	Somewhat disagree	15	11	18	18	18
	Strongly disagree	7	5	9	9	9
	Total disagree	22	16	27	27	27
	Don't know	3	3	4	5	5
The right to have radio and television shows in their own language.	Strongly agree	18	19	–	16	16
	Somewhat agree	40	40	–	40	40
	Total agree	58	59	–	56	56
	Somewhat disagree	25	24	–	24	24
	Strongly disagree	13	14	–	15	15
	Total disagree	38	38	–	39	39
	Don't know	3	4	–	4	4

Office of Research Surveys: 1991-1997; *1992: The right to education in their native language in elementary and secondary school; 1993: (a) The right to conduct classes in their native language at elementary schools. (b) The right to conduct classes in their native language at secondary schools.

Table A-72: Bulgarian Views on the Rights of Turks

"The Turkish minority in Bulgaria is seeking various rights. Which of the following rights do you think they should have?" [1991-1994 "Minority groups in Bulgaria are seeking their rights . . ."]

		1991	1992	1993	1993	1994	1996	1997	1998	1999
The unlimited right to establish organizations and associations to preserve and develop their traditions and culture.	Strongly agree	39%	39%	29%	31%	25%	22%	27%	24%	32%
	Somewhat agree	23	24	29	29	35	33	34	31	28
	Total agree	62	63	58	60	60	55	61	55	60
	Somewhat disagree	14	9	13	12	16	14	15	18	14
	Strongly disagree	19	18	17	18	16	25	18	20	19
	Total disagree	33	27	30	30	32	39	33	38	33
	Don't know	5	11	12	10	10	6	6	7	7
The right to conduct primary and secondary classes in school in their own language.*	Strongly agree	15	19	16	18	12	8	10	10	11
	Somewhat agree	10	12	14	16	14	10	12	10	14
	Total agree	25	31	30	34	26	18	22	20	25
	Somewhat disagree	23	16	19	17	26	18	20	21	22
	Strongly disagree	48	44	41	41	39	59	54	54	47
	Total disagree	71	60	60	58	65	77	74	75	69
	Don't know	4	10	10	8	10	5	5	6	6
The right to conduct university classes in their own language.	Strongly agree	—	—	—	—	—	6	7	7	6
	Somewhat agree	—	—	—	—	—	5	6	5	7
	Total agree	—	—	—	—	—	11	13	12	13
	Somewhat disagree	—	—	—	—	—	15	17	17	19
	Strongly disagree	—	—	—	—	—	67	63	64	61
	Total disagree	—	—	—	—	—	82	80	81	80
	Don't know	—	—	—	—	—	7	7	7	7
The right to have their own representatives in parliament.	Strongly agree	29	34	27	24	18	24	28	29	34
	Somewhat agree	17	19	25	29	32	33	30	32	35
	Total agree	46	53	52	53	50	57	58	61	69
	Somewhat disagree	21	10	16	13	19	13	13	13	10
	Strongly disagree	28	26	22	24	23	23	22	20	16
	Total disagree	49	36	38	37	42	36	35	33	26
	Don't know	5	10	10	11	8	6	7	7	5
The right to have radio and television shows in their own language.	Strongly agree	—	—	17	14	12	—	—	—	—
	Somewhat agree	—	—	15	14	18	—	—	—	—
	Total agree	—	—	32	28	30	—	—	—	—
	Somewhat disagree	—	—	15	14	20	—	—	—	—
	Strongly disagree	—	—	42	48	39	—	—	—	—
	Total disagree	—	—	57	62	59	—	—	—	—
	Don't know	—	—	11	10	12	—	—	—	—

Office of Research Surveys: 1991-1999; *1991-1994: The right to conduct classes in school in their own language.

Table A-73: Polish Views on the Rights of Minorities

"Minority groups in Poland are seeking their rights. Which of the following rights do you think they should have?"

		1991	1992	s1993	f1993
The unlimited right to establish organizations and associations to preserve and develop their traditions and culture.	Strongly agree	24%	25%	18%	23%
	Somewhat agree	48	39	41	45
	Total agree	72	64	59	68
	Somewhat disagree	18	20	24	19
	Strongly disagree	6	7	8	8
	Total disagree	24	27	32	27
	Don't know	4	9	9	6
The right to conduct primary and secondary classes in school in their own language.*	Strongly agree	28	23	23	25
	Somewhat agree	50	48	47	47
	Total agree	78	71	70	72
	Somewhat disagree	14	15	17	17
	Strongly disagree	4	6	6	6
	Total disagree	18	21	23	23
	Don't know	4	8	7	6
The right to have their own representatives in parliament.	Strongly agree	18	18	18	22
	Somewhat agree	39	43	42	43
	Total agree	57	61	60	65
	Somewhat disagree	26	17	20	18
	Strongly disagree	10	11	10	10
	Total disagree	36	28	30	28
	Don't know	7	11	11	8
The right to have radio and television programs in their own language.	Strongly agree	—	—	19	—
	Somewhat agree	—	—	44	—
	Total agree	—	—	63	—
	Somewhat disagree	—	—	20	—
	Strongly disagree	—	—	8	—
	Total disagree	—	—	28	—
	Don't know	—	—	9	—

Office of Research Surveys: 1991-1999; *1991-1994: The right to conduct classes in school in their own language.

Table A-74: Hungarian Views on the Rights of Minorities

"Minority groups in Hungary are seeking their rights. Tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with giving minority groups?"

		1992	1993	1994
The unlimited right to establish organizations and associations to preserve and develop their traditions and culture.	Strongly agree	58%	51%	47%
	Somewhat agree	30	33	37
	Total agree	88	84	84
	Somewhat disagree	7	9	8
	Strongly disagree	2	2	4
	Total disagree	9	11	12
	Don't know	3	5	6
The right to conduct classes in school in their own language.*	Strongly agree	68	62	55
	Somewhat agree	26	29	35
	Total agree	94	91	90
	Somewhat disagree	3	4	4
	Strongly disagree	1	1	2
	Total disagree	4	5	6
	Don't know	1	3	4
The right to have their own representatives in parliament.	Strongly agree	59	48	46
	Somewhat agree	29	33	34
	Total agree	88	81	80
	Somewhat disagree	7	10	9
	Strongly disagree	2	3	5
	Total disagree	9	13	14
	Don't know	3	5	4

Office of Research Surveys: 1992-1994; *1991-1994: The right to conduct classes in school in their own language.

Table A-75: Czech Views on the Rights of Minorities

"Minority groups in the Czech Republic are seeking their rights. Tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with giving minority groups?"

		1992	1993	1994
The unlimited right to establish organizations and associations to preserve and develop their traditions and culture.	Strongly agree	31%	29%	29%
	Somewhat agree	47	47	44
	Total agree	78	76	73
	Somewhat disagree	14	18	18
	Strongly disagree	2	4	6
	Total disagree	16	22	24
	Don't know	5	2	3
			(a)	(b)
The right to conduct classes in school in their own language.	Strongly agree	19	18	8
	Somewhat agree	39	36	24
	Total agree	58	54	32
	Somewhat disagree	28	30	43
	Strongly disagree	10	14	21
	Total disagree	38	44	64
	Don't know	4	3	4
The right to conduct university classes in their own language.	Strongly agree	8	6	—
	Somewhat agree	23	16	—
	Total agree	31	22	—
	Somewhat disagree	41	42	—
	Strongly disagree	23	31	—
	Total disagree	64	73	—
	Don't know	5	5	—
The right to have their own representatives in parliament.	Strongly agree	30	23	23
	Somewhat agree	49	52	49
	Total agree	79	75	72
	Somewhat disagree	12	14	17
	Strongly disagree	5	7	8
	Total disagree	17	21	25
	Don't know	4	4	3
The right to have radio and television programs in their own language.	Strongly agree	15	12	—
	Somewhat agree	41	36	—
	Total agree	56	48	—
	Somewhat disagree	27	31	—
	Strongly disagree	12	16	—
	Total disagree	39	47	—
	Don't know	6	5	—

Office of Research Surveys: 1991-1999; (a) in elementary school, (b) in secondary school.

Table A-76: West European Views on the Rights of Minority Groups

"Minority groups in [Survey Country] are seeking their rights. Tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with giving minority groups..."

		Britain	France	Germany*	
The unlimited right to establish organizations and form associations preserving and developing their traditions and culture.	Strongly agree	9%	16%	26%	28%
	Somewhat agree	29	34	37	33
	Total agree	38	50	63	61
	Somewhat disagree	24	20	20	23
	Strongly disagree	32	27	13	13
	Total disagree	56	47	33	36
		Don't know	5	3	4
The right to conduct school classes in their own language.	Strongly agree	9	12	22	30
	Somewhat agree	28	27	35	35
	Total agree	37	39	57	65
	Somewhat disagree	21	22	26	19
	Strongly disagree	38	36	14	14
	Total disagree	59	58	40	33
		Don't know	4	3	2
The right to have their own political organizations.	Strongly agree	8	6	7	10
	Somewhat agree	22	12	17	25
	Total agree	30	18	24	35
	Somewhat disagree	19	22	32	30
	Strongly disagree	47	56	41	30
	Total disagree	66	78	73	60
		Don't know	4	3	5

Office of Research Surveys: 1992; *first column is western Germany, second column is eastern Germany

Table A-77: Global Issues

"From the following list of issues, please tell me which you think is most important for world leaders to address?"

	Britain	France	Germany	Italy
Unemployment	24%	57%	53%	55%
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	23	12	14	11
Instability in world financial markets	8	5	5	6
Narcotics and drug trade	17	7	6	6
Environmental pollution	14	7	7	11
Terrorism	10	5	6	6
AIDS	1	5	2	5
Other (<i>volunteered</i>)	2	2	4	1

Office of Research Surveys: 1999

Table A-78: Fear of Attack

"How concerned are you that another country might attack our country, are you very concerned, somewhat concerned, not very concerned or not at all concerned?"

		1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria	Concerned	41%	38%	34%	36%	47%	34%	24%	31%	41%
	Not concerned	46	51	49	49	47	60	69	63	53
	Don't know	13	11	17	15	6	6	7	6	6
Czech Rep.	Concerned	23	25	27	25	31	21	17	17	39
	Not concerned	73	71	70	72	66	76	80	80	59
	Don't know	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	2
Hungary	Concerned	31	42	41	26	41	36	21	19	42
	Not concerned	65	56	56	71	58	61	77	79	57
	Don't know	4	2	3	4	1	3	2	2	1
Poland	Concerned	61	69	62	41	45	33	30	34	39
	Not concerned	33	27	33	50	49	61	66	61	57
	Don't know	6	4	4	9	6	7	4	5	4
Romania*	Concerned	34	42	38	33	—	46	40	43	57
	Not concerned	49	34	38	50	—	47	57	54	40
	Don't know	17	24	24	17	—	7	3	2	2
Slovakia	Concerned	34	34	34	29	33	27	25	—	47
	Not concerned	61	63	62	67	63	67	71	—	50
	Don't know	4	3	5	4	4	5	4	—	3

Office of Research Surveys: 1991-1999; * From 1991 through 1994, Romanians were asked whether they thought an attack was very likely, likely, not very likely or not at all likely.

Table A-79: Confidence in NATO

"Now I would like to ask you about some institutions and organizations. Please tell me how much confidence you have in the following institutions and organizations [*added after 1997*: to deal effectively with European problems]. Do you have a great deal, a fair amount, not very much or no confidence at all in NATO [*added after 1997*: to deal effectively with European problems]?"

		s1990	f1990	s1991	f1991	s1992	f1992	s1993	f1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria*	Confident	-	22%	23%	43%	31%	-	30%	24%	33%	27%	28%	42%	44%	32%
	Not confident	-	15	14	42	23	-	29	40	41	49	44	37	39	54
	Don't know	-	53	52	15	46	-	41	36	27	24	28	22	17	14
Czech Rep.	Confident	19%	-	44	38	45	42%	-	49	56	-	43	50	61	53
	Not confident	45	-	23	35	26	34	-	28	29	-	43	40	35	45
	Don't know	36	-	33	27	29	24	-	23	15	-	14	11	4	3
Hungary	Confident	-	-	-	32	39	32	-	61	49	-	52	59	74	73
	Not confident	-	-	-	31	24	31	-	23	21	-	32	34	22	21
	Don't know	-	-	-	37	37	37	-	17	29	-	16	7	4	5
Poland	Confident	17	21	40	39	32	-	38	49	57	-	55	60	69	72
	Not confident	46	36	33	35	37	-	32	33	27	-	22	25	15	20
	Don't know	37	43	27	26	31	-	30	19	16	-	23	15	15	8
Romania	Confident	23	35	-	37	37	27	43	-	55	-	51	57	49	36
	Not confident	25	30	-	24	23	20	18	-	15	-	28	35	39	52
	Don't know	52	35	-	39	39	53	39	-	30	-	21	8	12	12
Slovakia	Confident	14	-	28	24	29	29	-	39	48	-	37	40	45	28
	Not confident	47	-	35	45	39	43	-	37	34	-	42	49	46	68
	Don't know	39	-	37	31	31	29	-	24	18	-	21	11	9	4

Office of Research Surveys: 1990-1999; *In the Fall 1990 and Spring 1991 surveys, Bulgarians were given three response options: (1) yes, have confidence; (2) no, do not have confidence or (3) in some cases yes, in other cases no. For the sake of comparability, percentages for the third option are not reported, but may be calculated.

Table A-80: Confidence in the EU

"Now I would like to ask you about some institutions and organizations. Please tell me how much confidence you have in the following institutions and organizations [*added after 1997*: to deal effectively with European problems]. Do you have a great deal, a fair amount, not very much or no confidence at all in the European Union [*added after 1997*: to deal effectively with European problems]?"

		s1991	f1991	s1992	f1992	s1993	f1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria	Confident	41%	58%	43%	-	38%	29%	40%	41%	40%	60%	69%	55%
	Not confident	5	29	15	-	23	34	33	35	35	20	17	26
	Don't know	45	13	42	-	39	37	27	25	25	20	14	19
Czech Rep.	Confident	65	54	58	54%	-	54	59	-	53	54	68	58
	Not confident	12	24	17	28	-	26	23	-	31	34	28	38
	Don't know	23	22	25	19	-	20	18	-	16	12	4	4
Hungary	Confident	-	48	56	51	-	69	53	-	62	65	81	76
	Not confident	-	21	17	23	-	17	19	-	20	26	15	15
	Don't know	-	31	27	26	-	14	29	-	18	8	4	8
Poland	Confident	52	51	38	-	41	49	47	-	55	55	63	60
	Not confident	26	30	36	-	30	34	33	-	22	27	21	29
	Don't know	22	19	26	-	29	16	19	-	23	18	16	10
Romania	Confident	-	51	44	33	48	-	57	-	56	60	57	48
	Not confident	-	11	20	20	17	-	13	-	24	30	29	35
	Don't know	-	38	35	48	35	-	30	-	20	10	14	17
Slovakia	Confident	44	37	43	41	-	49	51	-	57	64	65	55
	Not confident	26	37	31	35	-	29	29	-	24	27	28	41
	Don't know	30	27	26	23	-	21	19	-	19	9	7	5

Office of Research Surveys: 1991-1999; *In the Spring 1991 survey, Bulgarians were given three response options: (1) yes, have confidence; (2) no, do not have confidence or (3) in some cases yes, in other cases no. For the sake of comparability, percentages for the third option are not reported, but may be calculated.

Table A-81: Confidence in the OSCE

"Now I would like to ask you about some institutions and organizations. Please tell me how much confidence you have in the following institutions and organizations [*added after 1997*: to deal effectively with European problems]. Do you have a great deal, a fair amount, not very much or no confidence at all in the OSCE [*added after 1997*: to deal effectively with European problems]?"

		s1991	f1991	s1992	f1992	s1993	f1993	1994	1996	1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria	Confident	29%	59%	41%	—	32%	25%	35%	—	50%	48%	46%
	Not confident	3	26	12	—	19	29	33	—	18	21	26
	Don't know	62	15	47	—	49	46	32	—	32	30	29
Czech Rep.	Confident	63	55	57	54%	—	49	50	48%	47	56	55
	Not confident	11	21	16	26	—	26	27	30	35	32	34
	Don't know	26	24	28	20	—	25	22	22	17	12	11
Hungary	Confident	—	43	49	44	—	59	53	52	38	72	55
	Not confident	—	18	15	22	—	16	11	23	25	22	23
	Don't know	—	39	35	34	—	25	36	25	37	6	21
Poland	Confident	51	47	38	—	41	44	42	43	45	53	58
	Not confident	19	24	30	—	24	29	27	21	24	15	18
	Don't know	30	29	33	—	35	27	31	36	31	31	24
Romania	Confident	—	43	43	27	41	—	54	—	53	46	37
	Not confident	—	9	17	16	15	—	12	—	29	29	34
	Don't know	—	48	41	57	43	—	33	—	18	25	29
Slovakia	Confident	49	42	47	45	—	49	51	54	61	55	48
	Not confident	20	31	27	31	—	28	28	24	26	30	43
	Don't know	31	26	27	24	—	23	21	22	13	15	9

Office of Research Surveys: 1991-1999; *In the Spring 1991 survey, Bulgarians were given three response options: (1) yes, have confidence; (2) no, do not have confidence or (3) in some cases yes, in other cases no. For the sake of comparability, percentages for the third option are not reported, but may be calculated.

Table A-82: Confidence in the UN

"Now I would like to ask you about some institutions and organizations. Please tell me how much confidence you have in the following institutions and organizations [*added after 1997: to deal effectively with European problems*]. Do you have a great deal, a fair amount, not very much or no confidence at all in the United Nations [*added after 1997: to deal effectively with European problems*]?"

		s1993	f1993	1994	1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria	Confident	40%	34%	43%	53%	56%	51%
	Not confident	23	30	31	21	25	30
	Don't know	37	36	26	26	19	19
Czech Rep.	Confident	—	56	63	52	63	61
	Not confident	—	26	25	35	31	33
	Don't know	—	18	12	13	7	6
Hungary	Confident	—	68	58	57	70	67
	Not confident	—	19	15	29	26	22
	Don't know	—	14	26	14	4	10
Poland	Confident	55	61	65	59	68	74
	Not confident	19	25	19	21	13	13
	Don't know	25	14	16	21	19	13
Romania	Confident	55	—	59	65	60+	45
	Not confident	16	—	14	25	25	36
	Don't know	29	—	27	11	16	19
Slovakia	Confident	—	54	59	61	60	49
	Not confident	—	26	26	27	29	45
	Don't know	—	20	15	12	11	7

Office of Research Surveys: 1991-1999

Table A-83: Support for Basic NATO Responsibilities (NATO member states)

"If we join NATO there are certain things we may be asked to do. Please tell me if you would strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose the following:"

	Czech Republic			Hungary			Poland			
	1995	1996	1997	1995	1996	1997	1995	1996	1997	1998
The stationing NATO troops in our country										
Strongly Support	7%	5%	8%	11%	12%	11%	18%	15%	20%	15%
Somewhat Support	23	26	25	23	32	32	35	40	37	41
Somewhat Oppose	31	31	35	24	25	25	24	21	23	22
Strongly Oppose	32	32	28	35	24	27	21	13	15	13
Don't Know	7	5	5	7	7	4	2	10	10	9
Sending our troops to defend another NATO country										
Strongly Support	10	10	17	7	6	12	16	15	25	22
Somewhat Support	32	35	38	19	26	28	32	40	41	43
Somewhat Oppose	25	25	27	27	22	27	28	19	16	18
Strongly Oppose	25	23	13	42	38	29	21	16	8	9
Don't Know	8	7	5	5	7	4	2	8	8	8
Regular, routine exercises by NATO forces in our country										
Strongly Support	6	5	14	6	6	10	18	10	24	20
Somewhat Support	27	29	36	22	20	34	34	35	43	43
Somewhat Oppose	28	30	30	29	26	25	25	24	18	19
Strongly Oppose	32	31	16	38	41	27	22	21	7	9
Don't Know	7	5	5	6	7	3	2	10	9	8
Regular, routine overflights by NATO aircraft over our country										
Strongly Support	5	5	10	9	7	16	25	9	17	14
Somewhat Support	21	25	28	26	29	35	37	32	36	36
Somewhat Oppose	31	28	33	24	23	22	19	24	24	28
Strongly Oppose	36	35	24	34	34	24	17	23	13	14
Don't Know	7	6	5	6	7	4	2	11	10	8
Sending our troops on NATO peacekeeping missions										
Strongly Support	-	-	20	-	-	16	24	-	-	27
Somewhat Support	-	-	41	-	-	36	37	-	-	45
Somewhat Oppose	-	-	21	-	-	21	19	-	-	11
Strongly Oppose	-	-	12	-	-	23	18	-	-	8
Don't Know	-	-	6	-	-	3	2	-	-	9

Table A-84: Support for Basic NATO Responsibilities (non-NATO member states)

"If we join NATO there are certain things we may be asked to do. Please tell me if you would strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose the following:"

		Bulgaria			Romania			Slovakia		
		1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	1996	1997	1998	1999
<i>Stationing NATO troops in our country</i>										
Strongly Support	6%	—	—	9%	14	13	16%	20%	9%	8%
Somewhat Support	16	—	15	15	14	13	18	27	18	13
Somewhat Oppose	19	—	24	24	23	20	24	21	27	20
Strongly Oppose	47	—	38	38	42	53	32	26	38	53
Don't Know	12	—	14	14	13	8	10	6	8	7
<i>Sending our troops to defend another NATO country</i>										
Strongly Support	8	10%	15	16	16	9	25	26	13	9
Somewhat Support	18	24	26	25	25	20	26	32	26	14
Somewhat Oppose	16	20	21	22	22	19	18	18	26	23
Strongly Oppose	45	25	26	26	26	45	22	20	30	49
Don't Know	13	12	13	12	12	8	10	4	5	6
<i>Sending our troops on NATO peacekeeping missions</i>										
Strongly Support	—	—	19	18	11	11	—	30	17	15
Somewhat Support	—	—	27	26	19	19	—	35	36	23
Somewhat Oppose	—	—	17	19	17	17	—	15	21	18
Strongly Oppose	—	—	23	24	43	43	—	16	19	37
Don't Know	—	—	15	12	9	9	—	4	7	6
<i>Regular, routine exercises by NATO forces in our country</i>										
Strongly Support	7	6	17	16	13	13	17	25	14	11
Somewhat Support	20	21	27	24	20	20	24	35	36	21
Somewhat Oppose	15	20	20	22	17	17	20	17	25	21
Strongly Oppose	44	38	22	26	42	42	29	18	19	41
Don't Know	14	14	14	12	8	8	11	5	8	7
<i>Regular, routine overflights by NATO aircraft over our country</i>										
Strongly Support	8	6	—	12	11	11	17	22	9	9
Somewhat Support	15	23	—	20	19	19	24	32	23	17
Somewhat Oppose	16	20	—	25	19	19	20	21	28	21
Strongly Oppose	46	38	—	30	43	43	28	20	31	47
Don't Know	15	14	—	13	8	8	11	5	8	6

Office of Research Surveys: 1995-1999; *This question was not asked prior to 1997.

Table A-85: EU Membership

"If [Survey Country] had the opportunity to become a full member of the European Union, would you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose it?"

		1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria*	Strongly support	50%	52%	58%	59%	52%
	Somewhat support	25	26	21	23	26
	Somewhat oppose	4	4	3	4	4
	Strongly Oppose	1	2	2	2	4
	Don't know	20	16	17	12	15
Czech Rep.	Strongly support	29	23	29	39	30
	Somewhat support	43	43	41	43	41
	Somewhat oppose	11	11	14	10	16
	Strongly Oppose	2	4	5	2	5
	Don't know	15	19	11	5	7
Hungary	Strongly support	35	30	43	49	38
	Somewhat support	43	42	35	37	40
	Somewhat oppose	7	7	8	6	9
	Strongly Oppose	3	3	5	4	5
	Don't know	12	16	10	4	7
Poland	Strongly support	38	30	38	32	24
	Somewhat support	43	44	40	45	40
	Somewhat oppose	5	7	6	9	18
	Strongly Oppose	1	2	3	4	7
	Don't know	13	17	13	10	11
Romania	Strongly support	—	61	61	65	48
	Somewhat support	—	23	28	25	33
	Somewhat oppose	—	2	3	2	5
	Strongly Oppose	—	1	1	2	3
	Don't know	—	13	7	6	11
Slovakia	Strongly support	32	33	45	43	29
	Somewhat support	47	37	36	38	43
	Somewhat oppose	7	7	9	7	16
	Strongly Oppose	2	2	2	4	6
	Don't know	12	20	8	7	7

Office of Research Surveys: 1990-1999; * For 1997: "If Bulgaria had the opportunity to become a member of the European Union within the next five years..."

Table A-86: Opinion of the United States

"Do you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the United States?"

	s1990	f1990	s1991	f1991	s1992	f1992	s1993	f1993	s1994	f1994	s1995	f1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria																
Very unfavorable	-	58%	-	42%	51%	32%	-	29%	23%	19%	16%	-	21%	27%	28%	22%
Somewhat favorable	-	17	31	30	43	-	-	45	49	51	53	-	54	52	48	45
Somewhat unfavorable	-	2	3	4	5	-	-	7	12	6	13	-	12	10	13	18
Very unfavorable	-	1	2	1	2	-	-	2	4	3	4	-	3	3	4	7
Don't know	-	23	22	14	18	-	-	17	12	14	15	-	10	8	7	8
Czech Republic																
Very favorable	32%	-	39	34	26	24%	-	19	-	24	-	19%	14	21	20	18
Somewhat favorable	39	-	48	53	62	63	-	66	-	58	-	60	64	61	63	61
Somewhat unfavorable	4	-	5	8	8	8	-	10	-	11	-	16	16	11	13	16
Very unfavorable	1	-	1	1	1	1	-	1	-	3	-	4	3	3	2	3
Don't know	23	-	6	4	3	4	-	3	-	4	-	2	3	4	2	2
Hungary																
Very favorable	29	-	-	46	27	23	-	26	27	-	-	21	15	29	31	28
Somewhat favorable	52	-	-	37	49	60	-	58	52	-	-	54	62	55	54	55
Somewhat unfavorable	6	-	-	6	10	6	-	6	10	-	-	14	11	8	9	9
Very unfavorable	1	-	-	1	2	-	-	1	2	-	-	3	4	3	3	3
Don't know	12	-	-	10	12	11	-	8	10	-	-	8	9	5	3	5
Poland																
Very favorable	31	32	40	33	21	-	-	21	16	13	-	11	15	23	22	22
Somewhat favorable	53	56	49	56	63	-	-	62	65	71	-	67	65	64	64	63
Somewhat unfavorable	2	-	5	4	8	-	-	6	8	9	-	12	11	5	5	7
Very unfavorable	1	2	-	1	1	-	-	1	2	2	-	2	1	1	1	2
Don't know	13	10	6	6	7	-	-	10	10	7	-	8	9	7	8	6
Romania																
Very favorable	28	28	-	30	19	23	-	24	-	25	-	-	30	37	33	24
Somewhat favorable	51	60	-	51	57	50	-	56	-	55	-	-	59	55	56	55
Somewhat unfavorable	6	6	-	8	8	7	-	6	-	5	-	-	4	4	5	11
Very unfavorable	1	1	-	1	1	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	1	1	1	5
Don't know	14	4	-	10	15	18	-	12	-	14	-	-	6	2	5	6
Slovakia																
Very favorable	31	-	32	28	21	21	-	-	20	-	19	-	19	18	-	8
Somewhat favorable	44	-	53	58	61	61	-	-	63	-	63	-	59	59	-	50
Somewhat unfavorable	3	-	7	8	12	12	-	-	10	-	12	-	14	16	-	30
Very unfavorable	1	-	1	1	1	2	-	-	3	-	3	-	3	3	-	10
Don't know	21	-	7	5	4	4	-	-	4	-	5	-	5	3	-	3

Office of Research Surveys: 1990-1999

Table A-87: Opinion of Russia

"Do you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Russia (1990-1991: the Soviet Union)?"

	s1990	f1990	s1991	f1991	s1992	f1992	s1993	f1993	s1994	f1994	s1995	f1995	s1996	f1996	s1997	f1997	s1998	f1998	s1999	f1999
Bulgaria																				
		Very favorable	-	17%	39%	31%	-	33%	24%	22%	24%	33%	-	34%	35%	45%	34%			
		Somewhat favorable	-	27	38	43	-	45	55	54	57	52	-	52	55	42	52			
		Somewhat unfavorable	-	21	8	11	-	9	10	8	9	6	-	7	5	7	7			
		Very unfavorable	-	14	4	3	-	3	4	3	2	2	-	1	1	2	2			
Czech Republic		Don't know	-	22	10	12	-	11	7	13	8	6	-	6	4	4	5			
		Very favorable	6%	-	4	3	2	-	2	-	4	-	3%	2	5	3	4			
		Somewhat favorable	19	-	23	35	35	-	25	-	35	-	31	31	41	35	33			
		Somewhat unfavorable	23	-	44	45	42	-	47	-	41	-	46	48	40	48	46			
		Very unfavorable	14	-	21	13	16	-	23	-	15	-	17	17	12	12	16			
Hungary		Don't know	38	-	8	4	4	-	3	4	-	3	2	2	2	3	2			
		Very favorable	2	-	2	2	-	3	2	-	-	-	2	2	2	3	3			
		Somewhat favorable	28	-	12	26	29	-	26	27	-	-	17	22	30	27	22			
		Somewhat unfavorable	41	-	37	31	39	-	49	46	-	-	46	49	47	46	48			
		Very unfavorable	19	-	39	22	16	-	14	15	-	-	27	19	16	20	22			
Poland		Don't know	11	-	10	18	15	-	9	10	-	-	9	8	5	3	5			
		Very favorable	2	1	1	1	-	2	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	1	1			
		Somewhat favorable	22	20	15	28	-	27	21	19	-	23	22	25	24	25	24			
		Somewhat unfavorable	36	21	45	43	-	53	49	55	-	51	53	50	49	53	51			
		Very unfavorable	22	41	32	24	17	-	11	22	20	19	20	15	18	15	17			
Romania		Don't know	19	17	7	12	-	8	8	6	-	7	5	9	7	7	6			
		Very favorable	6	6	-	3	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2	3	2	2			
		Somewhat favorable	52	50	-	47	-	-	28	-	33	-	-	37	35	29	32			
		Somewhat unfavorable	21	30	-	32	-	-	48	-	36	-	-	41	47	48	45			
		Very unfavorable	6	7	-	5	16	-	9	-	11	-	-	11	12	15	13			
Slovakia		Don't know	16	7	-	13	-	-	14	-	20	-	-	8	3	6	8			
		Very favorable	5	-	4	9	5	-	6	-	7	4	-	5	4	-	4			
		Somewhat favorable	22	-	33	49	39	-	44	-	55	39	-	34	44	-	48			
		Somewhat unfavorable	23	-	37	28	38	-	36	-	27	40	-	43	37	-	36			
		Very unfavorable	11	-	18	8	12	-	11	-	7	15	-	13	11	-	9			
	Don't know	39	-	9	6	6	4	-	3	3	3	-	4	3	-	2				

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Table A-88: U.S. Influence on Domestic Affairs

"The U.S. has too much influence over our country's affairs." Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree?

		1991	s1992	f1992	s1993	f1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Bulgaria	Agree	33%	—	34%	38%	45%	44%	41%	43%	52%	55%	61%
	Disagree	39	—	35	36	31	29	37	37	30	30	22
	Don't know	27	—	31	26	23	27	22	20	18	15	17
Czech Rep.	Agree	33	34	34	—	43	52	51	51	44	47	57
	Disagree	57	54	57	—	51	43	42	42	49	48	38
	Don't know	10	12	9	—	7	5	7	7	6	5	5
Hungary	Agree	—	25	26	—	23	39	39	37	41	44	52
	Disagree	—	60	61	—	62	46	49	50	50	51	37
	Don't know	—	14	13	—	15	14	12	13	9	5	10
Poland	Agree	37	34	—	44	48	43	38	46	38	39	48
	Disagree	45	51	—	40	38	38	49	39	51	48	39
	Don't know	18	16	—	16	14	19	14	15	11	13	12
Romania	Agree	29	18	23	21	—	35	—	42	47	50	46
	Disagree	44	46	42	44	—	45	—	43	46	35	40
	Don't know	26	35	35	35	—	20	—	15	6	15	13
Slovakia	Agree	43	47	43	—	44	48	40	45	45	46	63
	Disagree	44	39	47	—	45	43	50	42	46	45	32
	Don't know	13	14	10	—	11	8	10	14	9	9	5

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Table A-89: Russia Aggressive by Nature

"Please tell me which of the following statements comes closer to your point of view:"

	Bulgaria	Czech Rep.	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
Russia is aggressive by nature. It will just be a matter of time before Russia regains its strength and tries to use its military aggressively.	14%	30%	29%	44%	35%	20%
Russia is not necessarily aggressive by nature. If democracy succeeds there it is likely that Russia will behave peacefully.	68	60	63	44	54	67
Don't know	19	10	8	12	10	14

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**Office of Research
Department of State
SA-44, Room 352
301 Fourth Street, S.W.
Washington, DC 20547
(202) 619-4965**